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Abstract
Trust is a concept that has been used in computing to support better decision making. For
example, trust can be used in access control. Trust can also be used to support service
selection. Although certain elements of trust such as reputation has gained widespread
acceptance, a general model of trust has so far not seen widespread usage. This is due to
the challenges of implementing a general trust model. In this thesis, a middleware based
approach is proposed to address the implementation challenges.
The thesis proposes a general trust model known as computational trust.
Computational trust is based on research in social psychology. An individual’s
computational trust is formed with the support of the proposed computational trust
architecture. The architecture consists of a middleware and middleware clients. The
middleware can be viewed as a representation of the individual that shares its knowledge
with all the middleware clients. Each application uses its own middleware client to form
computational trust for its decision making needs. Computational trust formation can be
adapted to changing circumstances. The thesis also proposed algorithms for
computational trust formation. Experiments, evaluations and scenarios are also presented
to demonstrate the feasibility of the middleware based approach to computational trust
formation.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Decision making is about trying to make the best possible selection from a set of
available choices. Decisions in real life are often made through satisficing (i.e., trying to
make a good enough selection) as opposed to aiming for the optimal solution [119]. This
is due to the fact that human beings are cognitive misers [42] that take advantage of
mental shortcuts (cognitive heuristics) when faced with complex decisions. Note that the
taking of these mental shortcuts is usually not out of laziness but due to the limited
capacity of human beings to process uncertainty and incomplete information [42]. As a
result, when faced with complex decisions, trust is often used as a mental shortcut for
complexity reduction. This is by eliminating choices that are not trusted from
consideration. Trust can be thought of as an alternative to rational prediction [75].
This chapter is organized as follow. The chapter starts with a discussion of the
current use of trust in computing. This is followed by an introduction to computational
trust. Two scenarios are provided as illustration of the use of computational trust in
computing. The chapter ends with a discussion of the challenges to calculating
computational trust and how this thesis contributes towards addressing these challenges.

1.1 Current Use of Trust in Computing
In computing, trust has its roots in computer security. Authentication and authorization
are concepts commonly associated with trust [50]. In this thesis, this type of trust is
known as access trust. The goal of access trust is to restrict access so as to protect
computing resources from harm. One could think of an authorized user as a user that is
trusted by the computing resource owner. The more a user is trusted, the more likely it
would be afforded more rights.
A common form of access trust is identity-based trust. Trust is determined from
the identity of the user (e.g. username and password). A weakness of identity-based trust
is its assumption that identity is a trust predictor. This may be a valid assumption in
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closed environments such as a corporate LAN where all the LAN participants have been
vetted (i.e., being hired by human resources) beforehand. This is not a valid assumption
in open environments such as the Internet. On the Internet, most of the users are strangers
to each other. Knowing the identity of the stranger (if it is even available) is not sufficient
in determining how much the stranger can be trusted.
In [16], the authors proposed that trust should be resolved without the use of
identity. The paper introduced the term trust management as “a unified approach to
specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials and relationships that allow
direct authorization of security-critical actions” [16]. This view of trust is sometimes
known as rule-based trust or policy-based trust. Several well-known trust management
systems include PolicyMaker [16], KeyNote [15] and REFEREE [28]. In a trust
management system, rules or policies are used to define the conditions in which rights are
to be granted. This is usually based on the presence of digital certificates (credentials).
An example is to only grant access to university computing resources if the user has a
certificate proving that the user is a student of the university. More recently, this view of
trust has been used to provide security for web services through WS-Security [97] and
WS-Trust [96].
In [50] and [40], the authors identified a number of weaknesses to trust
management. The weaknesses include:


A trust management system is a binary yes/no system where a user is either
trusted or not trusted. Trust in everyday social life however is much more
complex. For example, John may trust both Alice and Bob but between the two,
John may trust Alice more than Bob. Such trust dynamics are not represented in
trust management systems.



In trust management, certificate issuers are unconditionally trusted. If a university
issues a certificate stating that a user is a student, it is automatically assumed that
this is indeed the case. This is an unrealistic assumption. There may be a conflict
of interest or factors such as money or even carelessness that could result in the
publishing of inaccurate certificates.
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Trust is not static and may change over time. For example, good experiences from
using a service may increase trust in the service while bad experiences do the
opposite. Instead of updating trust immediately based on a trustee’s change in
behavior, a trust management system needs to wait for certificates to make any
trust changes. As a result, the trust management system is completely dependent
on the pace at which certificate issues updates and distributes certificates.

To address the weaknesses of trust management, a more general model of trust is needed.
In this thesis, this general model of trust is known as computational trust.

1.2 Computational Trust
The first part of this section covers the research that forms the foundation of
computational trust. Next, a definition for computational trust is proposed. This is
followed by discussion on the properties of computational trust and the different
dimensions of computational trust. Finally, computational trust formation is explained.

1.2.1

Foundational Research

Many different disciplines have studied the concept of trust. In biology, research has
shown that the hormone Oxytocin [70] when administered can increase trust among
humans. In [17], the author examined trust as seen in social psychology, philosophy,
economics, contract law and market research. The author discovered that different
disciplines tend to view trust differently. For example, social psychology tends to focus
on trust as the fulfillment of expectations. In philosophy, trust is viewed as non-rational.
In economics, trust is viewed as rational.

In contract law, the focus is on trust as a

complement to legal contracts. Finally in market research, the focus is on the role that
trust plays in relationship based marketing.
Of the different disciplines, this thesis has adopted the view of trust in social
psychology. Basically, trust can be divided into four areas of research [27]. Individual
trust treats trust as a personality trait. Interpersonal trust is concerned with trust as it
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1

relates to a trustor and a trustee. A trustor refers to a subject that trusts others. A trustee
2

is an entity that is being trusted. Relational trust believes that trust is an emergent
property of a relationship as opposed to a directed behavior. Societal trust is concerned
with the role that trust plays in the proper functioning of society. Trust is often credited as
the social capital that makes cooperation in a society possible [92].
Of the four research areas, the focus of this thesis is on interpersonal trust. As a
real life example, consider the case of a buyer (trustor) trying to buy a car from a used car
salesperson (trustee). There is no way for the buyer to know whether or not the
salesperson has the buyer’s best interest in mind. The salesperson could be trying to sell
the buyer a lemon. The uncertainty and lack of complete information makes the car
buying decision challenging. Trust can be used to aid in the buyer’s decision making. A
buyer can choose to only buy cars from a trusted used car salesperson. In a computing
context, the example could be the buying of a car from a used car website.
Many real life decisions have computing equivalents. Thus interpersonal trust can
be used in computing to aid the trustor in its decision making. In this thesis,
computational trust is built on the research in interpersonal trust. This should allow
computational trust to be used in not just computer security but also in general decision
making such as web service selection.

1.2.2

Definition

Trust is a concept that is easily recognizable but surprisingly difficult to define. Many
different definitions of trust have been proposed to address the different facets of trust.
For example, the American Heritage Dictionary defines trust as “firm reliance on the
integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing” [132]. Grandison and Sloman define
trust as “the quantiﬁed belief by a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty,

1

A subject could be a person, a group of people (e.g. organization) or a representative of a person (e.g.
software agent).
2

An entity could refer to both animate (e.g. person) and inanimate (e.g. movie) object.
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security and dependability of a trustee within a speciﬁed context” [51]. Note that in both
definitions, trust is defined through the listing of the characteristics of a trustee.
A different approach to defining trust is provided by Deutsch in [35]:


An individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an
event perceived to be beneficial (Va+) or to an event perceived to be harmful
(Va−);



He perceives that the occurrence of Va+ or Va− is contingent on the behavior of
another person;



He perceives the strength of Va− to be greater than the strength of Va+



If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties, the individual is
said to have made a trusting choice; if he chooses not to take the path, he has
made a distrustful choice;

In this definition, there is no listing of characteristics. This is also the case in [44] where
Gambetta defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to
monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action”.
The definition of computational trust in this thesis is based on the definition
proposed by Gambetta in [44]. The concept of roles as discussed in [24] is also
incorporated into the trust definition. We define computational trust as follows:
Computational trust is a particular level of subjective assessment of
whether a trustee will exhibit characteristics consistent with the role
of the trustee, both before the trustor can monitor such characteristics
(or independent of the trustor’s capacity ever to be able to monitor it)
and in a context in which it affects the trustor’s own behavior.
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When compared to the definition presented in [44], the term “probability” has been
replaced with the term “assessment” to highlight the fact that trust can be calculated in
ways other than probability theory. As the term “agent” has a different meaning in social
science than in computer science, the more general terms “trustor” and “trustee” are used
instead to avoid confusion. Also, a trustee can be an inanimate object. So “taking action”
may not always be possible for certain trustees. The term “action” therefore has been
replaced with the term “exhibit characteristics”. As for decision making, there are roles in
which both the trustor and the trustee must play. For example the decision of buying
services from a trustee. In this example, the trustor plays the role of a buyer while the
trustee plays the role of a seller. Whether the trustor trusts the trustee or not is dependent
on what the trustor believes to be the role of a “good seller”. If a trustee conforms to the
role as defined by the trustor, then the trustor can be said to trust the trustee.

1.2.3

Properties

Trust can be characterized by a number of basic properties [1], [52]. These properties are
also applicable to computational trust and are briefly described in this section.

1.2.3.1

Quantifiable and Comparable

There are many different ways in which trust can be represented. For example in [2], trust
is represented as a binary value of trust or mistrust. Although a binary representation is
easy to understand, it also has the weakness of lack of expressiveness. A simple way to
provide more expressiveness is to represent trust as multi-valued. In [1] for example, four
different trust degrees are defined. These are “Very Trustworthy”, “Trustworthy”,
“Untrustworthy” and “Very Untrustworthy”. It is also possible to represent trust as a
continuous variable as opposed to a discrete variable. Common representations include
representing trust as a value between zero and one (often seen in cases when trust is
treated as a probability) or between negative one and one. Although representing trust as
a real number allows for fine-grained distinction, such a representation can make it
difficult to discern the meaning behind the calculated trust value. For example, given two
trust values 0.73 and 0.74, what is the cause for the trust differences? Is it a rounding

7

error or is there something fundamentally different about trust in the two trustees? A
continuous representation makes discerning trust differences more challenging.
A trustor may feel uncertain about the result of its trust calculation. Some
researchers choose to represent this uncertainty as separate from trust. Often times, this is
known as reliability ( [110], [59]) or confidence ( [54], [128], [135]) in the calculated
trust. Other researchers choose to integrate uncertainty into trust such as in [23] where
trust is represented not as one value but as a range of possible trust values. Here, the
larger the range, the less certain the trustor is with regards to the calculated trust value.

1.2.3.2

Subjective

Different trustors may have different views on whether a trustee can be trusted. The
differences in trust are caused by the following two factors:


Incomplete information. A trustor may not have access to the complete history of
a trustee. Trust is often calculated based on available information. Different
trustors may not have access to the same information.



Subjectiveness of trustor. Different trustors may interpret the same information
differently. For example, a more forgiving trustor may be willing to accept some
failures from a trustee while a less forgiving trustor may not. Different trustors
may also have different views on how much uncertainty is acceptable. Emotions
like love and friendship could influence trust calculation as well. Finally, different
trustors may view the role of a trustee differently. For example, a trustor may
value security more than ease of use while this may not be the case for a different
trustor. These differences in expectations may influence the level of trust that a
trustor has for a trustee.

1.2.3.3

Multidimensional

A trustor may trust a trustee in one dimension but not in a different dimension. For
example, a trustor may trust a dentist with his dental health but not trust the dentist’s
stock picks. A trustor may trust Amazon’s EC2 Compute Cloud [8] but not trust its
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Mechanical Turk service [9]. A trustor may trust a trustee with transactions that are less
than a hundred dollars but not in cases when the transaction is worth a million dollars.
Even the environment can play a role in a trustor’s trust in a trustee. For example, an
environment in which malicious sellers are actively being identified and banned can
increase trust in all the sellers in the environment. The associations of a trustee for
example, the fact that a trustee is acting on behalf of the government may have an impact
on trust as well.
It is possible for trust in one dimension to influence trust in a different dimension.
As an example, consider the case of general trust and specific trust [107]. An example of
general trust is trust in Amazon [7]. An example of specific trust is trust in one of the
services provided by Amazon. If Amazon decided to launch a new service, knowing
nothing about the new service, the trustor’s trust in Amazon may influence the trustor’s
initial trust in the new service.

1.2.3.4

Dynamic

A trustor’s level of trust in a trustee may change over time. This change may be caused
by the presence of new information or the retirement of old information that are no longer
relevant. It could also be caused by the lack of new information on a trustee. With no new
information, a trustee’s behavior could have changed without the trustor knowing
anything about it. This increases the trustor’s uncertainty with regards to the calculated
trust value. It is important for computational trust to be regularly reevaluated so that it
can keep up with the dynamic nature of trust.

1.2.3.5

Reflexive, Non-Symmetrical and Non-Transitive

Trust is reflexive as a trustor always trusts itself. Though the level of trust a trustor has
for itself may change over time (as trust is dynamic). Since trust is also multidimensional,
there is more than one type of self-trust. For example, a trustor that does not trust itself to
fix the water leak would hire a plumber to do the job. A trustor that does not trust itself to
calculate trust would have to depend on others to calculate trust for it (trust delegation).
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In general, trust is non-symmetrical. This means that knowing the level of trust a
trustor A has for a trustee B does not help in determining B’s level of trust in A. This
non-symmetrical property follows from the property of trust being subjective. Therefore,
a trust relationship between A and B can be represented as two one-way trusts.
In general, trust is non-transitive. However, under certain semantic constraints, it
is possible for trust to be transitive. According to [64], transitivity requires that “the last
edge in the path represents functional trust and that all other edges in the path represent
referral trust, where the functional and the referral trust edges all have the same trust
purpose”. The term “trust purpose” is used to refer to why the calculated trust is needed.
Suppose the trustor has a trust purpose for finding a good car mechanic. Referral trust
would be the trust in a trustee to be able to recommend a good car mechanic. Functional
trust would be the trust in a trustee as being a good car mechanic. If A trusts B to
recommend a good car mechanic and B recommends C, then through transitivity, A can
trust C to be a good car mechanic. A different example of trust transitivity can be found
in a public-key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, trust transitivity is established through the
existence of a chain of certificates (known as a certification path).
In general, trust is weakened or diluted by transitivity [64]. As such, in a chain of
A, B and C, A’s trust in C cannot be greater than B’s functional trust in C.

1.2.4

Conceptual Model

A conceptual model is used to show the “relationships between factors that are believed
to impact or lead to a target condition” [93]. A conceptual model should be
implementation independent. The conceptual model of computational trust is based on
the work of Lewis and Weigert [75]. The model views trust as consisting of three
dimensions: cognitive trust, emotional trust and behavioral trust. For the rest of this
section, each of the dimensions is described followed by a discussion of the relationships
between the dimensions.
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1.2.4.1

Cognitive Trust

Cognitive trust is trust based on reasoning. It is knowledge-driven [61] though the
information that cognitive trust is based on can be unreliable and incomplete. Given the
available information, a cognitive leap is needed to arrive at a trustor’s cognitive trust in a
trustee [75]. As predicting the future is often impossible, the cognitive leap though based
on knowledge is still a leap of faith. Different trustors may have different comfort levels
about how much information it needs before it is willing to make a cognitive trust
prediction. This is one of the reasons for why trust is subjective.

1.2.4.2

Emotional Trust
3

Emotional trust or affective trust is trust based on feelings and affective bonds. It is noncognitive and often cannot be justified by the available information. Examples of
emotional trust includes trust based on faith, love, friendship, family, common values etc.
It is also present in public trust such as trust in doctors, judges, politicians, etc. Due to the
presence of emotion, a trustor would feel hurt or betrayed when the trustor realizes that
the trustee should not have been trusted. This is seen when relationship ends or when
someone who is highly respected such as a judge is caught in a scandal.

1.2.4.3

Behavioral Trust

Behavioral trust is trust as expressed through a trustor’s behavior. Experiments such as
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games [10] can be used to investigate this type of trust. In a PD
game, a player can choose to either cooperate or defect. A player who chooses to
cooperate can be viewed as having behavior trust in the opposing player while a player
who chooses to defect is signaling the opposite. A strict behavioral interpretation of trust
can be misleading as trust is not the only factor that could influence a trustor’s behavior
[75]. For example, a trustor may decide to take action not due to trust but due to pressure

3

In psychology, the term “affect” refers to feeling or emotion [4].
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from its superior. An interpretation of this action as trust would lead to the drawing of the
wrong conclusion.

1.2.4.4

Trust Relationships

Cognitive trust, emotional trust and behavioral trust are related to each other [75]. The
web of relationships is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. To develop emotional trust, a
cognitive base needs to be present as it is hard to develop emotions towards complete
strangers. When reasoning about whether to trust, a trustor’s emotions may influence how
the available information are interpreted [72]. A trustor’s behavior can be influenced by
its cognitive trust and emotional trust. Behavioral trust exhibited by others may influence
a trustor’s cognitive trust and emotional trust.

Figure 1: Relationships among Trust Dimensions
In [75], it was pointed out that trust in real life can be decomposed into cognitive
trust and emotional trust. For example, ideological trust can be viewed as trust with high
cognition and emotion. Faith is trust with high emotion but with a lack of cognition. For
mundane everyday decisions such as the route to drive to work or what to have for lunch,
trust typically consists of low cognition and low emotion. A more detailed list of
examples can be found in [75].
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1.2.5

Trust Formation

The conceptual model introduced in Section 1.2.4 forms the basis for computational trust
formation. Cognitive trust can be viewed as a function of a trustor’s beliefs in a trustee
[25]. Belief can be defined as the “degree of conviction of the truth of something
especially based on a consideration or examination of the evidence” [12]. Evidence is any
information that can be used in the formation of belief value. An evidence creator is also
known as the evidence source. There are many different types of evidence. The most
common are the trustor’s experience with a trustee, recommendation, reputation and
signal. Experience with a trustee is the knowledge that the trustor gained after interacting
with the trustee. Recommendation is experience that a trustor shares with others. For
example, when a movie critic writes a review for a movie, the review is the critic’s movie
recommendation. Reputation is the consensus assessment of a trustee by members of a
social network [94]. An example reputation is the Tomatometer of Rotten Tomatoes
[106] that is used to keep track of the reputation of movies among movie reviewers. In
the example, Rotten Tomatoes is the reputation system. The movie reviewers are
members of Rotten Tomatoes’ social network. Signal is information that a trustee
volunteered to the trustor. For example, by volunteering information showing that the
trustee has just passed an inspection (information that a trustor may not be aware), this
increases the trustor’s beliefs in a trustee.
The formation of emotional trust is based on the trustor’s emotions towards the
trustee. Behavior trust formation is based on the behaviors exhibited towards the trustee.
A graphical illustration of computational trust formation is shown in Figure 2. As
computational trust is subjective, it is the responsibility of the trustor to determine how
the trust dimensions are to be combined to form computational trust. It is also the
responsibility of the trustor to determine how the different trust dimensions influence
each other.
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Figure 2: Computational Trust Formation

1.3 Application of Computational Trust
To demonstrate how computational trust can be used in computing, two scenarios are
introduced in this section. The scenarios are movie selection and web service selection.
The scenarios are used throughout this thesis to highlight different aspects of
computational trust.

1.3.1

Movie Selection Scenario

In the movie scenario, the movie selector (trustor) is interested in selecting a movie
(trustee) to watch based on the movie’s quality. Reading a movie’s description does not
help in making quality determination. A movie description is typically advertisement
from the movie studios. Advertisements can be assumed to be biased towards the movie.
To obtain evidence on a movie’s quality, a movie selector could obtain reputation values
from movie review sites such as Rotten Tomatoes, IMDb (The Internet Movie Database)
[60], Metacritic [91], etc. Due to differences in the underlying social network and
differences in the reputation calculation algorithm used, different reputation systems may
produce different reputation values. For example, the movie “Zombieland” as of October
6, 2010 has a score of 89% on Rotten Tomatoes, a 7.8 on IMDb and a 73 on Metacritic.
The differences in reputation values could also be due to the reputation system being
malicious or biased. As a result, this thesis has adopted the view that a trustor should
have access to as many evidence sources as possible. This is to provide the trustor with
the flexibility of selecting the evidence sources for evidence gathering.
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An example cognitive trust calculation is shown in Figure 3. In the figure, the
movie selector chooses to only contact Rotten Tomatoes and IMDb for the reputation of
“Zombieland”. Basically, quality belief is calculated by averaging the normalized
reputations. As for cognitive trust, it is calculated by being assigned the same value as the
quality belief.

Figure 3: Cognitive Trust Formation (Movie)
In terms of emotional trust, the movie selector may enjoy horror films. Such
emotion could influence whether the movie is emotionally trusted. With respect to
behavior trust, the movie selector’s observations that a lot of his friends have seen
“Zombieland” and liked it can cause the movie to be behaviorally trusted. These different
trust dimensions are combined based on the movie selector’s subjective views to form the
selector’s computational trust in a movie.

1.3.2

Web Service Selection Scenario

Typically web service selection starts with web service discovery. The return value of
*
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service instance based on offers. Such approaches are often risky. A web service may not
keep its promise to provide the agreed upon offer. This could be due to the service having
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exaggerated or lied about its capabilities (intentional) or the service being overloaded
(unintentional). Trust can be used to assess the validity of an offer. Figure 4 graphically
depicts an example of how cognitive trust in a web service is calculated based on beliefs:
qualification, timeliness, accuracy and coverage.

Figure 4: Cognitive Trust Formation (Web Service)
In terms of the qualification of the web service, this could be deduced from the
qualification signals (certificates) issued by neutral third parties (certificate providers)
that has validated the web service’s qualification. As for the timeliness of the web
service, i.e., whether computation required can complete on time or not, this belief is
formed through the weighted average of the consumer’s past experiences with the service
and the service’s reputation. The results produced by a web service could be evaluated by
the consumer in terms of accuracy and coverage. The results are accurate if they are
correct. The results have good coverage if the breadth of the solutions provided meets the
trustor’s expectations. As both accuracy and coverage cannot be obtained through
monitoring, they are obtained by querying the consumer after service invocation.
Accuracy belief and coverage belief are based on applying weighted average on the
consumer’s past experiences with the service and the service’s reputation. Finally,
cognitive trust is calculated from the four calculated beliefs. In this case, if a web service
is believed to be qualified and the values calculated for timeliness belief, accuracy belief
and coverage belief are all greater than zero, then cognitive trust is assigned a positive
value of 1. Otherwise, cognitive trust is assigned the negative value of -1.
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In the case of timeliness belief, accuracy belief and coverage belief, the beliefs are
formed from evidence of multiple types. This is to account for the fact that evidence of
different types has different properties. Between experience, recommendation and
reputation, experience is considered the most important as it is created by the trustor [63].
4

It is assumed that the trustor is always non-malicious towards itself . A trustor also
always has its own best interest in mind. This may not be the case with recommendation
created by recommender and reputation created by reputation system. Recommendation
and reputation however can be used to guide the trustor in terms of which trustee to
invoke to gain experience. Moreover, the number of past experiences that a trustor has
with a trustee could be very low if the trustor had very few interactions with the trustee.
The number may be too few to be representative of the trustee’s behavior. In this case,
recommendations and reputation may be valued more. Between recommendation and
reputation,

recommendation

is

usually

valued

more

than

reputation.

With

recommendation, the trustor determines the recommenders to be contacted. This is based
on the assumption that the trustor is familiar with the behavior of the recommenders.
Without familiarity, a trustor has to depend on reputation. With reputation, its calculation
is often opaque to the trustor. This means that the trustor may not be able to determine the
effectiveness of the gathered reputation. As for signals, third-party signals are valued
more than signals generated by the trustee. This is due to the fact that a signal created by
the trustee about itself can be self-serving.
As different evidence types have strengths and weaknesses, this thesis has
adopted the view that having access to multiple evidence types is desirable in belief
calculation. This is similar to views found in existing work such as [59] and [110]. For
each evidence type, multiple evidence sources should be accessible. In the case of web
services, reputation systems may include [78], [87] and [140].
In terms of emotional trust, this could be influenced by the branding of a web
service. In fact, the use of branding to create an affective bond between a consumer and a

4

This does not mean that the trustor cannot act maliciously towards others.
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brand (e.g. through shared values such as caring about the environment) is known as
emotional branding [47]. With respect to behavior trust, a consumer is more likely to
behaviorally trust a web service that is popular and used by many. The different trust
dimensions are combined based on the consumer’s subjective views to form the
consumer’s computational trust in a web service.

1.4 Challenges to Computational Trust
The idea of applying a general model of trust to computing was first proposed by Marsh
[84] in 1994. Since then, certain elements of trust such as reputation has gained
widespread acceptance (e.g. eBay [38] and Amazon). However, the concept of a general
trust model has so far failed to gain traction. We believe that this is due to the inherently
difficulty in implementing a general trust model. For computational trust, the challenges
are as follows:


Lack of standards for discovering and accessing evidence. This means that it is up
to the application developer to implement all needed evidence discovery and
evidence gathering protocols. This is inefficient as applications may implement
the same protocols leading to code duplication. Also, if the trustor has preferences
towards a certain set of evidence sources, this would need to be configured for
each application individually. Moreover, if the trustor would like to use the
evidence provided by an evidence source, it is not always possible as the
protocols needed may not be supported by an application.



Lack of standards for representing evidence. Evidence can be represented as a
rating. A rating is the result of evidence evaluation where the result is represented
as a position on a scale [101]. Ratings can come in different forms. For example,
ratings used by Rotten Tomatoes are in the form of 0 to 100 percent. Ratings used
by IMDb are in the form of 1 to 10. There are other forms of evidence
representations as well. For example as a X.509 certificate or in the form of a text
review. Some evidence may even be encrypted to ensure security and privacy.
The lack of a standard evidence representation makes it challenging for an
application to be able to understand what the different evidence are representing.
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Evidence Filtering. Not all the gathered evidence should be used in belief
calculation. Evidence may be fabricated by malicious evidence sources to
intentionally mislead the trustor. Evidence may be biased by the views of
evidence sources. For example, a movie reviewer (evidence source) that is biased
against horror films may give a horror film a worse rating than what a regular
moviegoer would considered to be fair.
According to [63], there are currently two main approaches to evidence
filtering. One approach is to simply exclude or give low weight to evidence that
are outliers. This is based on the assumption that in any environment, the majority
of the evidence are non-biased and non-malicious. In [137] for example, a beta
distribution is computed of the evidence. Any evidence that is less than the 1%
quantile or greater than the 99% quantile are filtered out. A different approach is
for the trustor to identity those evidence sources that can be trusted to provide the
trustor with quality evidence. When evidence is needed, only those trusted
evidence sources would be contacted for evidence gathering. An example can be
found in [30] where evidence source trust depends on whether the evidence
source agrees with the trustor.



Computational Trust is subjective and multidimensional. There are many different
ways in which computational trust in a trustee can be calculated. Factors such as
the trustor’s emotion (e.g. feeling pessimistic), the trustor’s preferences (e.g.
valuing accuracy over coverage), the decision the trustor is trying to make (e.g.
movie selection or web service selection), the importance of the decision, etc.
could all have an influence on computational trust calculation.

1.5 Contributions of Thesis
Listed below are the contributions of this thesis:


A general trust model known as computational trust. The model is based on work
by Lewis and Weigert [75]. As a result, unlike most work on trust in computing,
computational trust has a social psychological underpinning. The model is also
different from other work in that it considers trust dimensions and treats evidence
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based trust (cognitive trust and behavioral trust) and non-evidence-based trust
(emotional trust) differently. When implementing the computational trust model,
a number of adaptations have been made to Lewis and Weigert’s model including
the merging of cognitive and behavioral trust, deriving emotions from the
trustor’s knowledge of the trustee and the simplification of the relationships
among the trust dimensions


An architecture for supporting computational trust formation. The architecture
consists of a middleware known as SCOUT (Services supporting COmpUtation of
Trust). SCOUT consists of a set of web services that can be used by Trust
Calculators for computational trust calculation. The calculated computational trust
can be used to support decision making. The computational trust architecture is
designed to address the challenges outlined in Section 1.4.



Algorithms for computational trust formation.



Experiments, evaluations and scenarios demonstrating the feasibility of the
proposed architecture in supporting computational trust formation.

1.6 Thesis Organization
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides more
background on trust. Chapter 3 reviews the trust literature. Chapter 4 provides a high
level overview of the computational trust architecture. The components of the
architecture are introduced in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The algorithms implemented in
the architecture are described in Chapter 7. Our prototype implementation is described in
Chapter 8. Experiments using the prototype are described in Chapter 9. The prototype is
applied to two different scenarios in Chapter 10. We evaluated the architecture with
respect to our stated goals in Chapter 11. Finally, the thesis ends with conclusions and
future works in Chapter 12.
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1.7 Summary
Trust is a concept has been investigated by many different disciplines including
computing. There are a number of weaknesses to the current computing approach to trust.
This could be addressed through the adoption of a more general trust model. In this
thesis, the trust model is known as computational trust. It is based on research on
interpersonal trust in the field of social psychology. A definition for computational trust
is provided along with discussion of its properties, conceptual model, formation and
application. The rest of this thesis focuses on addressing the challenges to calculating
computational trust.
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Chapter 2

2

Trust Primer

The focus of this chapter is on providing more background on trust. As computational
trust is a type of trust, the discussions in this chapter also apply to computational trust.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section describes the preconditions for
trust. Next, several concepts that are related to trust are introduced and explained. This is
followed by a discussion of the role that privacy plays in trust calculation. The fourth
section of this chapter covers the relationship between trust and risk. The last section
discusses how trust can be used in decision making.

2.1 Preconditions for Trust
Trust is not always needed for decision making. In [69], the authors identified three
preconditions for trust. The preconditions are dependence, uncertainty and vulnerability.
Dependence is about having to rely on others to fulfill a specific need. Uncertainty occurs
when one is not one hundred percent certain about the outcome of a decision. As for
vulnerability, it is the cost for making of a wrong decision. Uncertainty and vulnerability
together are commonly known as risk [69]. There would be no need for trust if a decision
poses no risk to the trustor [82].
In the movie selection scenario, the selector depends on the movie being of high
quality. Without actually seeing the movie, there is always uncertainty about the actual
movie quality. Finally, making the wrong movie selection could result in wasted money
and time. As the scenario satisfied all three preconditions, trust can be used in the
scenario to facilitate movie selection. Similar arguments can also be made for the web
service selection scenario.

2.2 Concepts Related to Trust
In this section, several concepts are introduced with the goal of clarifying how these
concepts are related to trust.
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2.2.1

Untrust, Distrust and Mistrust

In [86], the authors introduced the concepts: untrust, distrust and mistrust. Mistrust is
used to describe trust that turns out to be misplaced. Distrust is the negative form of trust
where the trustee is believed to be actively working against the trustor. Finally, untrust is
when there is trust in a trustee but not enough to overcome the perceived risk. A
graphical illustration of the different concepts is shown in Figure 5. In the figure, the
cooperation threshold is used to represent the perceived risk associated with a decision.

Figure 5: From Distrust to Trust [86]
In movie selection and web service selection, a selection is only made if trust in a
movie or a web service is above the cooperation threshold. Distrust occurs if a movie is
believed to be of low quality or if a web service is believed to be incompetent or
malicious. Untrust occurs if trust exists but just not enough for a selection to be made. As
for mistrust, this occurs after a selection when the trustor discovers that it should not have
selected the movie or web service.

2.2.2

Trustworthiness

Trust and trustworthiness should not be used interchangeably [31], [45]. Trust is
associated with the trustor and could influence the behavior of a trustor. Trustworthiness
is a characteristic of the trustee. A trustee is perceived to be trustworthy. A trustor is more
likely to trust a trustee that exhibits the characteristic of trustworthiness [122].
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In movie selection, a movie directed by a competent director is perceived to be
trustworthy. Whether a selector would trust such a movie is a completely separate
question. A web service could behave in a trustworthy manner by trying its best to satisfy
all consumer requests. Whether the displayed trustworthiness is enough for a consumer to
trust the web service is subjective and consumer dependent.

2.2.3

Contract

A trustor and a trustee may decide to enter into a contract. By doing so, the trustor and
trustee are delegating the responsibility for contract enforcement to some agreed upon
authority. An authority could be the legal system or an impartial mediator. It is the
authority’s responsibility to assess whether there is any contract violation and if so to
impose punishment. The introduction of a contract does not mean that there is no need for
trust [25]. Trust in the authority to be able to enforce signed contracts underlies the entire
rationale for contracts. A trustor also needs to trust that that the trustee would be deterred
by the punishment. Otherwise, the trustee could choose to accept the punishment and
violate the contract at will.
Contracts are not always available for all decision making. For example, there is
usually no contract for movie watching. Contracts are more commonly associated with
web services. A web service could offer a standardized contract to all its consumers. A
web service could also choose to negotiate with each of its consumers to offer customized
contracts to suit each of the consumer’s needs.

2.2.4

Confidence

A trustor trusts a trustee to complete the assigned job. A trustor is confident that the
trustee can complete the assigned job. In the previous examples, trust and confidence are
used interchangeably. Different researchers have offered different views on how to
distinguish between the two concepts. According to Luhmann in [82], confidence is the
expectation of not being disappointed. For example, a trustor is confident that the light
would turn on with the flip of a switch. Luhmann argues that trust also involves
expectation except it presupposes a situation of risk. With trust, a trustor is given a choice
while this is not the case with confidence. For example, whom a trustor should buy a used
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car from is a trusting decision. This is not the view in [31] where trust is defined as “an
attitude of confident expectation…”. In this definition, confidence is considered a part of
trust which seems to contradict the view of Luhmann [86].
In [118], the authors argued that trust is only relevant in risky situations where
familiarity with the trustee is low. Moreover, trust can only applied to a trustee that is a
person or a person-like entity. Confidence on the other hand is based on a high level of
familiarity and can be applied to just about anything. Carole Smith in [121] proposed an
alternate view where trust is seen as a moral exercise of free will. With trust, there is
uncertainty about the possible outcomes and a lack of objective information. With
confidence, there is an explicitly established outcome where information is collected in
an objective and scientific manner. For example, holding public servants accountable
through performance reviews can increase public confidence in a public institution. The
focus on performance measurements however can have a negative effect instilling
distrust between employees and managers.
There is a distinct lack of agreement among different researchers on how to
distinguish between trust and confidence. As the disagreement is mainly a naming issue
(i.e., when should trust be used and when should confidence be used to describe a
situation), we do not see how introducing the concept of confidence could benefit
decision making. As a result, we ignore confidence and focus on trust exclusively in this
thesis. Note that in some computer science literature, the term confidence is sometimes
used to refer to confidence in the calculated trust. This specific usage of the term is
unrelated to the discussion in this subsection and therefore the usage is acceptable.

2.3 Privacy
It is up to an evidence source to determine whether evidence should be disclosed to a
trustor. Without evidence, cognitive trust cannot be calculated. Yet when evidence is
disclosed, privacy may be lost. It is difficult to recover from privacy loss. As an example,
consider a trustee’s identity. Identity is needed for trust calculation. For maximum
privacy, a trustee could choose anonymity. However, it is almost impossible to calculate
trust if a trustor does not know who the trustee is. As a result, trustees are often provided
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with lesser privacy through pseudonymity. Even with pseudonymity, it can be difficult to
hold a trustee accountable for its bad behavior if the trustee can change its pseudonym at
will. So for pseudonymity to work, it needs to be difficult for a trustee to acquire more
than one pseudonym.
In the field of trust negotiation [13], disclosure policies are used to implement
conditional evidence disclosure. The goal is to provide privacy protection by only
revealing evidence on an as needed basis. However as pointed out by Danah Boyd in
[18], privacy is more than just control over evidence disclosure. It is also about providing
the user with control over how its evidence is being distributed. There is a difference
between making private evidence publicly accessible and having that evidence being
widely publicized without the user’s consent [18].

2.4 Risk
Trust is a concept that is inherently linked to risk [22], [65]. Risk involves uncertainty
and vulnerability. In [73], risk is defined as the likelihood and severity of an accident. In
[88], the authors argued that risk should consider more than just the accidents or negative
outcomes. If a decision involves the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes,
the aggregate level of risk (i.e., risks from all possible outcomes of a decision) should be
different than if there is only the possibility of negative outcomes. This view of risk is the
one that is adopted in this thesis. Risk is also considered to have the following properties:
quantifiable, subjective, multidimensional and dynamic.
In [25], the authors argued that there are two types of risk. The first is the risk of
failure. This is the gain the trustor could have had had it not make the wrong decision.
The second is the risk of wasted effort. This is the investment of the trustor that had gone
to waste. Example investments could be time or money. As for how trust and risk are
related to each other, [45] proposed three possibilities:


Mediating relationship. In this relationship, trust does not have a direct impact on
decision making. Instead, trust is used to reduce the riskiness of a decision. It is
risk that is responsible for determining whether a decision should proceed.
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Moderating relationship. In this relationship, risk is responsible for moderating
the effect of trust on decision making. Basically when risk is high, trust has an
influence on decision making. When risk is low, trust is considered irrelevant to
decision making.



Threshold model. In this relationship, trust and risk are both independently
formed. A trustor would only implement a decision if its level of trust surpasses
its threshold of risk.

Of the three relationships, the mediating relationship is reported as having the widest
acceptance among ecommerce researchers [45]. As for the threshold model, although it is
widely used in computing, surprisingly it has no ecommerce research underpinning [45].

2.5 Decision Making
There are many factors that could influence a trustor’s decision making. Several example
factors include company policies, the cost of each decision choices, trust in a trustee,
loyalty to a trustee, etc. During decision making, a trustor may prefer a certain trustee but
is held back by its lack of trust in the trustee. An example of this could be whether to use
an unknown web service that is being offered at a great price point. If more trust is
needed, one possible solution could be to demand more accountability from the trustee.
An example could be to demand heavier punishment for contract violation. A different
approach to solve this problem could be to simply reduce the risk associated with the
decision. For example by buying insurance, a trustor could hedge against possible
negative outcome thereby reducing the need for high level of trust in the trustee.

2.6 Summary
For trust to be useful in decision making, there needs to be dependence, uncertainty and
vulnerability associated with the decision. The chapter introduced several concepts
related to trust including untrust, distrust, mistrust, trustworthiness, contract and
confidence. The concepts are explained and distinguished from trust. The role that
privacy and risk plays in trust is also explained. Finally, the chapter ends with a
discussion of trust’s influence on decision making.
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Chapter 3

3

Literature Review

The focus of this chapter is to distinguish our work from others in the trust literature. This
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a survey of work on trust and
reputation. Next, arguments for a middleware approach to computational trust formation
are presented. The arguments are based on insights gained from the literature survey.
Finally, the last part of this chapter covers work on trust middleware. None of the work
on trust middleware covers all the elements that we have identified as critical to
supporting computational trust formation.

3.1 Survey of Trust and Reputation
The literature survey on trust and reputation covers four different areas of computing.
These are the World Wide Web, peer-to-peer environments, virtual communities (e.g.
agent societies, grid computing, business networks, etc.) and pervasive environments
(e.g. mobile and wearable computing, context-aware computing, etc.). In each area, we
describe in detail how trust and reputation is used. Note that the survey is not intended to
be complete. Instead, the focus is on presenting representative works in each of the
computing areas. As there is no commonly accepted definitions for trust and reputation,
footnotes are used to point out differences in definitions whenever necessary.

3.1.1

The World Wide Web (WWW)

There are many different uses for trust and reputation on the World Wide Web. For
example, trust and reputation can be used to promote e-commerce. Such uses could be
found in Amazon [7], Best Buy [14], [26], eBay [38], Epinions [39] and [83]. Trust and
reputation can also be used for identifying quality information. Examples of such use
include Advogato [3], PageRank [19], IMDb [60], Metacritic [91], Rotten Tomatoes
[106], Slashdot [120], Stack Overflow [126] and Web of Trust [135]. In the field of
Semantic Web, trust and reputation are used to determine how much an information
source should be trusted [48] [104]. For the rest of this subsection, three works on the
WWW are described in detail.
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3.1.1.1

eBay

In eBay [38], a reputation system (feedback forum) is responsible for calculating the
reputation of each eBay member. After each transaction, a buyer and seller are allowed to
rate each other by leaving feedback. A feedback consists of both a rating (positive,
neutral or negative) and a short comment. If a member is a buyer, it can also leave
detailed ratings (scale of one to five stars) on the seller. The ratings are on criteria such as
communication and shipping time. The reputation of a member is calculated as the
difference between the positive and negative ratings left by eBay members (eBay’s social
network). To capture a member’s recent behavior, the ratings from the last one, six and
twelve months are summarized and presented as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: eBay’s Feedback Forum
Although there is a number of weaknesses to eBay’s reputation system such as its
counter intuitiveness (member with higher reputation is not always better on eBay) and
disproportionately positive feedbacks [102], the feedback forum has been shown to be
effective in encouraging transactions [102]. In fact, an analysis done by [81] on the
auctioning of collectible one-cent coins found that a seller’s reputation have a statistically
significant impact on the coin auction prices.

3.1.1.2

Web of Trust

Web of Trust (WOT) [135] is a browser add-on that is designed to promote safe
browsing. WOT uses user ratings and carefully selected information sources (e.g. listings
of phishing sites) to calculate the reputation of websites. A reputation in WOT is based
on assessments of four different components: trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy
and child safety. WOT also calculates its confidence in the calculated reputation.
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Confidence is based on the amount of evidence and the quality of the evidence sources. A
WOT user can also leave comments on a site. A comment could belong to one of
seventeen categories: good site, entertaining, spam, useless, etc. In WOT, the reputation
of a web subdomain actually contributes to the reputation of the parent web domain.
The reputations calculated by WOT are displayed as coloured icons next to search
results and links in emails. For example, a website with excellent reputation is assigned a
green icon while a site with poor reputation is assigned a red icon. A website could also
obtain a WOT Trust Seal as proof of its trustworthiness. The seal can be obtained for a
monthly fee. As of writing, WOT has rated over 28 million sites with over 10 million
add-on downloads.

3.1.1.3

Object Scoring by Chen and Singh

In [26], it is proposed that the reputation of a rater (member of a social network) should
be structured as a tree. The reputation tree has the rater’s reputation as the root with each
of its children being the reputation of the rater in different knowledge domains (subject
areas). To build a reputation tree, the first step is to perform comment evaluation. A
comment refers to the numeric rating giving to an object (product or service) along with
the associated text review. After comment evaluation, the reputation of a rater in a
specific knowledge domain can be calculated. This is based on all the evaluations in the
specific knowledge domain. Finally, the reputation of a rater can be calculated based on
the rater’s reputation in different knowledge domains.
The score of an object is calculated as the weighted average of the object’s
received ratings. The weight of a rating is assigned based on the rater’s reputation. If a
rater’s reputation in a specific knowledge domain is unavailable, the solution is to move
up the reputation tree and use the rater’s more general reputation instead. As for
confidence in the object score, this is calculated based on the total number of received
ratings, reputation of raters and degree of consistency among the ratings. During
experimentation, the authors compared their work with Epinions [39] and discovered that
raters with high reputation actually correspond well to those good raters selected by the
site manager and users of Epinions.
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3.1.2

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Networks

Trust and reputation are used in P2P networks to improve resource selection. They also
encourage cooperation by ensuring that good peers are rewarded while bad peers are
punished. Some works in P2P include [2], [20], [32], [54], [55], [56], [68], [71], [76],
[77], [90], [116], [123], [127], [130], [133], [134], [139] and [143]. In this subsection, six
of those works are described in greater detail.

3.1.2.1

XREP
5

XREP [32] is a reputation sharing protocol that is designed for Gnutella-like systems. In
6

XREP, each servent and each resource is assumed to have a unique identity. The XREP
7

protocol consists of five phases: resource searching, resource selection and vote polling,
vote evaluation, best servent check (confirm resource digest is valid from best servent)
and resource downloading (with a confirmed resource digest, one could download
resource from any servent). Votes take only two values: 1 for positive opinion and 0 for
negative opinion.
8

A distinguishing feature of XREP is that it not only calculates the reputation of
servents but also the reputation of resources as well. By considering both types of
reputation, this allows XREP to solve the cold-start problem, i.e., the problem of the lack
of reputation on newcomers. For a new resource, XREP proposes that the resource can
establish its reputation through the reputation of the servent. As for a new servent, it can
gain reputation by offering access to reputable resources.

5

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” actually corresponds to “recommendation” in this thesis.
One could also think of XREP as a protocol for how recommendations can be exchanged in Gnutella-like
systems.
6
7
8

A servent is a node in a P2P network. It is both a trustee and an evidence source.
A “vote” is basically a recommendation represented as a rating.

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” as used in this paragraph actually corresponds to “trust” in
this thesis.
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3.1.2.2

Bayesian Reputation System by Buchegger and Le Boudec
9

In [20], a reputation rating is defined as the opinion formed by node about node ’s
behavior in a P2P system. A reputation rating is updated based on a node’s first-hand
observation (experience) and first-hand observations shared by other nodes
(recommendations). In the former case, a modified Bayesian approach is used to update
the reputation rating. The modifications proposed in [20] include giving past evidence
less weight and to forget old observations through decay over time. In the latter case, the
reputation rating is updated by taking the received observations into account. As nodes
may provide false reports, [20] proposes to only update the reputation rating if the
reporter

10

is considered trustworthy or if the reported observations is similar to the node’s
11

own observations. The trustworthiness of a reporter (trust rating ) is calculated using the
same modified Bayesian approach based on observation similarity.
[20] also proposed to classify the different P2P nodes based on the expected value
of their beta distribution. For example, if a node

is willing to tolerate at most 25%

misbehavior, then a node will be classified as normal if its expected value is less than or
equal to 0.25. Otherwise, node

will be classified as misbehaving. The same approach

can also be used to classify the trustworthiness of reporters.

3.1.2.3

Fuzzy Trust by Griffiths, Chao and Younas

In [54], fuzzy logic is proposed as a way to calculate trust in P2P systems. The idea is for
a trustor to keep track of its experiences interacting with other member peers in the
dimensions of success, cost, quality and timeliness. Trust is then calculated from
experiences using fuzzy inference rules. The input fuzzy term is experience which could
have the value of negative big, negative medium, negative small, zero, positive small,
positive medium and positive big. The output fuzzy term is trust which could have the

9

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation rating” actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis.

10
11

A “reporter” is basically a recommender in this thesis.

Unlike in [20], this thesis does not distinguish between trust in nodes and trust in reporters. So, “trust
rating” actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis.
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value of high distrust, distrust, undistrust, untrust, trust and high trust. Confidence is also
calculated for each experience dimension to ensure that there are sufficient experiences
available to perform trust calculation. If the calculated confidence is below a certain
threshold, then a default experience value (chosen based on the trustor’s trusting
disposition) is used as oppose to the trustor’s actual experiences. The paper also points
out that sometimes selecting a peer based solely on trust may not be enough. So,
additional fuzzy inference rules could be introduced that combines trust with other
decision factors (e.g. advertised cost).

3.1.2.4

DCRC and CORC

In P2P networks like Gnutella, cooperation among peers is essential to the searching and
downloading of content. It is therefore important for there to be incentives to encourage
cooperation among peers. In [55], the authors proposed a reputation based incentive that
is tied to a peer’s level of participation in the system. The paper proposed two different
ways to calculate the reputation score

12

of a peer. These are the debit-credit reputation

computation (DCRC) scheme and the credit-only reputation computation (CORC)
scheme.
With DCRC, a peer does not calculate its own reputation score. Instead, this is
outsourced to a reputation computation agent (RCA). A peer presents its actions within
the P2P network to the RCA and in return gets back its new reputation score. There are
three types of credits that can be claimed by a peer. These are the Query-Response Credit
(QRC) for proof of having responded to a query message, the Upload Credit (UC) for
proof of having served content to a peer and the Sharing Credit (SC) for proof of having
been online and for having contents that could be shared with others. As for debits, the
only type of debit supported is the Download Debit (DD) for proof of content download.
Together, the debits and credits are used to compute a peer’s reputation score.

12

A “reputation score” is basically reputation that is calculated using either DCRC or CORC scheme.
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CORC is functionally similar to DCRC with the only difference being that it does
not support DD. There is incentive in CORC for a peer to stop contributing to the P2P
network as soon as it has obtained a good reputation score. To prevent this from
happening, the RCA time-stamps the calculated reputation score for expiration. Both
DCRC and CORC have their respective strengths and weaknesses. A detailed comparison
of the two reputation computation schemes is available in [55].

3.1.2.5

Anomaly Detection by Stakhanova, et al.

In a P2P network, trust can be used to determine whether a peer should accept or send
traffic to a different peer. In [127], trust is calculated based on four types of actions:
resource search, resource upload, resource download and traffic extensiveness. Each time
an action is taken, it can be classified as good (successful outcome) or bad (fail outcome).
The classification is based on anomaly detection. The idea is for the creation of a peer
profile that establishes a peer’s typical behavior in the P2P network. Periodically, a peer’s
online session data is analyzed using a one-class support vector machine (SVM) for any
deviation from the peer profile. Once an anomaly is discovered, Chebyshev’s rule is used
to determine the impact the anomaly has on an action.
The trust score

13

of a peer is calculated as the percentage of bad actions during a

given time period. In [127], the authors proposed to reject all traffic from peers with trust
score that is greater than the distrust threshold. Traffic from peers with trust score that is
lower than the full trust threshold is always accepted. If a peer’s trust score is between the
two thresholds, then only part of the peer’s traffic is accepted.

3.1.2.6

PET and M-CUBE

PET [77] is a trust model that is designed to encourage cooperation in P2P resource
sharing. The trust model consists of a reputation model and a risk model. Reputation

14

in

13

Due to differences in definitions, “trust score” actually corresponds to the inverse of “trust” in this
thesis.
14

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in the paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis.
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PET represents the accumulative assessment of a peer’s long-term behavior. Interactionderived information (experience) and recommendations are used in reputation
calculation. Risk

15

in PET represents a peer’s short-term behavior. Risk is calculated

using interaction-derived information and is normalized to the worst case scenario. When
calculating trust, weights are assigned to both reputation and risk. The paper recommends
risk be assigned a high weight especially in dynamic systems.
M-CUBE (Multiple Currency based Economic Model) [76] is a decentralized
trading scheme that utilizes the trust calculated by PET to enforce cooperative resource
sharing. The idea is for each peer to issue its own currency and to set its own price for the
offered resources. If a peer needs the resource offered by a different peer, the first step is
to obtain the currency of the other peer. This can be done through a currency exchange
protocol where initially the currency ratio is set to one to one. The currency ratio will
self-adjust over time. This is to force a less trusted peer to pay more than a trusted peer.
Once currency has been obtained, the peer could now use the currency to acquire the
shared resource. If a peer refuses to share its resources, its trustworthiness will decrease
making currency exchange more expensive over time. When the trustworthiness of a peer
drops below a certain threshold, the peer would get banned from the P2P community.

3.1.3

Virtual Communities

A virtual community is in many ways similar to a real life community [1]. The role that
trust and reputation plays in a physical community therefore are applicable to virtual
communities as well. Some work on virtual communities includes the following:


Agent societies: [24], [25], [53], [59], [84], [100], [110], [111], [114], [142] and
[144]



15

Grid computing: [11], [79], [98], [129] and [136]

The paper’s definition of “risk” is different from the definition in this thesis. In fact, their definition is
really just a different way to calculate trust.
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Web services: [5], [78], [87], [115] and [144]



Others: [1], [108] and [147]

In this subsection, six representative works are described in detail.

3.1.3.1

Regret

The Regret system [110] assumes that the reputation

16

of an agent is based on three

dimensions: individual dimension, social dimension and ontological dimension. The
individual dimension is concerned with direct interaction (experience). Sociograms
(graphs representing social relations) are used to calculate reputation in the social
dimension. In Regret, it is assumed that each agent has its own sociograms. These
sociograms represent an agent’s view of the competition, cooperation and trade within
the agent society. Regret supports three types of social reputations: witness reputation,
neighborhood reputation and system reputation. The ontological dimension is concerned
with the creation of complex reputation. An example complex reputation could be an
agent’s reputation as a swindler that could be based on the agent’s reputation to
overcharge and its reputation for providing poor quality products.
Implementation wise, Regret is designed to be modular [109]. This means that an
agent can pick and choose the types of reputation to be used in reputation calculation. For
example, if one does not have any experiences with an agent, it could choose to calculate
the agent’s reputation based solely on social reputations. After some interactions with the
agent, there is now enough experiences so that any future reputation calculation will
include both individual and social dimensions.

3.1.3.2

FIRE

FIRE [59] is a trust and reputation model that is designed for open multi-agent systems
(MAS). Specifically, trust in FIRE is calculated based on interaction trust, role-based
trust, witness reputation and certified reputation. Interaction trust is calculated based on

16

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in the paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis.
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the direct experiences of an agent. Role-based trust uses rules to determine how much an
agent can be trusted. Witness reputation is calculated by employing a referral based
approach. Certified reputation is calculated based on certified references. By taking into
account a variety of information, this means that even if some information sources are
unavailable, trust can still be calculated. FIRE assumes that all agents are honest when
exchanging information. The possibility of there being disinformation is considered to be
future work.

3.1.3.3

Grid Computing by Azzedin and Maheswaran

In a grid computing system, trust [11] can be used to encourage resource sharing among
grid domains (GDs). Associated with each GD are two virtual domains: the resource
domain (RD) and the client domain (CD). It is assumed that a trust agent exists in each
GD and is responsible for calculating the GD’s trust in the other domains. As for the
resources and clients within a GD, they automatically inherit the trust attributes of their
RD and CD. Trust in a domain is calculated based on direct trust (experiences) and
reputation (recommendations from other domains). For domain-to-domain resource
sharing to occur, it is required for both GDs to have enough trust in each other (
).

3.1.3.4

Service Selection by Ali, Ludwig and Rana

A framework for web services discovery and selection is proposed in [5]. A trust
relationship in [5] consists of three phases: unknown, volatile and mature. A trust
relationship starts in the unknown phase. After some interactions, the relationship enters
the volatile phase. After developing a deeper understanding of a web service, the
relationship enters the more stable mature phase. A trust policy is used to capture a user’s
trust disposition. A policy can also be used to specify the conditions for transitioning
from one trust phase to another.
Trust in [5] is calculated using QoE (Quality of Experience) and QoC (Quality of
Compliance). QoE is concerned with how the service delivered is when compared to the
user’s expectations. QoC is concerned with whether the service delivered met the agreed
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upon quality of service (QoS). As for trust calculation, it is based on Fuzzy Cognitive
Maps (FCM). The paper proposed to only trust a web service if the subjective expected
utility to trust is greater than the subjective expected utility to distrust.

3.1.3.5

The TuBE Trust Management System

The TuBE trust management system [108] is responsible for facilitating inter-enterprise
collaborations. The Guard component of TuBE intercepts SOAP messages from
collaborating partners and passes the messages on to the trust decision maker. The
decision maker needs to decide whether a SOAP message should be allowed to proceed
or not. To make a trust decision, the decision maker passes information on the trustee
along the action that the trustee would like to take on to the data processing component.
In return, the decision maker receives a risk analysis and a constraint set. The constraint
set represents the acceptable risk given the current situation. By determining whether the
risk estimates can fit within the risk constraints, a decision is made on whether the SOAP
message should be blocked or not.
The data processing component of TuBE consists of four subcomponents. These
are risk, importance, reputation

17

and context evaluators. Experience data used by the

reputation evaluator comes from the reputation management component. Reputation in
TuBE is calculated using locally monitored experiences and experiences reported by
18

other peers in the reputation network .

3.1.3.6

Information Trustworthiness by Zuo and Panda

In [147], the authors presented a model for evaluating trust in information in a virtual
organization (VO). The model is based on the concept of objects where an object is a
piece of information on a topic or issue (e.g. unemployment rate). Different subjects may
have different views. This could result in the creation of multiple object versions. Since

17
18

Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in this paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis.
This is basically recommendations from other peers.
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new information can be created from existing information, it is possible to create a
compound object version from object versions as well. How a compound object version
is created can be represented using a version dependency tree.
There are many different ways to calculate trust in an object version. For
example, trust can be calculated by multiplying the owner’s trust in the object version
and the trust the evaluator (trustor) places on the owner. If the calculated trust is not
enough to satisfy the needs of the evaluator, the principle of object trust combination can
be used to increase the evaluator’s trust in the object version. The idea here is that if two
object versions are similar but are created through different approaches (have dissimilar
version dependency trees), then the average of the two object versions should be more
trustworthy than the individual object versions. For example, if two subjects through
completely different approaches arrived at the same conclusion with regards to the
unemployment rate, then the “multiple-proofs” should increase the level of trust in the
unemployment rate.

3.1.4

Pervasive Computing Environments

Works on trust and reputation in pervasive computing environments include [22], [23],
[52], [80] and [112]. In this subsection, the discussion focuses on two such works.

3.1.4.1

The SECURE Project

The SECURE project [22] is concerned with trust-based security in pervasive computing
environments. Trust and risk are viewed as having a mediating relationship in SECURE
where risk is seen as dependent on trust and an outcome’s intrinsic cost. SECURE also
supports trust delegation where a trustor’s trust in a trustee is just a reference to the trust
calculated by someone else.
When an interaction request is made to the SECURE framework, it is the
responsibility of the request analyzer to decide on whether the request is to be allowed or
denied. The request analyzer makes its decision based on information provided by the
entity recognition component, trust calculator and risk evaluator. The entity recognition
component is responsible for recognizing new or previously encountered entities. The
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trust calculator performs trust calculation based on information it obtained from the trust
lifecycle management component. The trust lifecycle management component is
responsible for the formation and evolution of trust based on information stored in the
evidence store. The risk analyzer uses the information provided by the risk configuration
component to calculate the potential risk of the interaction request. The risk configuration
component updates risk information based on the data stored in the evidence store. The
evidence store holds all the trust and risk-related data. This includes the experiences of
the trustor that can be obtained through monitoring and recommendations that are
obtained through recommendation gathering.

3.1.4.2

Trust-Based Admission Control by Grey et al.

In [52], a trust framework is used to enable access control in collaborative ad hoc
applications (e.g. blackjack game). To gain admission to an ad hoc application, the user
first needs to specify the member role (e.g. dealer) it is interested in joining as. At the
global level, an application manager will ask each existing member to vote on the
admission. Based on the voting results, the application manager will either accept or
reject the admission request. At the local level, each member uses its own trust-based
policies to determine whether or not to support the admission. As for trust, it is calculated
by the Trust Formation System based on a user’s past interactions (experiences).

3.2 Middleware Support for Computational Trust Formation
There are many applications for trust in computing. Depending on the application, trust
may be calculated differently. For example in P2P, trust is used to encourage cooperation.
Cooperation however is rarely an issue with web services. With web services the main
concern is whether the demanded QoS would be provided. Due to differences in concern,
trust calculation is different between P2P and web services. As a concrete example,
comparisons could be made between [55] and [5]. In [55] (Section 3.1.2.4), the authors
use trust to measure a peer’s level of participation in the network. Trust calculation
therefore involves a peer’s level of upload, download, resources shared and response rate
to queries. In [5] (Section 3.1.3.4), trust in a web service is calculated using the trustor’s
quality of experience and the web service’s quality of compliance.
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Although there are many different ways to calculate trust, there are still some
commonalities shared across the different trust calculation approaches. These
commonalities can be abstracted into a middleware. Applications that need trust
calculated therefore can leverage the services provided by the middleware in its trust
calculation. Specifically, this thesis has identified three different areas of computational
trust calculation that can benefit from middleware support. The areas are evidence
gathering, belief calculation and emotional trust calculation.
To calculate cognitive trust, an application needs access to quality evidence. As
for how evidence are to be collected and how evidence quality is to be determined, this is
an issue that can be delegated to a middleware. Belief calculation can also be delegated to
the middleware. This is based on the view that a trustor’s beliefs about a trustee should be
consistent across different applications. Cognitive trust calculation has therefore been
simplified to a problem of selecting the relevant beliefs and determining how the beliefs
are to be combined to form cognitive trust. In terms of emotional trust, emotions are
associated with the trustor. It therefore makes sense for the middleware to keep track of
the trustor’s emotional trust so that it maintains consistent across different applications.

3.3 Survey of Trust Middleware
In this section, a literature survey is provided on trust middleware. As far as we know,
there is only one paper on trust middleware. It is the Personalized Trust Framework
(PTF) by Huynh in [58]. Note that Huynh’s paper does not cover all the issues discussed
in this thesis. Specifically, the paper does not presuppose the existence of a conceptual
model nor concern itself with evidence gathering. PTF only addresses the challenge of
trust being subjective and multidimensional. A description of PTF is provided below.
The Personalized Trust Framework (PTF) [58] is concerned with how a user’s
trust evaluation process can be captured and replicated by computers. The way PTF
works is for a document and its meta-data to be submitted to the Trust Manager. A
document in PTF refers to any piece of information that needs to be evaluated. As for
meta-data, this covers information such as document type, context type, originator, etc.
The Trust Manager matches the meta-data with the user’s trust profile (preferences) to
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determine the trust model to be used in trust calculation. An implementation of the trust
model, i.e., a trust engine is then initialized to perform trust calculation. If a specific trust
representation is required by the user, a converter could also be instantiated to perform
the necessary trust transformation before the calculated trust value is returned to the user.
Auditing is also supported by PTF. This allows a user to examine how trust is calculated.
Implementation wise, an ontology has been developed and forms the basic
building blocks of PTF. It is also the language that is used to write the trust profiles. A
trust profile contains the rules that are used for trust engine selection. It also contains
information on the concepts to be used in trust calculation. Rules in PTF are executed by
the Jena Rule Engine [103]. Both trust engines and converters can be written using Jena
rules or implemented as Java classes.

3.4 Summary
Trust and reputation are used differently in different areas of computing. In the literature
survey, the focus is on four areas: WWW, P2P networks, virtual communities and
pervasive computing environments. Based on insights gained from the literature survey, a
case is made for a middleware based approach for supporting computational trust
formation. PTF as a trust middleware does not address all of the identified trust
challenges.
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Chapter 4

4

Computational Trust Architecture

The focus of this chapter is to provide a high level overview of the computational trust
architecture. The individual components of the architecture are described in detail in the
next two chapters. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
describes the assumptions made when designing the computational trust architecture.
Next, an overview of the architecture is provided. The final section of this chapter
describes how information flows through the architecture.

4.1 Assumptions
The computational trust architecture is designed with the following assumptions in mind.

4.1.1

Identity and Type

Trustors, trustees and evidence sources all need to have unique identities. As explained in
Section 2.3, identities needs to be verifiable and long lived. How this can be achieved is
outside the scope of this thesis. Some possible references to learn more about identity
includes X.509 [57], PGP [146] and Sybil attack [36], [74]. It is assumed in this thesis
that any identity used in the proposed architecture has already been verified and can be
trusted. If this is not the case, identity can be treated as evidence. Belief in a trustee’s
identity therefore forms the basis for computational trust formation.
Trustors, trustees and evidence sources also need to be categorizable into their
respective types. For example, a trustee could be a movie in the fantasy genre. A trustee
could be a web service providing cloud computing. It is assumed that an ontology and
taxonomy is in place for performing the categorization. How this can be achieved is
outside the scope of this thesis. Some possible references include UDDI [29] and
RosettaNet [105].
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4.1.2

Computational Trust Formation

Computational trust formation is introduced in Section 1.2.5. The computational trust
architecture currently only supports a limited form of computational trust formation.
More support has been identified as future work. Basically, the architecture makes a
number of formation assumptions. The assumptions are the following:


The relationship between cognitive trust and emotional trust is not explicitly
supported by the architecture. Capturing the impact that a trustor’s emotions have
on its beliefs in a trustee is a difficult problem. So is the capturing of how beliefs
can impact a trustor’s emotions. Further compounding the problem is the fact that
the relationship is circular where emotions can influence beliefs which again can
influence emotions. As a result, this relationship is currently not explicitly
supported by the architecture. Instead, any changes in cognitive trust and
emotional trust due to their relationship would necessitate the trustor making
manual adjustments to cognitive trust and emotional trust.



Behavior trust is not explicitly represented in the architecture. If a trustor
observes other trustors’ behaviors towards a trustee, such behavioral knowledge
can be treated as evidence. The evidence can be used in cognitive trust
calculation, thereby removing the need to explicitly represent behavior trust.

Figure 7 shows the resulting computational trust formation where computational trust is
calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust.

Figure 7: Computational Trust Formation (Architecture)
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4.1.3

Evidence

There are many different types of evidence. The computational trust architecture
currently supports four different evidence types:


Experience. Experience is the knowledge that the trustor gained about the trustee.
There are two ways that a trustor can gain experience with a trustee. One is to
directly interact with the trustee. Another is to directly observe the trustee
interacting with another trustor. In the first approach, monitoring is used to record
the trustee’s behaviors during an interaction. Besides monitoring, a trustor could
also be asked for its view on a completed interaction. In the second approach, if a
trustee is aware of the presence of observers, it may behave differently (e.g.
perform better) than when it is not being observed. Therefore when calculating
belief from experience, it is important to take into account the means used in
experience gathering.



Recommendation. When a trustor shares its experience with others, the shared
experience is known as recommendation. All gathered recommendations should
be filtered. This is to avoid using recommendations from biased or malicious
recommenders in belief calculation.
An endorsement is a type of recommendation. When a movie advertises
that it is recommended by movie critics, this can be seen as the critics endorsing a
movie. With recommendation, the burden is on the trustor to discover the
available recommendations. With endorsement, the burden is shifted to the
trustee. It is the responsibility of the trustee to provide the trustor with all of its
endorsements. As an endorsement could be neutral or negative, it is in the
trustee’s interest to throw away these non-positive endorsements. Therefore,
endorsements are often biased towards the trustee. This can be seen in movie
advertisements where all mentioned reviews are positive. Due to the inherent bias,
care should be taken when using endorsements in belief calculation.
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Reputation. Reputation is the consensus assessment of a trustee by members of a
social network. All gathered reputations should be filtered. This is to avoid using
reputations from biased or malicious reputation systems in belief calculation.



Signal. In economics, signaling [124] is used by a party to provide information
about itself. The provided information can be used by the interacting parties to
overcome the challenge of information asymmetry. In decision making, a trustee
could send signals to the trustor explaining why it should be believed.

4.1.4

Belief

There are many different types of beliefs. To better organize the different beliefs, the
computational trust architecture aggregates beliefs into aggregate belief. An aggregate
belief is calculated from its constituent beliefs. The computational trust architecture hides
the mappings from beliefs to aggregate belief from the applications that need
computational trust calculated. By only exposing aggregate beliefs, this makes it easier
for an application to specify the aggregate beliefs needed for cognitive trust calculation.
The computational trust architecture currently supports eight different aggregate beliefs:


Accessibility belief. This is belief in a trustee as being reachable when needed.
Example constituent beliefs include availability belief, latency belief, etc.



Competence belief. This is belief in a trustee as being qualified for what is
expected of the trustee. Example constituent beliefs include qualification belief,
popularity belief (i.e., inferring competence from the trustee being popular), etc.



Dependability belief. This is belief in a trustee as being reliable and has the
trustor’s best interest in mind. A dependable trustee is one who would not betray
the trustor. An example betrayal could be the violation of a signed service level
agreement (SLA). Example constituent beliefs include compliance belief (i.e.,
level of compliance with SLA), popularity belief, etc.



Identity belief. This is belief in a trustee as being who it says it is. Example
constituent beliefs include personal knowledge belief (i.e., having knowledge that
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only the trustee would know such as password), behavioral belief (i.e., behaving
in a way that is similar to the trustee), etc.


Performance belief. This is belief in a trustee as being able to carry out what is
expected of the trustee. Example constituent beliefs include timeliness belief,
response time belief, etc. Competence belief and performance belief are not the
same. Competence is concern with capability. For example, having graduated
from the Computer Science program is proof of competence. Performance is
concern with usage of the capability. For example, being able to apply what is
learned in the program to solve computing problems is proof of performance. A
competent trustee could choose to perform well or to perform poorly. An
incompetent trustee however by definition cannot perform well.



Privacy belief. This is belief in a trustee as being in compliance with the trustor’s
policies with respect to the trustor’s information. Example constituent beliefs
include information retention belief, information sharing belief, etc.



Quality belief. This is belief in the excellence of a trustee. Quality belief is used in
cases when the trustee is an inanimate object. It is used in place of performance
belief. For example, a trustor forms its belief in the quality of a novel. It does not
form its belief in the performance of a novel. Example constituent beliefs include
accuracy belief, bias belief (i.e., is the trustee bias?), etc.



Security belief. This is belief in a trustee as being able to protect the interest of the
trustor from harm. Example constituent beliefs include auditability belief,
integrity belief (includes data and transactional integrity), etc.

There are many possible mappings from belief to aggregate belief. For example, a
positive mapping would be availability belief that has a positive influence on the
aggregate belief accessibility. A negative mapping would be bias belief that has a
negative influence on the aggregate belief quality. A belief could also be a constituent
belief in multiple aggregate beliefs. For example, popularity belief has a positive
influence on both competence and dependability beliefs.

47

In terms of the scenarios, in movie selection, quality belief is already an aggregate
belief; therefore cognitive trust formation remains the same as in Figure 3 of Section
1.3.1. As for web service selection, the cognitive trust formation needs to be updated with
the incorporation of aggregate beliefs. The resulting cognitive trust formation is shown in
Figure 8. In the figure, competence belief, performance belief and quality belief are
accessible to the consumer. How these aggregate beliefs are formed (from constituent
beliefs or from evidence directly) is hidden from the consumer.

Figure 8: Cognitive Trust Formation from Aggregate Beliefs (Web Service)

4.1.5

Emotional Trust Formation

The computational trust architecture does not support the formation of emotional trust
from the trustor’s emotions directly. This is due to the difficulty in monitoring the
trustor’s emotions. Instead, emotional trust is formed through the recognition of the
trustee. For example, based on the trustee’s type and identity, the trustor may be
predisposed to emotionally trust or distrust the trustee. An example is shown in Figure 9
where trustee types and identities are organized into a hierarchy. Each node in the
hierarchy is assigned an emotional trust value. If there is no emotional trust value set for
a trustee, the emotional trust value of its closest parent is used instead. For example, there
is no emotional trust value set for the horror film “Zombieland” in Figure 9. Therefore,
the trustor’s emotional trust value in horror movies is used as an approximation.
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Another example is to create a hierarchy based on the trustee’s relationship with
the trustor. Example relationships could include family, friend, acquaintance and
stranger. Multiple hierarchies can be used together to form the trustor’s emotional trust in
a trustee. An example of the use of multiple hierarchies is for emotional trust to be
formed based on the sum of the emotional trust from each hierarchy. Another example is
for emotional trust to be based on the maximum emotional trust value obtained from all
the hierarchy.

Trustee

Web
Service

Movie

Comedy

Horror

Alien

Amazon

EC2 Compute
Cloud

HP

IBM

Mechanical
Turk

Figure 9: Hierarchy of Trustee Type and Identity

4.1.6

Factors Influencing Computational Trust Formation

There are many factors that influence computational trust formation. The computational
trust architecture grouped the factors into decision, trustor and trustee.

4.1.6.1

Decision Factors

Decision factors are factors associated with a decision. An example is decision type
where the trustor calculates computational trust differently for movie selection and web
service selection. Another example is the importance of a decision where more evidence
may be demanded if a decision is important. Table 1 shows an example of how trust
types can influence computational trust formation. Other example decision factors
include decision cost, decision environment, etc.
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Table 1: Trust Types and Computational Trust Formation
Types of Trust

Computational Trust Formation

Faith
Emotion
Cognition and Emotion
Cognition
Rational

4.1.6.2

Trustor Factors

Trustor factors are factors associated with the trustor. A change in a trustor factor may
influence computational trust formation of many decisions. Trustor factors include:


Trust Disposition. A trustor could be an optimist, a realist or a pessimist in its
trust disposition [85]. An optimist may demand less evidence in belief calculation
while the opposite is the case for a pessimist. A realist’s evidence demands falls
somewhere in between an optimist and a pessimist.



Trust Preference. A trustor`s trust preferences could influence the algorithms used
for computational trust calculation (e.g. Bayesian vs. average). It could also
influence how evidence are gathered (e.g. prefer one evidence source over
another) and how beliefs in a trustee are formed (e.g. Bayesian vs. average).



Culture. The culture upbringing of a trustor could influence computational trust
formation. For example, the presence of credit card symbols had been shown to
have a bigger impact on trust in Latin American and Brazil than in the US [131].
Basically, different cultures may interpret the same evidence (a credit card signal
in this case) differently. Moreover, different cultures may instill in a trustor
different norms and values. For example, business relationships in Japan are more
personal than in more “legalistic” cultures such as the US [17]. Trustors living in
cultures with a high degree of power inequality (high power distance) or cultures
that are less tolerant of change (high uncertainty avoidance) have been shown to
have a higher use of evidence from personal sources (e.g. friends) and a lower use
of evidence from impersonal sources (e.g. Consumer Reports) [34].
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4.1.6.3

Trustee Factors

Trustee factors are factors associated with the trustee. An example is the identity of the
trustee where computational trust is calculated differently depending on whether the
trustor recognizes the trustee. If a trustee is recognizable, it can be calculated using
emotion. Otherwise, it is calculated using cognition. Other trustee factors include trustee
type, trustee’s relationship with the trustor, etc.

4.1.7

Privacy

As explained in Section 2.3, privacy plays an important role in computational trust
formation. Due to the complexity of the issues involved, privacy is considered outside the
scope of this thesis. Some possible references to learn more about privacy includes [13],
[18], [49] and [113]. This is an important area that should be addressed in future work.

4.1.8

Architecture Deployment

Computational trust is subjective as detailed in Section 1.2.3.2. To accommodate the
trustor’s subjective views, it is assumed that each trustor has its own computational trust
architecture deployment.

4.1.9

Summary

A summary of all the discussed assumptions is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Assumptions of Computational Trust Architecture
Assumptions
Identity and Type

Computational trust formation

Evidence

 Identity is unique and long lived
 Identity has already been verified through means outside
the scope of this thesis
 Every trustor, trustee and evidence source has a type
property whose assignment is outside the scope of this
thesis
 Computational trust is calculated from cognitive trust and
emotional trust
 Behavioral trust is treated as a form of cognitive trust
 The relationship between cognitive trust and emotional
trust is not represented in the proposed architecture
 Evidence types: Experience, recommendation, reputation
and signal
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Belief

Emotional trust formation
Factors influencing
computational trust formation
Privacy
Architecture deployment

 Aggregate belief is calculated from constituent beliefs
 Aggregate beliefs: Accessibility, competence, dependability
identity, performance, privacy, quality and security
 Emotional trust is calculated from properties of a trustee
 The properties can be organized into a hierarchy
 Decision factors
 Trustor factors: Disposition, preference and culture
 Trustee factors
 Outside the scope of this thesis
 Each trustor deploys its own architecture

4.2 Overview of Architecture
A graphical illustration of the computational trust architecture is shown in Figure 10. The
architecture consists of three components: SCOUT (Services supporting COmpUtation of
Trust), Evidence Repository and Trust Calculator. SCOUT is a middleware that provides
three different web services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation
Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for the discovery
and gathering of evidence. Any gathered evidence is normalized (i.e., mapped to standard
evidence representation) before being stored in the Evidence Repository. The Evidence
Repository is the storage for all the gathered evidence. BFS uses the evidence stored in
the Evidence Repository for belief and aggregate belief calculation. ETS is responsible
for calculating the trustor’s emotional trust in a trustee. An application could contact EGS
directly for evidence gathering. It could also contact BFS or ETS to obtain the trustor’s
aggregate belief or emotional trust. An application could also subscribe to BFS or ETS to
be informed of any changes to the trustor’s aggregate belief or emotional trust.
The Trust Calculator is a client that can be used to access the SCOUT services. It
calculates computational trust based on the belief values and emotional trust values
calculated by SCOUT. An application could either query or subscribe to the
computational trust calculated by the Trust Calculator.
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Figure 10: Computational Trust Architecture

4.3 Information Flow of Architecture
The computational trust architecture can be viewed from the perspective of the flow of
information. Such a perspective is graphically illustrated in Figure 11. In the figure,
computational trust formation is described as a three step process. The process starts with
a request for a computational trust calculation. This results in evidence gathering.
Evidence may be found locally. For example by parsing the log file of the trustor’s
interaction with a trustee. Evidence may also be found in the open environments. For
example by requesting reputation from an Internet-based reputation system. In both
cases, the gathered evidence are normalized before being stored in an Evidence
Repository. The next step is the calculation of the trustor’s beliefs and aggregate beliefs
in a trustee based on the stored evidence. Finally, the last step is to perform the trust
calculation. This involves the calculation of cognitive trust from aggregate beliefs and
emotional trust from the trustor’s knowledge about the trustee. Computational trust is
calculated from cognitive and emotional trust. There are many different algorithms that
can be used in belief, aggregate belief and trust calculations. The different algorithms
used in the literature are summarized in Table 3.
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Figure 11: Information Flow of Architecture
Table 3: Algorithms for Belief, Aggregate Belief and Trust Calculation
Categories
Arithmetic

Probability Theory

Fuzzy Logic
Others

Examples










Summation: [38], [55]...
Average: [7], [14]…
Weighted average: [11], [39], [91], [135]...
Others: [23], [53], [71], [84]…
Bayesian approach: [20], [43], [62], [80]…
Belief theory: [64], [142]…
Others: [2], [114]…
[5], [41], [54], [145]…
[59], [68], [110], [117]…

4.4 Summary
The computational trust architecture consists of a SCOUT middleware, an Evidence
Repository and Trust Calculators that are used by applications to perform computational
trust calculation. When designing the architecture, a number of assumptions were made.
The assumptions include identity, computational trust formation, evidence, belief,
emotional trust formation, factors influencing computational trust formation, privacy and
architecture deployment. To provide a different perspective on how the computational
trust architecture operates, the chapter also describes how information flows through the
architecture. The information flow helps illustrates how information changes as it passes
through the computational trust architecture.
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Chapter 5

5

SCOUT

The focus of this chapter is on introducing the SCOUT middleware. This chapter is
divided into four sections. The first section provides a high level overview of the
middleware design. The next three sections focuses on the introduction of each of the
SCOUT services in detail.

5.1 SCOUT Design
SCOUT is designed with the following properties in mind:


Modularity. SCOUT is designed to support evidence gathering, belief calculation
and emotional trust calculation. To achieve modularity, all three functionalities
are implemented as web services that can operate independently of each other.



Extensibility. There are many algorithms and protocols that can be used to
implement the different SCOUT functionalities. To achieve extensibility, a plugin approach has been adopted for cases when there is no best way to implement a
specific functionality.



Adaptability. Computational trust is subjective and multidimensional. The
SCOUT services therefore should be adaptable to meet the needs of
computational trust formation. To achieve this, a policy based approach has been
adopted. A policy refers to “a rule that defines a choice in the behavior of a
system” [33]. Policies are used in SCOUT to determine how each service
responds to the trustor’s queries or subscriptions. For example, a policy could
specify that a specific algorithm is always to be used in calculating quality belief
in movies as this is the trustor’s preferences. Another example could be that if a
decision is important, this may entail the gathering of more evidence, the
consideration of more evidence types and the use of a higher threshold for
evidence filtering. All these requirements can be presented as policies for
important decisions. As every trustor is different, policies are selected as it is
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challenging to program for adaptability ahead of time. Moreover, a trustor may
change over time. Policies allow for any change to be captured without requiring
the coding and compilation of the SCOUT services.

5.2 Evidence Gathering Service
The Evidence Gathering Service (EGS) is responsible for gathering the evidence needed
for belief calculation. A graphical illustration of EGS is shown in Figure 12. In the figure,
the Evidence Gathering Manager is responsible for processing any request for evidence
gathering. This is accomplished through the exposed gatherEvidence method that has as
input the following three parameters:


Trustee. Information about the trustee can be represented as attribute-value pairs.
There are two attribute-value pairs that must be present for each trustee: the
trustee’s identity and the trustee’s type. For example, the online retailer Amazon
has an identity of “www.amazon.com” and type of “OnlineRetailer”. Amazon’s
EC2 Service has an identity of “aws.amazon.com/ec2/” and type of
“WebService/ComputeCloud”. In this case, since EC2 is both a web service and a
compute cloud, both are specified with the more general type specified first and
the types separated by a slash. Other attributes could include the trustee’s
relationship with the trustor, signals that the trustee is willing to provide, etc.



Belief. Evidence could be gathered for aggregate belief calculation or belief
calculation. As aggregate belief is just a special type of belief, EGS does not
differentiate between aggregate belief and belief. Instead, both are treated the
same when it comes to evidence gathering.



Hints. This is an optional parameter that is represented as attribute-value pairs. It
is used to provide hints to EGS with regards to how evidence gathering should be
changed. Some example hints may include the importance of decision, the
evidence types to be used, etc.

The input parameters are used in policies to determine how evidence are to be gathered.
This may involve the invocation of one or more Evidence Gatherers for evidence
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discovery and gathering. The gathered evidence are then handed over to the Evidence
Handler for processing. After processing, the last step is for the evidence to be stored in
the Evidence Repository.
As for evidence filtering, EGS has adopted the trust-based approach (see evidence
filtering bullet point in Section 1.4 for a review). This is due to the fact that the outlierapproach depends on the gathered evidence exhibiting certain statistical properties [63].
The assumption that outliers should be filtered out is not always a valid assumption. A
trustor may have views that are more similar to the outliers than the majority of evidence.
In the trust-based approach, trust is used for identifying and avoiding of distrusted
evidence sources. To calculate evidence source trust, EGS first needs to identify whether
an evidence source can provide evidence of high quality. Feedbacks provided by
evidence gathering requesters can be used for assessing the quality of evidence.
Feedbacks can be provided to EGS by calling the provideFeedback method of the
Evidence Gathering Manager. This method takes two input parameters: trustee and belief
feedbacks. The two input parameters are used in policies to determine the Evidence
Source Assessor to be invoked for assessing evidence quality and for calculating
evidence source trust. The calculated evidence source trust can be taken into account
during evidence gathering. For the rest of this section, each of the components of EGS is
described in detail.

Figure 12: Evidence Gathering Service
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5.2.1

Evidence Gatherer

There is currently no standard for evidence discovery and evidence gathering. As a result,
to gather evidence from multiple evidence sources, different discovery and gathering
protocols have to be implemented. Moreover, not all evidence sources provide evidence
in formats that are machine friendly. For example Rotten Tomatoes does not provide an
API for accessing the reputation of movies. The only way to access a movie’s reputation
is to access the movie page and parse the html file to extract the movie’s reputation. This
in turn makes evidence gathering challenging.
In EGS, each Evidence Gatherer is responsible for one evidence discovery and
gathering protocol. An Evidence Gatherer may be responsible for a single evidence
source (e.g. IMDb) or multiple evidence sources (e.g. locating reputation systems through
a registry). Evidence Gatherers are implemented as plug-ins to EGS. This allows an
Evidence Gatherer to be implemented by a third party (e.g. the evidence source) and used
in multiple SCOUT deployments. This in turn reduces the burden on application
developers as they no longer have to write and support different evidence discovery and
gathering protocols.
Finally, all Evidence Gatherers deployed in EGS are registered with a registry.
The registry is used by the Evidence Gathering Manager (Section 5.2.4) to discover the
available Evidence Gatherers for evidence gathering.

5.2.2

Evidence Handler

In EGS, Evidence Handler is responsible for mapping the gathered evidence to a standard
representation. For example, all evidence could be mapped to an interval of [-1, 1] where
1 is the best and -1 is the worst. By having a single standard evidence representation, this
simplifies evidence interpretation. No longer would an evidence user have to worry about
what a piece of evidence is representing.
Besides evidence mapping, the Evidence Handler is also responsible for the
metadata needed for evidence interpretation. The following metadata are supported by the
Evidence Handler: timestamp of evidence creation, timestamp of evidence gathered,
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identity of evidence source, identity of trustee and belief. The metadata could be provided
by the evidence source (e.g. timestamp of evidence creation), generated by the Evidence
Handler itself (e.g. timestamp of evidence gathered) or obtained from the Evidence
Gatherer (e.g. identity of evidence source, identity of trustee and belief). The mapped
evidence along with their metadata are stored into the Evidence Repository by the
Evidence Handler.
Evidence Handlers are implemented as plug-ins to EGS. This allows EGS to be
extended to support new evidence representations. As with Evidence Gatherers, all
deployed Evidence Handlers are registered with a registry. The registry is used by the
Evidence Gatherers to discover the available Evidence Handlers. The selection of an
Evidence Handler is based on evidence type and evidence representation.

5.2.3

Evidence Source Assessor

There are many ways in which an evidence source can be assessed. For example,
evidence source trust

19

in [30] is represented as a triplet: (servent_id, num_agree,
20

num_disagree). For each servent , the trustor records the number of times the servent’s
21

recommendations agrees or disagrees with the trustor’s feedback. In a recommendation ,
a servent either votes for or against another servent as a content provider. After a
successful download, any servent that voted for the content provider would have its
num_agree increase by one. Those servents that voted against the content provider would
have their num_disagree increase by one. If a download failed, any servent that voted for
the content provider would have its num_disagree increase by one. Those servents that
voted against the content provider would have their num_agree increase by one. Based on
the calculated evidence source trust (i.e., num_agree vs. num_disagree), a decision can
now be made on whether to contact a servent for recommendation. Other evidence source

19
20
21

Known as “credibility” in [30].
A servent is a node in a P2P network. It is both a trustee and an evidence source.
Known as “vote” in [30].
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assessment algorithms include [1], [11], [80] and [142]. In this thesis, an evidence source
assessment algorithm is introduced in Section 7.2.
In EGS, each Evidence Source Assessor is responsible for implementing its own
evidence source assessment algorithm. The Evidence Source Assessors are implemented
as plug-ins. This allows EGS to be easily extended to support new evidence source
assessment algorithms. The Evidence Source Assessors are also provided with access to a
scheduler. The scheduler can be used to schedule when trust in an evidence source is to
be reevaluated. This is to provide an evidence source with enough time to prove its
trustworthiness as oppose to having evidence source trust calculated after every feedback.
As with Evidence Gatherers, all deployed Evidence Source Assessors are registered with
a registry. The registry is used by the Evidence Gathering Manager (Section 5.2.4) to
discover the available Evidence Source Assessors.

5.2.4

Evidence Gathering Manager

The Evidence Gathering Manager (EGM) employs policies to determine how evidence is
to be gathered and how evidence sources are to be assessed. It is the responsibility of the
trustor to deploy the needed policies. Policies are in the form of if condition then action
and are the focus for the rest of this section.

5.2.4.1

Evidence Gathering Policy

The Evidence Gathering Manager uses evidence gathering policies (EG-Policies) to
determine how the evidence needed for belief calculation is to be gathered. The syntax
for EG-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An EG-Policy may state that specific
evidence gatherers are to be used for evidence gathering. An example is shown in Figure
13. In the figure, “Trustee”, “Belief” and “Hint” are obtained through the gatherEvidence
method. If it is hinted at that the decision is of low importance, evidence gatherers with
identity of “EG1” (lines 1-7) and “EG2” (lines 9-16) are invoked for evidence gathering.
For decision of high importance, “EG1” (lines 1-7) and “EG3” (lines 18-25) are invoked
instead. A possible reason for the EG-Policies in Figure 13 is that some evidence sources
may be more costly than others. A trustor may only be willing to use the costlier evidence
sources (i.e., invoking “EG3”) if it is hinted at that the decision is of high importance.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
then
gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG1");
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" )
then
gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG2");
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" )
then
gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG3");
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
end

Figure 13: EG-Policies (Identity)
It is not always the case that a trustor would know in advance which evidence
sources should be contacted for evidence gathering. In such cases, the better approach is
to let EGM handle the Evidence Gatherers to be invoked. Such an example is shown in
Figure 14. In the figure, the registry is used to look up all the Evidence Gatherers with
properties that satisfy the trustor’s evidence gathering requirements (line 8). Since no
evidence type is specified, the policy assumes that reputation is to be gathered. A
different approach would be to throw an exception if evidence type is not specified. After
the Evidence Gatherers are found, they are invoked for evidence gathering. An advantage
of this property-based approach is that if a new evidence gatherer is deployed, the
evidence gatherer would be included in evidence gathering if it has the necessary
properties. This is not the case with the identity-based approach where the EG-Policies
need to be updated before the new Evidence Gatherer can be used in evidence gathering.
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1 when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
4 then
5
properties = [ "TrusteeType" : trustee.getType(),
6
"Belief" : belief.getType(),
7
"EvidenceType" : "Reputation" ];
8
gatherers = Registry.lookup(properties);
9
10
for (gatherer: gatherers)
11
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
12 end

Figure 14: EG-Policy (Properties)
1
when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
4
then
5
properties = [ "TrusteeType" : trustee.getType(),
6
"Belief" : belief.getType(),
7
"EvidenceType" : "Reputation" ];
8
gatherers = Registry.lookup(properties);
9
10
sortByEvidenceourceTrust(gatherers);
11
12
for (int i=0; i<3; i++) {
13
gatherer = gatherers.get(i);
14
15
if (gatherer.getEvidenceourceTrust() > 0)
16
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
17
else
18
break;
19
}
20 end

Figure 15: EG-Policy (Evidence Source Trust)
A weakness of the EG-Policies presented in Figure 13 and Figure 14 is that the
policies do not take evidence source trust into account during evidence gathering. The
policies implicitly assume that that all the evidence sources can be trusted. This is often
not a valid assumption. The use of evidence source trust in evidence gathering is
demonstrated in Figure 15. In the figure, it is assumed that each Evidence Gatherer has
access to a single evidence source. As such, the Evidence Gatherers can be sorted based
on evidence source trust (line 10). After sorting, the three Evidence Gatherers that have
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access to the most trusted evidence sources are invoked for evidence gathering. The
invocation is under the condition that an Evidence Gatherer may be skipped if the
corresponding evidence source trust is less than or equal to zero.
As seen in Figure 15, the EG-Policy turns out to be rather complex. This is not
considering the case of an Evidence Gatherer having access to multiple evidence sources.
To simplify the use of evidence source trust in an EG-Policy, an abstraction known as
strategy has been implemented. A strategy is an encapsulation of all the steps that need to
be taken to perform evidence gathering. EGM currently supports two strategies: the
broadcast strategy and the evidence source trust strategy. The broadcast strategy involves
the invocation of all matched Evidence Gatherers in evidence gathering. An example is
shown in Figure 16. The example is functionally the same as the EG-Policy shown in
Figure 14. The evidence source trust strategy performs evidence gathering based on
evidence source trust. An example is shown in Figure 17. The example is functionally the
same as the EG-Policy shown in Figure 15. The only difference is that the example
actually works with Evidence Gatherers that have access to multiple evidence sources.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
then
strategy = new BroadcastStrategy();
strategy.set("EvidenceType", "Reputation");
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
end

Figure 16: EG-Policy (Broadcast Strategy)
1
when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" )
4 then
5
strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy();
6
strategy.set("EvidenceType", "Reputation");
7
strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", 3);
8
strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0);
9
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
10 end

Figure 17: EG-Policy (Evidence Source Trust Strategy)
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5.2.4.2

Evidence Source Assessment Policy

The Evidence Gathering Manager uses evidence source assessment policies (EAPolicies) to determine the Evidence Source Assessor that is responsible for processing the
incoming feedback. The syntax for EA-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An example
EA-Policy is shown in Figure 18. In the figure, an Evidence Source Assessor is selected
based on its identity “EA1”. Next, the assessor is configured using the set method (lines
6-7). For example, an “EvidenceWindow” of 60 restricts assessment to evidence that
have been created in the last 60 minutes. If creation timestamp is unavailable, the
timestamp associated with evidence gathering is used instead. There is no point in
assessing outdated evidence. After the completion of configuration, the assessor is
invoked to calculate evidence source trust. Depending on the evidence source assessment
algorithm implemented, an Evidence Source Assessor may choose to not calculate
evidence source trust right away. Instead, a scheduler can be used by the assessor to
schedule evidence source trust to be calculated periodically.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
feedback: BeliefFeedback( type == "Timeliness" )
then
assessor = Registry.lookup("EA1");
assessor.set("EvidenceWindow", 60);
…
assessor.assessEvidenceource(trustee, feedback);
end

Figure 18: EA-Policy

5.3 Belief Formation Service
The Belief Formation Service (BFS) is responsible for calculating the trustor’s aggregate
beliefs from the available evidence. A graphical illustration of BFS is shown in Figure
19. In the figure, the Belief Formation Manager is responsible for processing any request
for the trustor’s aggregate belief. This is accomplished through the exposed
getAggregateBelief method that has as input three parameters: trustee, aggregate belief
and hints. These input parameters are used in policies to determine how aggregate belief
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is to be calculated. This may involve the invocation of one or more Belief Engines to
perform belief calculation.
A trustor can also subscribe to the aggregate beliefs calculated by BFS. This is
accomplished through subscribeAggregateBelief method exposed by the Belief
Formation Manager. The method has the same input parameters as getAggregateBelief.
The return value of the method is a unique identifier: subscriptionId. The subscriptionId
identifier is used in the unsubscribeAggregateBelief method to unsubscribe from an
existing subscription. Aggregate belief subscription is the responsibility of the
Subscription Manager.
BFS also exposes a provideFeedback method that has as input three parameters:
trustee, aggregate belief feedbacks and hints. The input parameters are used in policies to
determine how an aggregate belief feedback can be mapped to constituent belief
feedbacks. The provideFeedback method of EGS is then invoked with the trustee and
belief feedbacks. For the rest of this section, each of the components of BFS is described
in detail.

Figure 19: Belief Formation Service

5.3.1

Belief Engine

There are many ways to calculate a trustor’s belief in a trustee (Table 3 of Section 4.3). In
BFS, belief calculation is the responsibility of the Belief Engines. Basically, each Belief
Engine is responsible for implementing its own belief formation algorithm. Evidence
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needed for belief calculation can be retrieved from the Evidence Repository. If the
evidence available in the repository are not enough for belief calculation to proceed, EGS
could be invoked to perform additional evidence gathering.
Belief Engines are implemented as plug-ins to BFS. This allows BFS to be
extended to support new belief formation algorithms. All Belief Engines deployed in BFS
are registered with a registry. The registry is used by the Belief Formation Manager
(Section 5.3.2) to discover the available Belief Engines for belief calculation.

5.3.2

Belief Formation Manager

The Belief Formation Manager (BFM) employs policies to determine how aggregate
belief in a trustee is calculated and how feedback to aggregate belief is mapped to
feedback to constituent beliefs. It is the responsibility of the trustor to deploy the needed
policies. The rest of this section is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the
belief formation policies. The second part describes aggregate belief subscription. The
last part introduces the aggregate belief feedback policies.

5.3.2.1

Belief Formation Policy

The Belief Formation Manager uses belief formation policies (BF-Policies) to determine
how beliefs and aggregate beliefs are to be calculated. The syntax for BF-Policies is
discussed in Appendix A. An example BF-Policy is shown in Figure 20. In the figure,
“Trustee”,

“AggregateBelief”

getAggregateBelief

and

“Hint”

are

obtained

method or subscribeAggregateBelief

through

either

the

method. The trustor’s

performance belief in a web service is calculated based on the trustor’s experiences. To
calculate performance belief, its constituent belief timeliness needs to be calculated (see
Figure 8 in Section 4.1.4 for reference). To calculate timeliness belief, a Belief Engine
identified as “BE1” is selected (line 6). The belief formation algorithm implemented by
the Belief Engine is then configured (lines 7-8) based on the trustor’s preferences. The
configuration step is optional as a trustor may be satisfied with the defaults of the Belief
Engine. Documentation associated with the Belief Engine should detail the defaults of the
belief formation algorithm along with what can and cannot be configured. The last step is
to invoke the Belief Engine (line 9) to calculate timeliness belief. The calculated belief
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value is returned as the belief value of aggregate belief performance. If an aggregate
belief has multiple constituent beliefs, the constituent beliefs can all be calculated by
different Belief Engines. The constituent beliefs can also be calculated by the same Belief
Engine invoked multiple times.
1
when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Performance" )
4
hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" )
5
then
6
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("BE1");
7
beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30);
8
...
9
beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Timeliness"));
10 end

Figure 20: BF-Policy
A different example could be to employ different formation algorithms based on
the trustor’s trust disposition. A pessimistic trustor could invoke multiple Belief Engines
and take the minimum of the calculated beliefs as its belief in the trustee. For an
optimistic trustor, the maximum belief value could be selected. For a realistic trustor, its
belief in a trustee could be based on the average of the beliefs calculated by the Belief
Engines.

5.3.2.2

Aggregate Belief Subscription

Upon invocation of the subscribeAggregateBelief method, the EGM creates a new
subscription and adds it to the Subscription Manager. Periodically (as defined by the
trustor), the Subscription Manager examines each of its subscriptions to determine
whether it is time for an aggregate belief to be reevaluated. If so, the aggregate belief is
calculated based on the deployed BF-Policies and returned to the subscriber. When a
subscription

is

no

longer

needed

by

the

subscriber

(i.e.,

invocation

of

unsubscribeAggregateBelief method), EGM deletes the subscription from the
Subscription Manager. As a subscriber may not be interested in all the changes in the
calculated aggregated belief, the Subscription Manager supports the registration of a filter
to filter out those aggregate belief changes the trustor is not interested in knowing. The
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syntax for aggregate belief filter is discussed in Appendix A. An aggregate belief filter
could be specified as a hint with the name of “AggregateBeliefFilter”. Several example
types of filters supported by the Subscription Manager are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Example Aggregate Belief Filters
Aggregate Belief Filter

Description

aggBelief.belief < 0

Only notify subscriber if aggregate belief has
dropped below zero

aggBelief.belief != lastAggBelief.belief

Only notify subscriber if aggregate belief has
changed from last published aggregate belief

Math.abs(aggBelief.belief –
lastAggBelief.belief) > 0.2

Only notify subscriber if the change in aggregate
belief from the last published aggregate belief is
greater than 0.2

5.3.2.3

Aggregate Belief Feedback Policy

The Belief Formation Manager uses aggregate belief feedback policies (AF-Policies) to
determine how feedback to aggregate belief is mapped to feedback to beliefs. The syntax
for AF-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An example AF-Policy is shown in Figure
21. In the figure, feedback to aggregate belief performance is mapped to feedback to
timeliness belief. Since there is only one constituent belief, timeliness belief is simply
assigned the timestamp and feedback of performance belief. As EGS expects a list of
belief feedbacks as input, the square brackets ([ ]) are used to create a list. The
provideFeedback method of EGS is then invoked with the belief feedbacks (line 8).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Performance" )
then
feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Timeliness",
aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),
aggFeedback.getFeedback());
EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]);
end

Figure 21: AF-Policy
If an aggregate belief is formed from multiple constituent beliefs, then more
complex mappings are needed. For example, a quality belief feedback of 1.0 can be
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mapped to feedback of 1.0 to accuracy belief and coverage belief. A quality belief
feedback of 0.5 can be mapped to feedback of 0.75 for accuracy belief but feedback of
0.25 for coverage belief. The mappings are based on the idea of assigning meaning to the
provided aggregate belief feedback. The mappings can be defined as different AFPolicies. For example, there is an AF-Policy for when quality belief feedback is 1.0 and
another for when quality belief feedback is 0.5.

5.4 Emotional Trust Service
The Emotional Trust Service (ETS) is responsible for calculating the trustor’s emotional
trust in a trustee. A graphical illustration of ETS is shown in Figure 22. In the figure, the
Emotional Trust Manager (ETM) is responsible for processing any request for the
trustor’s emotional trust. This is accomplished through the exposed getEmotionalTrust
method that has as input one parameter: trustee. The input parameter is used in policies to
determine the trustor’s emotional trust in the trustee. For emotional trust subscription,
ETM exposes two methods: subscribeEmotionalTrust and unsubscribeEmotionalTrust.
Both methods function in the exact same way as in the case of BFS. The syntax for
emotional trust filter is discussed in Appendix A.

Figure 22: Emotional Trust Service
Emotional trust formation is based on the establishment of a hierarchy (Section
4.1.5). The hierarchy can be constructed using emotional trust policies (ET-Policies). The
syntax for ET-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An example of ET-Policies is shown
in Figure 23. In the figure, a hierarchy has been established for horror movies. By using
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“salience”, the trustor can prioritize which policy should fire when there are multiple
conditional matches. For example, if the trustee is the horror movie “Zombieland”, then
the first three policies (lines 1-6, 8-13 and 15-20) in Figure 23 could fire. This is due to
the fact that the first policy (lines 1-6) matches any trustee; the second policy (lines 8-13)
matches any trustee that is of type movie while the third policy (lines 15-20) matches any
trustee that is of type horror movie. As only one policy can fire, the policy with the
highest “salience” would fire, thereby returning the emotional trust value of 0.8. ETS
currently only supports one hierarchy. Support for multiple hierarchies will be part of our
future work.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

salience 0
when
trustee: Trustee( )
then
0
end
salience 10
when
trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" )
then
0.5
end
salience 20
when
trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie/Horror.*" )
then
0.8
end
salience 30
when
trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie/Horror.*" && id == "Alien" )
then
1.0
end

Figure 23: ET-Policies

5.5 Summary
SCOUT is a middleware designed to support computational trust formation. SCOUT
currently consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation
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Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for evidence
gathering. BFS is responsible for aggregate belief formation. ETS is responsible for
emotional trust formation. All three services are designed with modularity, extensibility
and adaptability in mind.
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Chapter 6

6

Trust Calculator

The focus of this chapter is on introducing the Trust Calculator. This chapter is divided
into three sections. The first section provides a high level overview of the Trust
Calculator design. The second section explains how computational trust calculation can
be described using a trust calculation plan. The final section of this chapter covers the
Trust Calculator. The Trust Calculator calculates computational trust based on the
supplied trust calculation plan.

6.1 Trust Calculator Design
The Trust Calculator is designed with the following properties in mind:


Adaptability. There are many factors that could influence computational trust
calculation (see Section 4.1.6 for reference). To capture the different ways to
calculate computational trust, the Trust Calculator uses trust calculation plans
(TcPlans). A TcPlan is basically a description of how computational trust is to be
calculated. The Trust Calculator associates with each set of factors a TcPlan and
switches TcPlans as the factors change.



Ease of Use. A TcPlan provides a high level abstraction of how computational
trust calculation is implemented. By separating the design of computational trust
formation from its implementation, even non-developers such as domain experts
can participate in determining how computational trust is formed.



Reusability. Different TcPlans may share similar computational trust formation
algorithms. To achieve reusability, these algorithms are implemented as nodes
that can be referenced in TcPlans. The nodes can also be packaged into libraries.
A library can either be home grown or obtained from third parties. By leveraging
the libraries when implementing computational trust calculation, a developer
could save on development time and effort by not having to implement all the
algorithms from scratch.
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6.2 Trust Calculation Plan
Trust calculation is a form of inductive reasoning [1]. The reasoning can be modeled as
the invocation of a tree. Computational trust calculation therefore is represented as a tree
in a TcPlan. The structure of a TcPlan is shown in Figure 24. A TcPlan is divided into
two segments: nodeDefinition and trustCalculation. In nodeDefinition (lines 3-5), the
nodes of the tree (i.e., the algorithms needed for computational trust calculation) are
defined. The trustCalculation segment (lines 6-9) consists of two parts. The trigger part
(line 7) specifies when computational trust calculation is to take place. If no trigger is
specified, the assumption is for computational trust calculation to take place now. The
tree part (line 8) specifies the aggregate beliefs and emotional trust to be obtained from
SCOUT. It also specifies the tree’s construction (i.e., how the nodes are to be applied to
aggregate beliefs and emotional trust to form computational trust).
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <tcplan>
3
<nodeDefinition>
4
…
5
</nodeDefinition>
6
<trustCalculation>
7
<trigger> … </trigger>
8
<tree> … </tree>
9
</trustCalculation>
10 </tcplan>

Figure 24: Structure of TcPlan
An example TcPlan is shown in Figure 25. In the figure, computational trust is
calculated for movie selection. Four nodes are defined in the nodeDefinition segment
(lines 3-14). Each node is given an identifier through node id that is referenced in tree
construction.

The

class

attribute

specifies

the

implementation

of

a

node.

“AggregateBeliefQuery” (lines 4-6) and “EmoTrustQuery” (line 7) are used to query
SCOUT for aggregate belief and emotional trust respectively. In the case of
“AggregateBeliefQuery”, any non-“aggregateBelief” parameter would be treated as hints
to the getAggregateBelief method of BFS (Figure 28 shows some possible hints).
“AggregateBeliefToTrust” (line 8) maps the trustor’s aggregate belief to cognitive trust.
“WeightedAvg” (lines 9-13) weights all of its inputs based on the “weights” parameter.
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In the tree part of the trustCalculation segment (lines 15-22), an XML element with child
elements represents a node with child nodes. Based on the elements, a tree can be
constructed. The tree is graphically represented in Figure 26. In the figure, nodes that
interact with the SCOUT middleware are represented as squares. All other nodes are
represented as circles.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <tcplan>
3
<nodeDefinition>
4
<node id="qualityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
5
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Quality</parameter>
6
</node>
7
<node id="emoTrust" class="EmoTrustQuery"/>
8
<node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/>
9
<node id="computationalTrust" class="WeightedAvg">
10
<parameters name="weights" type="double">
11
<parameter>0.7</parameter><parameter>0.3</parameter>
12
</parameters>
13
</node>
14
</nodeDefinition>
15
<trustCalculation>
16
<tree>
17
<computationalTrust>
18
<cognitiveTrust><qualityBelief/></cognitiveTrust>
19
<emoTrust/>
20
</computationalTrust>
21
</tree>
22
</trustCalculation>
23 </tcplan>

Figure 25: TcPlan (Movie)

Figure 26: Tree of TcPlan (Movie)

74

In Figure 25, computational trust is calculated with cognitive trust being assigned
a weight of 0.7 and emotional trust being assigned a weight of 0.3. Different movie
selectors may have different views on the appropriate weight to assign to cognitive trust
and emotional trust. As a result, when constructing a TcPlan, it is not always possible to
fill in the weights a priori. A Trust Calculation Template (TcTemplate) is used to allow
portions of the TcPlan to be filled in when appropriate. An example TcTemplate is shown
in Figure 27. Figure 27 is basically Figure 25 with the weights replaced by variables. The
variables are identified by being surrounded by curly brackets (lines 8-9). Also,
comments “BEGIN: TcTemplate” (line 2) and “END: TcTemplate” (line 15) are included
to identify the TcPlan as a TcTemplate. By assigning values to the variables, the
parameterization allows for the creation of a TcPlan from a TcTemplate. Variables in a
TcTemplate are commonly associated with information that are subjective (e.g. weights)
or decision dependent (e.g. decision importance). This information cannot be known until
the application is configured or during decision making.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- BEGIN: TcTemplate -->
<tcplan>
<nodeDefinition>
…
<node id="computationalTrust" class="WeightedAvg">
<parameters name="weights" type="double">
<parameter>{COG _WEIGHT}</parameter>
<parameter>{EMO_WEIGHT}</parameter>
</parameters>
</node>
</nodeDefinition>
…
</tcplan>
<!-- END: TcTemplate -->

Figure 27: TcTemplate (Movie)
A different TcPlan example is shown in Figure 28. In the figure, computational
trust is subscribed and used in web service selection. A “timer” of class “Timer” is
defined in the nodeDefinition segment (lines 4-7). The “timer” is set to trigger
computational trust calculation immediately with zero delay (line 5). After which,
calculation is set to trigger every 60 minutes (line 6). Besides triggering calculation by
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time, the Trust Calculator also supports triggering through SCOUT subscription. For
example, by subscribing to emotional trust or aggregate belief, a TcPlan could trigger
computational trust calculations only if there has been a change in the emotional trust or
aggregate belief obtained from SCOUT.
In the figure, cognitive trust is calculated from competence belief, performance
belief and quality belief. The “expression” parameter of the “cognitiveTrust” node (lines
30-32) is associated with conditions for “aBelief1”, “aBelief2” and “aBelief3”. The
numbering used on “aBelief” refers to the order of the elements in the tree part of
trustCalculation segment (lines 44-46). Therefore, “aBelief1” refers to aggregate belief
competence; “aBelief2” refers to aggregate belief performance, “aBelief3” refers to
aggregate belief quality. All three conditions need to be evaluated to “True” for the
cognitive trust value to be set to 1 (i.e., cognitively trusted). Otherwise, cognitive trust
value is set to -1 (i.e., cognitively distrusted). As the conditions are all “AND” together,
the “cognitiveTrust” node can short circuit the evaluation process if one of the conditions
is evaluated to false.

Aggregate beliefs are obtained from SCOUT through

“AggregateBeliefQuery”. Hints are provided to BFS in terms of “importance” (lines 10,
18, 26) and “evidenceType” (lines 14-17, 22-25).
In terms of computational trust formation, the “cause” parameter of the
“computationalTrust” node (line 35) is used to determine the calculated computational
trust value. If the value obtained from the node’s left child (i.e., “emoTrust”) has a value
that is greater than zero (trust > 0), then computational trust is assigned the value of the
node’s right child (i.e., “cognitiveTrust”). Otherwise, the returned computational trust
value is -1 (i.e., distrusted). Since emotional trust is evaluated first, the
“computationalTrust” node does not need to invoke the “cognitiveTrust” node if
emotional trust is not greater than zero. This is another demonstration of how
computational trust formation can be short circuited. The tree constructed from the
TcPlan is graphically represented in Figure 29.
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <tcplan>
3
<nodeDefinition>
4
<node id="timer" class="Timer">
5
<parameter name="delay" type="integer">0</parameter>
6
<parameter name="period" type="integer">60</parameter>
7
</node>
8
<node id="competenceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
9
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Competence</parameter>
10
<parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter>
11
</node>
12
<node id="performanceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
13
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Performance</parameter>
14
<parameters name="evidenceType" type="string">
15
<parameter>Experience</parameter>
16
<parameter>Reputation</parameter>
17
</parameters>
18
<parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter>
19
</node>
20
<node id="qualityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
21
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Quality</parameter>
22
<parameters name="evidenceType" type="string">
23
<parameter>Experience</parameter>
24
<parameter>Reputation</parameter>
25
</parameters>
26
<parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter>
27
</node>
28
<node id="emoTrust" class="EmoTrustQuery"/>
29
<node id="cognitiveTrust" class="ConditionalTrust">
30
<parameter name="expression" type="string">
31
aBelief1 == 1 && aBelief2 > 0 && aBelief3 > 0
32
</parameter>
33
</node>
34
<node id="computationalTrust" class="CausalTrust">
35
<parameter name="cause" type="string">trust > 0</parameter>
36
</node>
37
</nodeDefinition>
38
<trustCalculation>
39
<trigger><timer/></trigger>
40
<tree>
41
<computationalTrust>
42
<emoTrust/>
43
<cognitiveTrust>
44
<competenceBelief/>
45
<performanceBelief/>
46
<qualityBelief/>
47
</cognitiveTrust>
48
</computationalTrust>
49
</tree>
50
</trustCalculation>
51 </tcplan>

Figure 28: TcPlan (Web Service)
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Figure 29: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service)

6.3 Trust Calculator
A Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust formation. Each application has
its own Trust Calculator that can be customized to satisfy the application’s computational
trust needs. A graphical illustration of a Trust Calculator is shown in Figure 30. The Trust
Calculator consists of two components: the Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the
Trust Calculation Engine (TcEngine). The TcPlanner is responsible for TcPlan selection
based on existing factors. The TcEngine is responsible for the execution of the selected
TcPlan.

Figure 30: Trust Calculator
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The calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator has as input two parameters:
trustee and decision factors. The parameter trustee consists of trustee factors. An
application factors parameter has also been defined and can be supplied to the Trust
Calculator through the setApplicationFactors method. Unlike trustee and decision
factors, application factors are not discarded after computational trust formation. As a
result, application factors can be reused across decisions. Trustor factors are application
factors since they generally do not change across decisions. Trustee factors and decision
factors can also be application factors. An example is decision type where an application
that only makes one type of decision can specify decision type as an application factor
thereby no longer needing to provide decision type for every calculateTrust method
invocation. All three factor types are represented as attribute-value pairs. The TcPlanner
treats all the factors as the same during TcPlan selection. If there is any attribute conflict
(e.g. decision type being provided through both decision factors and application factors),
application factors are overwritten by trustee and decision factors.
The TcPlanner uses the factors to determine the TcPlan to be selected for
execution. For example, a decision factor could be importance. There may be different
TcPlans associated with different levels of importance. Thus there may be a TcPlan
associated with a decision of high importance and another TcPlan associated with a
decision of low importance. The factors could also influence the hints to be passed to
BFS. For example, a TcPlan corresponding to a decision of high importance may cause a
hint to be passed to BFS that reflects the importance of the decision.
If the selected TcPlan is a TcTemplate, the variables in the TcTemplate need to be
parameterized by the TcPlanner. It is the responsibility of the application developer to
define the mapping from factors to TcPlans (see Section 8.2.1 for examples). After
TcPlan selection, the next step is for the TcEngine to execute the TcPlan. This is by
instantiating a calculation tree from the TcPlan. By invoking the tree, the TcEngine
executes computational trust formation. The final step is for the Trust Calculator to return
the calculated computational trust to the application. The entire process is graphically
illustrated in Figure 31.
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The subscribeTrust method of the Trust Calculator has as input three parameters:
trustee, decision factors and trust listener. The trust listener is notified of any calculated
computational trust value. The return value of the method is a unique identifier:
subscriptionId. The subscriptionId identifier is used in the unsubscribeTrust method to
unsubscribe from an existing subscription. For a subscription to succeed, the
corresponding TcPlan needs to have a trigger defined. There is no reason for
computational trust subscription if a TcPlan only needs to be invoked once. The
TcEngine automatically ignores any trigger definition in the case of calculateTrust. As a
result, the same TcPlan can be used for both computational trust query and subscription.

Figure 31: Trust Calculator’s Execution
Although in most cases having access to computational trust is enough for making
trust-based decisions. There are exceptions when an application may be interested in how
computational trust is formed. For example, if the computational trusts calculated for two
trustees are the same, examining the underlying calculations may help determine which
of the two trustees should be selected. To provide this information to the application, the
TcEngine logs the output of each of the nodes in the TcPlan. The log is then returned to
the application as part of the calculated computational trust.

6.4 Summary
The Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust calculation. It consists of two
components: the Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the Trust Calculation Engine
(TcEngine). The TcPlanner takes the trustee, decision factors and application factors into
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account when performing TcPlan selection. A TcPlan is basically a description of how
computational trust is to be calculated. The selected TcPlan is passed to the TcEngine for
execution. The calculated computational trust value is returned to the requesting
application. In this thesis, it is assumed that each application has its own Trust Calculator.
The Trust Calculator is designed with adaptability, ease of use and reusability in mind.
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Chapter 7

7

Algorithms

The focus of this chapter is on introducing the algorithms used in the computational trust
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses an
approach for calculating belief from evidence. The second section explains how evidence
source trust can be calculated.

7.1 Belief Formation
There are many ways to calculate belief from evidence (see Table 3 in Section 4.3 for a
summary of the algorithms used in the literature). A belief formation algorithm is
introduced in this section. The algorithm is applicable to both belief and aggregate belief.
The equations used in belief formation are as follows:
(1)

(2)

In equation (1),
of

,

is belief calculated from the trustor’s experiences. The values
and

are calculated from recommendations, reputations

and signals respectively. Since different evidence types have different properties, these
properties need to be taken into account when evaluating beliefs calculated from the
evidence types. Therefore, a trustor’s belief in a trustee is calculated as the weighted
average of beliefs calculated from different evidence types. A possible weight assignment
is

.
In equation (2), the reliability of

is calculated. In this thesis, reliability is

an evaluation of the quality of the underlying evidence used in belief calculation. Like
belief, reliability is calculated as weighted average of reliabilities calculated from the
evidence types. The calculated
calculation.

and

can be used in cognitive trust
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If there is no evidence of a specific type, its weights in equations (1) and (2) can
be set to zero. The equations can be used in a BF-Policy where

and

are the values returned by the Belief Formation Service (BFS). Alternatively, the
equations can be a node in the Trust Calculator. The return values of BFS are then
,

,

and

. Both approaches are viable as demonstrated

in Section 10.2.1.1. The calculation of

,

,

and

are

the responsibility of the Belief Engines. The algorithms used are the focus of the rest of
this section.

7.1.1

Experience

The equations used for calculating belief from experiences are as follows:
(

(

∑

)

(3)

)

∑

{

(

)

(

)

(4)

Equation (3) is based on the equations proposed in Regret [110] and FIRE [59]. Belief is
calculated as the weighted average of the trustor’s experiences. Each experience
assigned a weight of

is

that is based on the age of the experience. Newer experiences are

assigned greater weights since these experiences are more likely to reflect the trustee’s
current behavior. In weight calculation,

(

) is the time difference between the

current time and the creation time of the experience. The recency scaling factor or λ
determines how much

(

for different values of

are shown in Figure 32. As seen in the figure,

(

) increases. As
,

(

) influences

increases, the rate of decrease of

when
)

values of

. The relationship between

(

and for

)
,

but for
when

(

(

) and
decreases as

slows down. For
,

when

)

. Increases in

reduces the calculated belief’s sensitivity to changes in the trustee’s

behaviors. As anomalies do happen, it may be desirable to not punish a trustee too
severely for a single misbehavior.
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Figure 32: Experience Weights
In equation (4), the reliability of

is calculated based on two factors. The

first factor is the age of the experiences. If belief is calculated from old experiences, the
calculated belief may be unreliable. As

in equation (3) already takes into account the

age of an experience, a simple solution is to sum all the weights as an approximation of
the age of the experiences [59]. The problem with this approach is that the summed
weight is influenced by not just

but also the number of experiences. Having more old

experiences does not imply higher reliability. To address this problem, only the weight of
the newest experience is used as an approximation of the age of the experiences. The
newest experience is assigned the maximum weight and is represented in equation (4) as
. This is a reasonable approximation as the newest experience is also the experience
that has the most influence on the calculated

.

The second factor that influences reliability is the number of experiences used in
belief calculation. As explained in [110], experiences are needed for the trustor to
become familiar with the trustee. As familiarity with the trustee increases, so should
reliability in the calculated belief. However, once familiarity is established having more
experiences should have no impact on belief reliability. Therefore,

is used to

represent the number of experiences used in belief calculation. The value of
represents the number of experiences needed to establish familiarity. In
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equation (4), if familiarity is established, the factor is assigned the value of one.
Otherwise, the factor is represented as the ratio of
Finally,

and

.

is calculated as the weighted average of experience age
is based on the trustor’s

and experience count factors. The assignment of the weight

preferences. Old experience that are no longer relevant can be filtered out using an
experience window (

). For example, a one year experience window implies

that all experiences that are older than one year are to be filtered out and cannot be used
in belief formation.

7.1.2

Recommendation

The equations used for calculating belief from recommendations are as follows:
∑

(5)
∑

∑(
∑
{∑ (
∑

)

.

/

(6)

)

In equation (5), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the gathered
recommendations. Each recommendation

is assigned a weight based on the trustor’s

level of trust in the recommendation’s recommender (

) [20], [22], [26]. This is so

that more trusted recommenders have a larger influence on

than less trusted

recommenders.
In equation (6), the reliability of

is calculated based on two factors. The

first factor is the trustor’s level of trust in the recommenders. The more recommendations
are gathered from trusted recommenders, the higher should be the reliability of the
calculated belief. This factor is calculated by applying weighted average to recommender
trust. The weights (

) used are the same as those in equation (5). The second factor

is the number of recommendations used in belief calculation. As a recommender is not
the trustor, even the most trusted recommender could on occasion deviate from the
trustor. Therefore having recommendations from more than one recommender is
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desirable and can help increase the reliability of the calculated belief. The calculation of
this factor is similar to the calculation of the experience count factor in Section 7.1.1.
Finally,

is calculated by subtracting the inverse of recommendation

count factor from the recommender trust factor. As the recommendation count factor
decreases, this should negatively impact

which is based on the trustor’s preferences.

could be adjusted using the weight

7.1.3

. The magnitude of the impact

Reputation

The equations used for calculating belief from reputations are as follows:
∑
∑

(7)
{

∑(
∑

)

∑(
∑

)

{

(

)

(8)

In equation (7), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the gathered reputations.
Each reputation

is assigned a weight

that is calculated based on two factors. The

first factor is the trustor’s level of trust in the reputation’s reputation system (

). A

reputation should be given more weight if it is created by a more trusted reputation
system. The second factor is the number of feedbacks used by the reputation system in its
reputation calculation. If a reputation is calculated from very few feedbacks, it is less
reliable and should be given less weight. The number of feedbacks used in reputation
calculation is a metric that can readily be found in web-based reputation systems. For
example, Amazon provides information on the number of reviews available for each of
its products. The same information is also found at Best Buy, eBay, Rotten Tomatoes,
IMDb, etc. The calculation of this factor is based on the same approach used for
calculating experience count factor and recommendation count factor. Finally,
calculated as the product of reputation system trust factor and feedback count factor.

is
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In equation (8), the reliability of
used for calculating

is calculated using the same approach

in Section 7.1.2. The value of

is

calculated by subtracting the inverse of reputation count factor from the weight factor.

7.1.4

Signal

A signal can be mapped to a numeric domain. An example signal is an Extended
Verification (EV) certificate [21] that is used as confirmation of a website’s identity. The
signal could be mapped to the domain of -1, 0 and 1. If a trustee does not have an EV
certificate, this could be mapped to 0. If the EV certificate failed to be validated, this
could be mapped to -1. Otherwise, the mapping would be to 1. After mapping, the signals
can now be used in belief formation. The equations used for calculating belief from
signals are as follows:
∑

(9)
∑

∑(
∑

)

∑(
∑

)

{

(

)

(10)

In equation (9), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the supplied signals. The
calculation uses the same approach used for calculating
equation (10), the reliability of
calculating

in Section 7.1.2. In

is calculated using the same approach used for

in Section 7.1.2. The value of

is calculated by

subtracting the inverse of signal count factor from the signaler trust factor.

7.1.5

Summary

Several algorithms have been proposed for belief formation. For belief formation from
experiences, the recency scaling factor λ is used to influence the weight assigned to each
experience. As λ increases, the calculated belief becomes less sensitive to the age of the
experiences. The weight

is used to determine whether age of experiences or amount

of experiences (influenced by subjective

) should be the main determinant
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for belief reliability. For trustees that change behaviors frequently, smaller λ and larger
is preferable. The opposite would be the case for trustees that seldom change.
As for belief formation from recommendations, recommender trust can be used
to weigh each of the gathered recommendation. The subjective weight

is used to

determine the influence that the amount of recommendations (influenced by subjective
) have on belief reliability. The same concept is also applicable to belief
formation from reputations. The only difference is that reputation is weighted by not
just reputation system trust but also by the number of feedbacks used in reputation
calculation. Finally, belief formation from signals is calculated using the same approach
as that for recommendations. The beliefs calculated from different evidence types can
be aggregated using weighted average with the weight assignments dependent on the
properties of evidence types.

7.2 Evidence Source Assessment
There are many ways to calculate evidence source trust as discussed in Section 5.2.3. An
evidence source assessment algorithm is introduced in this section. The algorithm can be
viewed as consisting of two stages: evidence assessment and evidence source trust
assessment. Both stages are described in detail in the rest of this section.

7.2.1

Evidence Assessment

There are many ways to perform evidence assessment. In [127], Chebyshev’s rule [89] is
used. In [6], [67] and [115], assessment is based on compliance level. The compliance
level approach has been adopted in this section. The approach calls for the evaluation of
the gathered evidence with respect to some evidence quality standard. The standard used
in this section is the trustor’s feedback. A trustor provides feedback to the Evidence
Gathering Service (EGS) after it has interacted with the trustee. To be in compliance
therefore means that the gathered evidence should be similar to the trustor’s feedback.
The equation used to perform evidence assessment is as follows:
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|

In equation (11),

|

(11)

has an interval of [-1, 1]. Any calculated

that is less than -1 is mapped to -1 instead. Similarity is represented as the absolute
difference between the feedback

and the evidence

. If the absolute difference is

zero, then the evidence is assigned the maximum assessment of one. Increases in the
absolute difference should have a negative impact on the calculated assessment. The level
of impact can be adjusted through
and

for different

as

. The relationships between |

|

values are shown in Figure 33. In the figure,

increases, the rate of decrease of

slows down. Changes in

therefore can be used to adjust how sensitive EGS should be to evidence
noncompliance.
similarity=0.2

similarity=0.3

similarity=0.4

1.500

assessmentij

1.000
0.500
0.000
-0.500

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2

-1.000
-1.500

|fdki-evj|
Figure 33: Evidence Assessments
Using equation (11), a single feedback can be can be used to assess the qualities
of multiple evidence. However, not all gathered evidence should be considered in
evidence assessment. As a trustee’s behavior may change over time, it is unreasonable to
expect old evidence to be in compliance with the trustor’s feedback. Therefore, an
evidence window (

) has been defined that can be used to limit the evidence

considered during evidence assessment. As an example, an evidence window of 60
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minutes would limit the evidence to those that have creation timestamp (or gathered
timestamp if creation timestamp is unavailable) that is within the past hour of the
feedback’s creation.
An evidence could have multiple assessments as it could be within the
of multiple feedbacks. If so, these assessments need to be aggregated to form the trustor’s
overall assessment of the evidence. The equation used for calculating overall evidence
assessment is as follows:
∑

(

)

(

)

(12)

∑

In equation (12), the overall assessment is calculated as the weighted average of the
individual assessments. Each assessment

is assigned a weight based on the

difference between feedback creation time and evidence creation time (or evidence
gathered time if evidence creation time is unavailable). The time difference is represented
as the difference in evidence age (
difference is normalized using

(

)) and feedback age (

(

)). The resulting

. The inverse of which is the weight assigned to

an assessment. If an evidence is created or gathered close to when the trustor interacts
with the trustee (i.e., when feedback is created), it is more likely to be correct than an
older evidence. As a result, the assessment of this evidence should be given more weight
than assessment of older evidence that has a higher likelihood of being wrong.

7.2.2

Evidence Source Trust Assessment

Evidence source trust can be viewed as a form of computational trust. As a result,
evidence source trust can be calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust. In terms
of cognitive trust, the overall evidence assessments calculated using equation (12) in
Section 7.2.1 can be viewed as the trustor’s experiences with the evidence sources.
Equations (3) and (4) in Section 7.1.1 therefore can be used to calculate the trustor’s
quality belief in the evidence provided by an evidence source. With belief calculated, the
last step is the calculation of cognitive trust. The equation for cognitive trust calculation
is as follows:
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(

)

In equation (13), cognitive trust in an evidence source

(13)

is calculated as the difference

between belief and the inverse of reliability. As belief reliability decreases, this should
have a negative effect on the calculated cognitive trust. The magnitude of the effect can
be adjusted through

. For example if

, the calculated cognitive

trust would be solely based on the calculated belief.
In terms of emotional trust, it can be calculated based on the trustor’s recognition
of the evidence source. As for computational trust, its calculation is as follows:
(

(14)

)

In equation (14), computational trust is calculated as the weighted average of cognitive
trust and emotional trust. The assignment of the weight

is based on the trustor’s

preferences. Some possible values are shown in Table 1 of Section 4.1.6.1.

7.2.3

Summary

An algorithm for calculating evidence source trust is proposed in this section. The
algorithm assesses the gathered evidence by comparing the evidence to the trustor’s
feedback. If the evidence is similar to the trustor’s feedback, a positive assessment would
be assigned to the evidence. Otherwise a negative assessment would be assigned.
Similarity’s influence on the calculated assessment can be adjusted through
For an optimistic trustor, the value assigned to

.

could be larger than that for a

pessimistic trustor that views any dissimilarity from feedback with suspicion. The
window

is used to limit the evidence to be considered during assessment. The

value for

could be based on the rate at which the trustees change behaviors.

As evidence can be reused, they may be multiple feedbacks for each piece of evidence.
An equation therefore has been proposed on how evidence assessment can take into
account multiple feedbacks.
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Finally, the assessments are treated as experiences from evidence gathering. This
in turn allows for the calculation of cognitive trust with subjective weight
being used to determine the influence that belief reliability has on cognitive trust. As for
the calculation of computational trust in an evidence source, the subjective weight to be
placed on cognitive trust and emotional trust is determined by

.

7.3 Summary
Two algorithms have been proposed in this chapter. The first algorithm is used to
calculate belief from evidence of different types. The second algorithm calculates
evidence source trust in two stages: evidence assessment and evidence source trust
assessment.
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Chapter 8

8

Implementation

The focus of this chapter is on describing the implementation of the computational trust
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the
prototype implementation of SCOUT. The second section introduces the prototype
implementation of the Trust Calculator.

8.1 SCOUT
SCOUT (Figure 34) is a web application that is implemented in Java EE 5. The
implementation is deployed on GlassFish [46], an open source application server.
SCOUT consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation
Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS consists of Evidence Gathering
Manager (EGM), Policy Engine, Evidence Gatherers, Evidence Handlers, Evidence
Source Assessors and Job Scheduler. BFS consists of Belief Formation Manager (BFM),
Subscription Manager, Policy Engine and Belief Engines. ETS consists of Emotional
Trust Manager (ETM), Subscription Manager and Policy Engine. Implementation wise,
the SCOUT services shared a number of SCOUT components.

Figure 34: SCOUT Implementation
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EGM, BFM and ETM are implemented as EJBs (Enterprise Java Beans) with web
service frontends. All three managers depend on the Policy Engine for interacting with
the deployed plug-ins (Evidence Gatherers, Evidence Source Assessors and Belief
Engines). The Policy Engine is an EJB that uses the Drools rule engine [37] for policy
processing. The policies are stored in a Policy Repository. It is the responsibility of the
managers to retrieve and deploy the policies to the Policy Engine. As for the different
plug-ins, they are all implemented as EJBs with communication with the Policy Engine
being based on JMS (Java Message Service). With JMS, messages are delivered by
specifying the destination of a message (as oppose to communicating using an EJB
reference) which in our implementation is based on identities of the plug-ins and the
Policy Engine.
The Subscription Manager is implemented as an EJB. It uses the Timer Service
offered by Glassfish to perform periodic subscriptions re-evaluation. As for the
specification and processing of aggregate belief filters and emotional trust filters, these
are based on the MVEL expression language [95]. The filtered aggregate beliefs and
emotional trusts are stored in a JMS message queue. A subscriber can retrieve its
subscribed information using its subscriptionId.
The Job Scheduler is implemented as a Servlet. It is based on the open source job
scheduling service Quartz [99]. The Job Scheduler is used by the Evidence Source
Assessors to trigger periodic evidence source trust calculation. It is also used to perform
Evidence Repository maintenance. As an example, evidence stored in the Evidence
Repository are periodically examined. If the evidence is outdated, they are removed from
the Evidence Repository.

8.2 Trust Calculator
The Trust Calculator is implemented as a Java SE 6 library. The implementation of the
Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the Trust Calculation Engine (TcEngine) is
described in the rest of this section.
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8.2.1

Trust Calculation Planner

The TcPlanner is implemented as a Java interface. It consists of a single method
formulateTcPlan that has as input a single parameter factors. The return value of the
method is the formulated TcPlan. An application developer could implement its own
TcPlanner based on the TcPlanner interface. An application developer could also use one
of the two implementations included in the Trust Calculator library for TcPlan selection.
The first TcPlanner implementation in the library is the XMLTcPlanner. The
planner reads an XML document that describes the mappings from factors to TcPlan. An
example document is shown in Figure 35. In the figure, if the decision type is movie
selection (line 5), then the TcTemplate named “MovieTrust” is retrieved and
parameterized with the supplied parameters (lines 7-13). The parameterization is based
on the Jtpl template engine [66]. If the mapping is to a TcPlan, then the “tctemplate” tag
is replaced by the “tcplan” tag. XMLTcPlanner offers a simple way to perform factors to
TcPlan mapping. If more complex mappings are needed, the PolicyTcPlanner in the
library can be used instead. The PolicyTcPlanner performs TcPlan selection based on
policies. The implementation uses the Drools rule engine [37] for policy processing. An
example policy is shown in Figure 36. The example is the same as Figure 35 except the
mapping is in policy form.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <mappings>
3
<mapping>
4
<factors>
5
<factor name="DecisionType">MovieSelection</factor>
6
</factors>
7
<tctemplate>
8
<name>MovieTrust</name>
9
<parameters>
10
<parameter name="COG_WEIGHT">0.7</parameter>
11
<parameter name="EMO_WEIGHT">0.3</parameter>
12
</parameters>
13
</tctemplate>
14
</mapping>
15 </mappings>

Figure 35: Factors-TcPlan Mapping (Movie)
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

when
Factor( name=="DecisionType" && value == "MovieSelection" )
then
template = new TcTemplate("MovieTrust");
template.set("COG_WEIGHT", 0.7);
template.set("EMO_WEIGHT", 0.7);
template.parse();
end

Figure 36: Factors-TcPlan Policy (Movie)

8.2.2

Trust Calculation Engine

The TcEngine performs computational trust calculation by parsing the TcPlan supplied
by the TcPlanner. First the nodes defined in the nodeDefinition segment of the TcPlan are
parsed and instantiated. The nodes all belong to one of three types: belief-belief, belieftrust and trust-trust. A belief-belief node takes aggregate belief as input and produces
aggregate belief as output. An example belief-belief node is the AggregateBeliefQuery
node that retrieves aggregate belief from SCOUT. A belief-trust node takes aggregate
belief as input and produces trust as output. An example belief-trust node is the
AggregateBeliefToTrust node that calculates cognitive trust from aggregate belief. A
trust-trust node takes trust as input and produces trust as output. An example trust-trust
node is EmoTrustQuery node that retrieves trust from SCOUT. If a node needed for
computational trust calculation is not available in the Trust Calculator library, an
application developer can choose to implement the node by extending one of the three
basic node types.
With the nodes instantiated, the next step is to consult the tree part of the
trustCalculation segment. For each element and its children, the corresponding nodes are
retrieved and their parent-children relationships established. By performing breadth-first
traversal, a tree can be constructed. The last step is to invoke the root node of the tree to
perform computational trust calculation. It is the responsibility of each parent node to
determine which of its child nodes should be invoked to continue the calculation.
As for computational trust subscription, besides the creation of a calculation tree,
a tree also needs to be created for triggering the computational trust calculation. This
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involves the parsing of the trigger part of the trustCalculation segment. The approach
taken is exactly the same as for calculation tree creation. After both trees are created, the
next step is for the TcEngine to invoke all the leaf nodes of the trigger tree. Associated
with each trigger node are conditions that have to be satisfied before its parent node can
be triggered. This would continue on until the root node of the tree has been triggered.
This causes the invocation of the root node of the calculation tree to perform
computational trust calculation. If a node needed for triggering computational trust
calculation is not available in the Trust Calculator library, an application developer can
choose to implement the node by extending the basic trigger node type.

8.3 Summary
SCOUT is implemented as a web application. The components of SCOUT are shared by
all three SCOUT services. As an example, the Policy Engine is shared by all three
SCOUT managers. The managers interact with the SCOUT plug-ins through the
deployed SCOUT policies. As for the Trust Calculator, it is implemented as a library that
can be used to perform computational trust calculation. In terms of the TcPlanner, two
implementations have been showcased. In terms of the TcEngine, the focus is on how a
TcPlan can be parsed and instantiated for computational trust query and subscription.
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Chapter 9

9

Experiments

The focus of this chapter is on presenting the experimental results. This chapter is divided
into eight sections. The first section discusses the goals of the experiments. The second
section examines the assumptions made in the experiments. Next, the metrics for
measuring the effectiveness of computational trust are introduced. This is followed by an
introduction to the experimental testbed. In section five, the experiments based on
experiences are explained. Next, the experiments based on recommendations are
discussed. This is followed by discussion of experiments based on both experiences and
recommendations. The last section of this chapter examines the conclusions that could be
drawn from the experiments.

9.1 Goals
The experiments in this chapter are designed to show the following:


Evidence source type and behavior plays a key role in computational trust
formation. An evidence source could be of type: trustor, recommender, reputation
system or signal provider. An evidence source could behave in an honest or
malicious manner. The experiments are designed to evaluate how the
effectiveness of computational trust changes with changes in the availability of
evidence source type and evidence source behavior.



Effectiveness of different computational trust formation algorithms. Specifically,
the averaging of evidence is used as a base case. The comparison is between the
use of a window to discard old evidence (

on page 84 of Section 7.1.1)

and the use of weighted average (equation (3) of Section 7.1.1 including varying
recency scaling factor or λ) to give newer evidence more weight. The goal is to
investigate which approach is more effective. Thresholds (e.g.

) are

not considered in the experiments. We consider the varying of belief reliability to
be part of future work.
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9.2 Assumptions
The experiments in this chapter are designed with the following assumptions in mind:


Computational trust is evaluated in a web service selection scenario. There are
many different approaches to evaluate computational trust. In this chapter,
computational trust is evaluated based on its effectiveness in supporting web
service selection.



Computational trust formation. Emotional trust evaluation is considered future
work. Instead, the focus of the experiments is on cognitive trust. Basically,
cognitive trust and computational trust are treated as the same in the experiments.
As for cognitive trust formation, it is assumed that cognitive trust is formed from
the aggregate belief performance and that the aggregate belief is formed from
either experiences or recommendations. For simplicity sake, it is assumed that the
calculated belief reliability has no influence on cognitive trust. These
assumptions are setup to limit the number of variables in the experiments. The
assumptions should be reduced or even eliminated in future work. Also, it is
assumed that experience, recommendation, aggregate belief, cognitive trust,
computational trust and feedback are all in the interval of [-1, 1].



Most web services provide average usage experiences. The web services are
configured as in Table 5 where most of the web services (40%) provides usage
experiences of 0 while few of the web services (10%) provides extremely high
(0.8) or extremely low (-0.8) usage experiences. The setup is chosen as it is a
reflection of the belief that extreme usage experiences are rare while average
usage experiences are common in everyday life. This is just one possible web
services setup. Other setups such as when extremes are more common than
average or when all usage experiences are equally likely are part of future work.
It is expected that different setups may lead to different experimental outcomes.
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Table 5: Web Services (Experiments)
Number of Web Services



Usage experience

1

0.8

2

0.4

4

0

2

-0.4

1

-0.8

Most evidence sources are honest. It is assumed that most evidence sources
would not change its evidence just to mislead the trustor. The setup is chosen the
belief that most honesty is more prevalent in everyday life. Other setups such as
most evidence sources being dishonest are considered future work. It is expected
that different setups may lead to different experimental outcomes.

9.3 Metrics
The effectiveness of computational trust is evaluated using the following two metrics


Mean experience (

). After a web service is selected, the trustor could invoke

the web service to gain experience. The mean experience is calculated by
averaging all of the gained experiences. This is to evaluate the effectiveness of
computational trust in terms of its contribution to the trustor’s overall experiences.


Percentage of positive experiences (

). A trustor should avoid invoking web

services that provide below average usage experiences (i.e.,

). The

percentage of the trustor’s experiences that are greater than or equal to zero can be
used to evaluate the effectiveness of computational trust in terms of its ability to
minimize the trustor’s negative experiences.

9.4 Experimental Testbed
The experiments in this chapter are conducted using an experimental testbed that is
described in this section. This is followed by a discussion of the different factors that can
be configured in the testbed.

100

9.4.1

Overview

The experimental testbed was developed using the Java programming language. It
implements the algorithm presented in Figure 37. In the setup phase (lines 1-4), the web
services, evidence sources and selector are configured. The selector implements an
algorithm for performing web service selection. A timer is also initialized to keep track of
time in the testbed.
With the completion of the setup phase, the testbed could begin web service
selections (lines 6-19). For all of the experiments in this chapter, repeatCount is set to
100 (line 6) and selectionCount is set to 50 (line 7). The testbed therefore performs 50
web service selections. Afterwards,

and

are calculated. This process is

repeated 100 times in order to reduce the impact that randomness has on the experiments.
After 100 experimental runs, the calculated
and

and

are averaged to form the

of an experiment.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

configure web_services
configure evidence_sources
configure selector
initialize timer
for i = 1 to repeatCount
for j = 1 to selectionCount
web_service = selector.select(web_services)
experience = web_service.invoke()
EGS.provideFeedback(web_service, experience)
Evidence_Repository.store(web_serivce, experience)
increment timer
end
reset selector, timer
cleanup Evidence_Respository
end

Figure 37: Experimental Testbed’s Algorithm

9.4.2

Web Services

The testbed can be configured with four different types of web services:
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Static web service. A static web service always provides its default usage
experience to the trustor. For example, a web service with
provide experience of



always

when invoked.

Fluctuating web service. A fluctuating web service provides its default usage
experience to the trustor. Occasionally, the web service may provide usage
experience that deviates from the default. The fluctuation is usually temporary
and lasts for a short period of time. An example of a fluctuating web service is an
online retailer whose performance fluctuates during boxing week sales due to its
servers being overloaded. The fluctuation of a web service is represented using
two parameters. The parameter
The parameter

represents the likelihood of fluctuation.

represents the maximum duration of fluctuation.

Duration is measured in time units generated by the testbed’s timer. The
magnitude and duration of the fluctuation is randomly generated with a uniform
distribution. For example, a web service with

,

has a 10% chance of fluctuation. During fluctuation,

and
is

assigned a randomly generated value. This represents the magnitude of the
change. The duration of the fluctuation is randomly generated to be less than or
equal to

. By the end of the duration,

is reset. In the example,

is reset to 0.4.


Dynamic web service. A dynamic web service is a static web service whose
default usage experience changes over time. For example, the installation of new
servers may permanently improve the usage experience of the trustor. As a web
service’s popularity increases, the increased traffic may permanently deteriorate
the usage experience of the trustor. The dynamisms of a web service is
represented by the

parameter. The parameter shows the likelihood of a

default usage experience change. For each change, a new default usage
experience is randomly generated with a uniform distribution. The web service’s
usage experience is then updated by 0.1 every time unit to move towards the new
default usage experience. For example, a web service with

and
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has a 4% chance of dynamism. During dynamism, a new default
usage experience is generated. Assume that the generated value is 0.7. For the
next three time units, the usage experience provided by the web service becomes
0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively. After arriving at 0.7 (i.e., the new default usage
experience), the usage experience remains at 0.7 until the next dynamism.


Fluctuating-Dynamic (FD) web service. A FD web service has the properties of
both fluctuating web service and dynamic web service. The usage experience
provided by a FD web service is represented using three parameters:
and

. For example, a web service with

,

and

,
,

has a 4% chance of dynamism.

During dynamism, the web service’s usage experience is updated as in the case of
a dynamic web service. Otherwise, it needs to be determined whether there is the
10% chance of fluctuation. During fluctuation, the web service’s usage experience
is updated as in the case of a fluctuating web service. Otherwise, the usage
experience provided by the web service would remain the same at

. For

simplicity sake, it is assumed that a FD web service cannot be both fluctuating
and dynamic at the same time.

9.4.3

Evidence Sources

The testbed can be configured with four different types of evidence sources:


Trustor. The trustor provides its experiences with a web service to be used in
performance belief formation.



Honest recommender. An honest recommender provides its own experiences as
recommendation to be used in performance belief formation. As a recommender
may have different experiences than the trustor, the

parameter is used

to represent the difference between the trustor’s usage experience and
recommendation. The value of

is randomly generated with a uniform

distribution within a specified range. For example if

,

-,
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then any recommendation provided by the honest recommender would deviate by
at most 0.1 from the trustor’s usage experience.


Malicious recommender. The goal of a malicious recommender is to mislead the
trustor. Therefore, recommendation provided by a malicious recommender is the
inverse of the trustor’s usage experience. For example, if the trustor’s usage
experience is 0.5, then the recommendation provided would be -0.5.



Oscillating

recommender.

An

oscillating

recommender

changes

its

recommendation from honest to malicious and vice versa at regular intervals. The
interval is determined by the
,

the

oscillating

parameter. For example with
recommender

would

provide

honest

recommendations for 5 time units. The recommender would then switch to
providing malicious recommendations for 5 time units. The transition between
honest to malicious and vice versa would continue to occur every 5 time units.

9.4.4

Web Service Selection Strategies

There are many different ways to perform web service selection. The simplest strategy is
the random strategy where a web service is selected at random. Web services could also
be selected based on computational trust. An example is to always select the web service
that is most trusted. This strategy is known as the max-trust strategy. An assumption
inherent in this strategy is that computational trust can be calculated for each of the web
services. If the trustor only has access to its own experiences, then it is possible that
computational trust cannot be calculated for those web services that the trustor does not
have experiences with. When faced with this challenge, exploration may be needed.
Exploration and several other terms are defined as follows:


Unknown web service: If a web service has never been invoked by the trustor, the
web service is unknown to the trustor. Therefore, computational trust cannot be
calculated for the web service.
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Known web service: If a web service is known to the trustor, then the trustor has
experience with the web service. Therefore, computational trust can be calculated
for the web service.



Exploration: Exploration is the random selection of an unknown web service for
invocation. Exploration allows the trustor to gain experience with an unknown
web service thereby the transitioning the unknown to a known web service.



Exploitation: Exploitation utilizes the max-trust strategy to select from the known
web services.

Web service selection between unknown and known web services can be viewed as a
tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. By choosing exploration, a trustor could
determine whether an unknown web service could be trusted. By choosing exploitation,
the trustor could take advantage of the calculated computational trust for known web
services. There are different heuristics for determining when to explore and when to
exploit. The testbed supports two strategies: ε-greedy exploration strategy and Boltzmann
exploration strategy. Both strategies are introduced in the rest of this section.

9.4.4.1

ε-greedy Exploration Strategy

The ε-greedy exploration strategy uses the calculated exploration ratio to determine when
to explore and when to exploit. By generating a random number between 0 and 1, the
random number could be compared to the exploration ratio. If the random number is less
than the exploration ratio, selection is based on exploration. Otherwise, the selection is
based on exploitation. The equation for calculating exploration ratio is the following:
(15)
(

)

In equation (15), time is a determinant for the value of the exploration ratio. When
, the

. As the time unit value increases, the exploration

ratio decreases. The strategy is based on the observation that at

, the web

services are all unknown, therefore the trustor should explore. As the time unit value
increases and as more and more web services become known, the strategy should
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transition to mainly exploitation. The parameter
influences

determines how much

. The relationship between

for different values of

and

are shown in Figure 38. In the figure, higher values of

speeds up the rate at which

decreases over

dr = 0.00

dr = 0.25

dr = 0.50

.

dr = 0.75

dr = 1.00

explorationRatio

1.200
1.000
0.800
0.600
0.400
0.200
0.000
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48

time
Figure 38: Exploration Ratios

9.4.4.2

Boltzmann Exploration Strategy

The Boltzmann exploration strategy uses the calculated exploration probability to
determine when to explore and when to exploit. By generating a random number between
0 and 1, the random number could be compared to the exploration probability. If the
random number is less than the exploration probability, selection is based on exploration.
Otherwise, the selection is based on exploitation. The equations used for calculating
exploration probability are the following:
(
(

{

)
)

(

(

(16)
)

)

(17)

In equation (16), exploration probability is influenced by two factors: the experience the
trustor would gain from exploration (

) and the experience the trustor would
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gain from exploitation (

). The

is estimated by averaging all

of the trustor’s past experiences from exploration. The

is estimated from

the computational trust calculated for the most trusted web service. If the calculated
, then the strategy prefers exploration. If the calculated
, then the strategy prefers exploitation. If the calculated
, then the strategy has no preference.
The influence that

and

have on exploration

probability is determined by the

parameter. Temperature is calculated

using equation (17) and is updated after every time unit value increment. The calculated
temperature decreases as the time unit value increases. The rate of decrease is determined
by the parameter

. The parameter

temperature. As

determines the minimum value of

is used as a divisor in equation (16),

relationship between

and

,

,

and

. The

for different values of

are shown in Figure 39. The legend of the

figure is shown in Table 6.
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time
Figure 39: Exploration Probabilities
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Table 6: Legend of Figure 39

Series1

0.00

-0.40

0.25

0.01

Series2

0.00

0.00

0.25 / 0.90

0.01 / 0.25

Series3

0.00

0.40

0.25

0.01

Series4

0.00

-0.40

0.90

0.01

Series5

0.00

0.40

0.90

0.01

Series6

0.00

-0.40

0.25

0.25

Series7

0.00

0.40

0.25

0.25

In Figure 39, if

as is the case with Series2, then

exploration and exploitation are equally likely (
both would return a usage experience of 0. As
change of

) since
increases, this slows down the rate of

as shown in Series4 and Series5. Higher values of

results in a smaller range of values for

as shown in

Series6 and Series7.

9.5 Experiments Based on Experience
In this section, the testbed is configured with the trustor as the only evidence source. In
each of the subsections, the experiments conducted are based on a different web service
type. The web service selection strategies are configured as follows:


Random strategy



ε-greedy exploration strategy
o



Boltzmann exploration strategy
o
o
o

108

The max-trust strategy is not used in the experiments as computational trust cannot be
calculated for unknown web services. The computational trust formation algorithms are
configured as follows:


Average
o



Average
o



Weighted average
o

9.5.1

Static Web Services

All the experiments in this subsection are based on static web services. The section is
divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging of all the trustor’s usage
experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage experiences using experience
window and the assignment of weights based on usage experience age.

9.5.1.1

Average

Table 7 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. As a
web service selection strategy could have numerous configurations, the table only shows
the minimum and maximum values for all configurations of a strategy. The columns in
the table show the values for the minimum mean experience, the maximum mean
experience, the minimum percentage of positive experiences and the maximum
percentage of positive experiences.
Table 7: Result Summary (Static Web Services, Average:

)

Random

-0.007

-0.007

69.26%

69.26%

ε-greedy

0.399

0.640

94.00%

97.26%

Boltzmann

0.223

0.722

94.00%

99.34%
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The experimental results show that the random strategy performs significantly
worse than the ε-greedy exploration strategy and the Boltzmann exploration strategy.
This demonstrates the effectiveness of computational trust calculated from experiences.
Between ε-greedy and Boltzmann, the experimental results are not as clear cut. Both
strategies produce a high percentage of positive experiences. As for mean experience, εgreedy has the better

value while Boltzmann has the better

value. This is

due to the fact that Boltzmann is a more complicated strategy that when configured
properly could be better than ε-greedy (i.e.,
worse than ε-greedy (i.e.,
,

) but when misconfigured could be

). As an example, a good configuration is when
and

. With this configuration, exploration

could continue until the web service with

is found. After that, only

exploitation could take place which leads to

of Boltzmann. An example of a bad

configuration is when

,

and

. With this

configuration, as long there is a web service to exploit, exploitation would be conducted.
As a result, after the first exploration, all that would happen is the exploitation of the first
explored web service. This is undesirable and would lead to

9.5.1.2

of Boltzmann.

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. An
example is shown in Table 8. With all of its old experiences discarded, a known web
service may be treated as an unknown web service. This means that the known web
service may be selected during exploration. As a web service’s usage experiences never
changes, exploring a web service that has already been explored would only lead to
worse usage experiences.
Table 8: Result Summary (Static Web Services, Average:

)

ε-greedy

-0.006

0.464

69.36%

97.20%

Boltzmann

0.223

0.699

81.20%

99.34%
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Weights when applied to computational trust formation should have no effect on
the experimental results. This is due the fact that usage experiences from a web service
never changes. Therefore, the observations made in Section 9.5.1.1 are applicable to
weighted average.

9.5.2

Fluctuating Web Services

All the experiments in this subsection are based on fluctuating web services. Unless
otherwise specified, the web services are assumed to have

and

. This is a pessimistic assumption as it assumes a 10% chance of service
fluctuation. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging of
all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage
experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on usage
experience age.

9.5.2.1

Average

Table 9 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in
improving the selection of fluctuating web services. However when compared to Table 7,
the values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that the usage experiences
obtained during fluctuation are not representative of the web service’s default usage
experience. As a result, if a fluctuation is in the positive direction, this may cause the
trustor to overestimate a web service. If a fluctuation is in the negative direction, this may
cause the trustor to avoid a web service that should have been selected for invocation.
Table 9: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Average:

Random

-0.014

-0.014

66.54%

66.54%

ε-greedy

0.361

0.514

88.72%

91.20%

Boltzmann

0.284

0.567

88.42%

92.84%

To examine how changes to

and

)

influences web service

selection, two additional experiments have been conducted. Representative results are
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seen in Table 10 and Table 11. Table 10 shows the experimental results when there is an
increase in

. Table 11 shows the experimental results when there is an increase in
. In both cases, the experimental results are lower than those in Table 9. This

is due to the fact that an increase in
increase in

would cause more fluctuation while an

would cause longer fluctuation.

Table 10: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services:
, Average:

)

Random

-0.002

-0.002

65.38%

65.38%

ε-greedy

0.311

0.402

84.60%

86.44%

Boltzmann

0.254

0.455

83.82%

88.14%

Table 11: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services:
, Average:

9.5.2.2

)

Random

-0.009

-0.009

65.78%

65.78%

ε-greedy

0.313

0.433

86.32%

89.08%

Boltzmann

0.220

0.480

86.38%

91.08%

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. An
example is shown in Table 12. In the table, the values of the different metrics all are
lower than in Table 9 with the only exception being the

of Boltzmann. In this

particular case, the value in Table 9 is due to a bad configuration which led to a lack of
exploration. With a smaller experience window, the calculated computational trust
becomes more sensitive to fluctuation which in turn led to more exploration. The increase
in exploration led to improvement in

. As for the reasoning for the negative

impact on web service selection, this is due to the fact that fluctuations are rare and that
the exploration of already explored web services in general is not worth the risk.
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Table 12: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Average:

ε-greedy

0.002

0.367

67.80%

90.80%

Boltzmann

0.310

0.464

81.82%

92.18%

)

When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown
to have a negative impact on mean experience but a positive impact on the percentage of
positive experiences. An example is shown in Table 13. By incorporating weights,
computational trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in
sensitivity may cause more mistrusting during fluctuation which in turn causes the drop
in values of the

metric. However, fluctuation could last for more than one time unit.

If the fluctuation produces a negative usage experience, the increase sensitivity could
cause the trustor to switch to a different web service. The trustor therefore would not
have to experience the rest of the negative usage experiences. This in turn improves the
values of the

metric.

Table 13: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Weighted Average:
)

9.5.3

ε-greedy

0.284

0.407

89.40%

91.46%

Boltzmann

0.235

0.403

89.24%

93.02%

Dynamic Web Services

All the experiments in this subsection are based on dynamic web services. Unless
otherwise specified, the web services are assumed to have
chosen to be less than

. The

is

as it is assumed that dynamic behavior changes occur less

frequently than fluctuations. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes
the averaging of all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering
of usage experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on
usage experience age.
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9.5.3.1

Average

Table 14 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in
improving the selection of dynamic web services. However when compared to Table 7,
the values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that changes in a web service’s
default usage experience could cause the calculated computational trust to be outdated by
the time of web service selection.
Table 14: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Average:

)

Random

-0.018

-0.018

58.00%

58.00%

ε-greedy

0.318

0.416

85.54%

87.36%

Boltzmann

0.234

0.493

84.62%

90.60%

To examine how changes to
experiment is conducted with

influences web service selection, an
increased to 0.08. The experimental results are

shown in Table 15. The results show that the increase in dynamism could have negative
impact on web service selection.
Table 15: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services:

, Average:

)

9.5.3.2

Random

0.005

0.005

56.98%

56.98%

ε-greedy

0.267

0.336

80.80%

82.32%

Boltzmann

0.212

0.404

77.94%

86.00%

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a positive impact on web service selection. An
example is shown in Table 16. In the table, the values of the different metrics all
performed better than Table 14 with the exceptions being

and

of ε-
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greedy. In this particular case, the parameter

of ε-greedy is set to 0, therefore

preference would always be given to exploration. With

, this means that

there is always unknown web services to explore (due to discarding of old experiences).
As a result, the strategy would always explore and never exploit leading to lower
experimental results. As for the reasoning for the positive impact on web service
selection, this is due to the fact that a web service’s default usage experience may change
over time. As a result, it is worthwhile to re-explore web services to see if anything has
changed from the last exploration.
Table 16: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Average:

ε-greedy

-0.007

0.422

58.72%

92.74%

Boltzmann

0.295

0.532

86.28%

95.54%

)

When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown
to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive
experiences. An example is shown in Table 17. By incorporating weights, computational
trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in sensitivity
allows the trustor to more quickly switch web services when faced with dynamism.
Table 17: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Weighted Average:

9.5.4

ε-greedy

0.380

0.463

91.72%

94.74%

Boltzmann

0.317

0.547

91.64%

96.42%

)

Fluctuating-Dynamic Web Services

All the experiments in this subsection are based on FD web services. Unless otherwise
specified, the web services are assumed to have

,

and

. This assumption is based on the parameter assumptions in Section 9.5.2
and Section 0. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging
of all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage
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experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on usage
experience age.

9.5.4.1

Average

Table 18 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in
improving the selection of FD web services. However when compared to Table 7, the
values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that fluctuation and dynamism
both can negatively impact web service selection.
Table 18: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Average:

9.5.4.2

)

Random

-0.009

-0.009

58.40%

58.40%

ε-greedy

0.250

0.345

80.86%

81.96%

Boltzmann

0.211

0.397

79.48%

85.52%

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a positive impact on web service selection. An
example is shown in Table 19. In the table, the values of the different metrics all
performed better than Table 18 with the exceptions being
greedy and

and

of ε-

of Boltzmann. In the case of ε-greedy, the reasoning is the same as

in Section 0. In the case of Boltzmann, the bad configuration causes the strategy to
perform too much exploration and not enough exploitation (21 explorations and 29
exploitations). As for the reasoning for the positive impact on web service selection, this
is due to the fact that exploration of already explored web services is worthwhile. This is
the case with dynamism as shown in Section 0. Although the impact is negative with
fluctuation, the negative impact is not big enough to overcome the positive impact of
avoiding dynamism.
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Table 19: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Average:

)

ε-greedy

-0.004

0.350

59.04%

86..44%

Boltzmann

0.277

0.411

77.34%

88.44%

When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown
to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive
experiences. An example is shown in Table 20. By incorporating weights, computational
trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in sensitivity
allows the trustor to more quickly switch web services when faced with dynamism.
Although this may lead to unnecessary switches in the case of fluctuation (it is better to
wait out the fluctuation that switch web services), the negative impact is not big enough
to overcome the positive impact of avoiding dynamism.
Table 20: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Weighted Average:

ε-greedy

0.288

0.373

86.10%

87.94%

Boltzmann

0.294

0.414

85.52%

89.20%

)

9.6 Experiments Based on Recommendation
In this section, the testbed is configured with recommender as the only type of evidence
source. In each of the subsections, the recommenders are configured differently. The
testbed is also configured with static web services. There is no need to experiment with
fluctuating, dynamic or fluctuating-dynamic web services. This is due to the fact that
recommendation is calculated based on deviation from the trustor’s usage experience. As
usage experience changes with different web service type, the change would also be
reflected in the recommendations. As a result, any observations made concerning a static
web service should be applicable to the other web service types as well. This is a
weakness of our recommendation definition that should be addressed in future work. In
terms of web service selection, only the max-trust strategy is evaluated. This is due to the
fact that recommendations are available for each of the web services.
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In terms of computational trust formation, it is based on equation (5) of Section
7.1.2. The formation is configured as follows:




Evidence source assessment (Section 7.2)
o Evidence assessment


o Evidence source trust assessment


Cognitive trust formation


Average
o



Average
o



Weighted average
o



In equation (5), recommender trust is used as weights for each of the gathered
recommendations. As a trustor may not have evidence source trust in all of the
recommenders, exploration of recommenders (similar to exploration of web services) is
needed. For each recommendation gathering, recommendations are gathered from both
unknown recommenders and known recommenders. For example, if
and

, 1 unknown recommender and 2 known recommenders are

contacted for recommendation gathering. The recommendations gathered from unknown
recommenders are not used in performance belief formation. The recommendations
however are used in evidence source assessment. This in turn allows evidence source
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trust to be calculated for unknown recommenders without their recommendations
influencing computational trust formation.
As for the formation of evidence source trust, since it is a form of computational
trust, it is assumed to be based solely on cognitive trust without considering belief
reliability. For simplicity sake, it is assumed that recommendations would be gathered at
every time unit. Moreover, the feedback provided would only be used to assess the
recommendation gathered in the previous time unit. The calculated recommendation
assessments are used in evidence source trust formation. The formation is based on either
average, average with experience window or weighted average.

9.6.1

Similar Recommenders

The recommenders in this subsection are configured as in Table 21. In the table, there are
four different variations of honest recommenders. The variations are based on either
disposition or magnitude. A recommender could either be more optimistic (
,

-) or more pessimistic (

,

-) than the trustor. The magnitude of
,

deviation could be either 0.1 (
,

-). As

-) or 0.2 (

in the experiments configuration (Section 0), this

means that there would be no negative assessment for any recommendation obtained
from honest recommenders. These honest recommenders can be thought of as being
“similar” to the trustor. In terms of the “bad” recommenders, 2 malicious and 2
oscillating recommenders (minority of recommenders) have been configured.
Table 21: Similar Recommenders (Experiments)
Number of Recommenders

Recommender Type

3

Honest (

,

-)

3

Honest (

,

-)

2
2
2

,

Honest (

-)

,

Honest (

-)

Malicious

1

Oscillating (

)

1

Oscillating (

)
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As for the rest of this subsection, it is divided into two parts. The first part
describes the calculation of evidence source trust through the averaging of all the
recommendation assessments. The second part explores the filtering of recommendation
assessments using experience window and the assignment of weights based on
recommendation age.

9.6.1.1

Average

The relationship between

and

for different values of

shown in Figure 40. The relationship between
values of

and

are
for different

are shown in Figure 41. By comparing the experimental results of

the max-trust strategy with the experimental results of the random strategy (Table 7 of
Section 9.5.1.1), the results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from
recommendations (similar recommenders) is effective in improving the selection of static
web services.
exploration = 0
exploration = 3

exp

exploration = 1
exploration = 14

exploration = 2

0.820
0.800
0.780
0.760
0.740
0.720
0.700
0.680
0.660
1

2

3

4

5

6

exploitation
Figure 40: Mean Experience (Similar Recommenders, Average:

)

The figures also suggest that an increase in exploitation has a positive effect on
mean experience and percentage of positive experiences. This is due to the fact that most
recommenders are honest and similar to the trustor. An increase in exploitation allows the
gathered honest recommendations to overwhelm the recommendations provided by the
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“bad” recommenders. The only exception in the figures is when

. In

this case, the overwhelm scenario is impossible when a “good” recommendation and a
“bad” recommendation cancel each other out. As for exploration, the figures suggested
that exploration is always preferable over no exploration. However, the impact of
increase in exploration is small. This is due to the fact that most recommenders are honest
and similar to the trustor. Therefore, similar recommenders can be easily located even
with

.
exploration = 0
exploration = 3

exploration = 1
exploration = 14

exploration = 2

102.00
100.00
98.00

+exp

96.00
94.00
92.00
1

2

3

4

5

6

exploitation
Figure 41: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Similar Recommenders, Average:
)

9.6.1.2

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to evidence source trust assessment, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. The
negative impact only applies to small number of exploitations. This is due to the fact that
the positive impact of exploitation is able to overwhelm the negative impact of smaller
experience window. An example is shown in Figure 42 and Figure 43. The negative
impact of experience window is due to the fact that for the majority of recommenders,
there is no need to reevaluate evidence source trust.
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When weights are applied to evidence source trust assessment, this has been
shown to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive
experiences. The positive impact only applies to web service selection with small number
of exploitation. This is due to the fact that the positive impact of exploitation is able to
overwhelm the positive impact of weighted average. An example is shown in Figure 44
and Figure 45. By incorporating weights, evidence source trust becomes more sensitive to
assessment changes. The increase in sensitivity allows the trustor to more quickly filter
out oscillating recommenders.
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9.6.2

)

Dissimilar Recommenders

The recommenders in this subsection are configured as in Table 22. In the table, four new
variations of honest recommender have been introduced. All four variations have
that are greater than

. This means that the recommendations

gathered from these recommenders could potentially be assessed negatively. These
honest recommenders can be thought of as being “dissimilar” to the trustor. Moreover,
there are more dissimilar recommenders than similar recommenders.
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Table 22: Dissimilar Recommenders (Experiments)
Number of Recommenders
1

Recommender Type

1

-)
,

Honest (

1

-)

,

Honest (

-)

3

Honest (

,

-)

2

Honest (

,

-)

1

Honest (

,

-)

1

Honest (

,

-)

2

9.6.2.1

,

Honest (

Malicious

1

Oscillating (

)

1

Oscillating (

)

Average

The relationship between

and

shown in Figure 46. The relationship between
values of

for different values of
and

are
for different

are shown in Figure 47. By comparing the experimental results of

the max-trust strategy with the experimental results of the random strategy (Table 7 of
Section 9.5.1.1), the results demonstrated that the computational trust calculated from
recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) is effective in improving the selection of
static web services. When the results are compared to Figure 40 and Figure 41 however,
the introduction of dissimilar recommenders is shown to have a negative impact on web
service selection.
Figure 46 suggests that an increase in exploitation has a mixed effect on mean
experience. This is due to the fact that a dissimilar recommender has the potential for
leading or misleading the trustor. As a result, an increase in exploitation could potentially
improve or deteriorate mean experience. Figure 46 suggests that an increase in
exploitation has a positive effect on percentage of positive experiences. This is due to the
fact that the recommendations provided by dissimilar recommenders generally are of the
same sign as that of a web service’s usage experience. For example, if a web service has
, for recommendation to be negative (i.e., of different sign), a dissimilar
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recommender needs to have

. As deviation is randomly generated, this

is going to rarely occur when compared to the case of the recommendation remaining
positive. The same reasoning could also apply to
and

and to lesser extents

. As a result, even when recommendations from

dissimilar recommenders dominate, the calculated computational trust is still likely to
result in the selection of a web service with positive usage experience.
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Figure 46 and Figure 47 suggest that an increase in exploration has a mixed effect
on mean experience and percentage of positive experiences. Given that dissimilar
recommenders are the majority and that they could either lead or mislead the trustor,
more exploration therefore could either improve or deteriorate web service selection.

9.6.2.2

Experience Window and Weights

When experience window is applied to evidence source trust assessment, a decrease in
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. The
negative impact only applies to web service selection with small number of exploitations.
This is due to the fact that the mixed impact of exploitation is able to overwhelm the
negative impact of smaller experience window. An example is shown in Figure 48 and
Figure 49. The negative impact of experience window is due to the fact that for the
majority of recommenders (similar, dissimilar and malicious recommenders), there is no
need to reevaluate evidence source trust.
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When weights are applied to evidence source trust assessment, this has been
shown to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive
experiences. The positive impact only applies to web service selection with a small
number of exploitations. This is due to the fact that the mixed impact of exploitation is
able to overwhelm the positive impact of weighted average. An example is shown in
Figure 50 and Figure 51. By incorporating weights, evidence source trust becomes more
sensitive to assessment changes. The increase in sensitivity allows the trustor to more
quickly filter out dissimilar recommenders and oscillating recommenders.
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9.7 Experiments Based on Experience, Recommendation
In this section, the testbed is configured with two types of evidence sources: trustor and
recommender. In each of the subsections, the evidence sources are configured differently.
The testbed is also configured with static web services. As the experiments are designed
to evaluate whether experience and recommendation complement each other in
computational trust formation, any observations made concerning static web services
should be applicable to the other web service types as well. In terms of web service
selection, only the max-trust strategy is evaluated. This is due to the fact that exploration
is not needed due to the existence of recommendations.
Computational trust formation is based on applying weighted average to
experience-based performance belief and recommendation-based performance belief.
Experience-based performance belief is assigned a weight of 0.7. Recommendation-based
performance belief is assigned a weight of 0.3. The weight assignment is based on the
observation that the trustor would always have its own best interest in mind while that
may not be the case with recommenders. If the trustor does not have experiences with a
web service, computational trust formation would be based solely on recommendationbased performance belief. In terms of belief formation, experience-based performance
belief is based on the averaging of all the trustor’s usage experiences. As for
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recommendation-based belief, evidence source trust formation is based on the averaging
of all the calculated recommendation assessments. The experimental results obtained
from evidence averaging should be applicable to cases of experience window and
weighted average.

9.7.1.1

Trustor and Similar Recommenders

An example of the relationship between

and

for experience,

recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 52. An
example of the relationship between

and

for experience,

recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 53.
In the figures, experience is based on

and

of Boltzmann in

Table 7 of Section 9.5.1.1. This is the best experimental results based on experience.
Recommendation is based on Figure 40 and Figure 41 with

. The

experimental results in the figures demonstrated that in most cases computational trust
calculated from experiences and recommendations (similar recommenders) can improve
on the experimental results of computational trust calculated from either experiences or
recommendations (similar recommenders) in the selection of static web service. The only
exception is when

in Figure 53. In this case, if the recommender is an

oscillating recommender, it could cause the trustor to try out web services with negative
usage experiences.
As for the reasoning for the improvement over experience-based computational
trust, this is due to the fact that exploration is no longer random but instead is directed by
the calculated recommendation-based performance belief. The improvement over
recommendation-based computational trust is due to the fact that experience-based
performance belief is given more weight and in some cases can help mitigate when
recommendation-based
recommendations.

performance

belief

is

dominated

by

misleading
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9.7.1.2

,

)

Trustor and Dissimilar Recommenders

An example of the relationship between

and

for experience,

recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 54. In the
figure, the experimental results demonstrated that for small number of exploitation,
computational trust calculated from experiences and recommendations (dissimilar
recommenders) can improve on the experimental results of computational trust calculated
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from either experiences or recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) in the selection
of static web service. However, as exploitation increases, recommendation-based
performance belief starts to coalesce around a single web service. Since the web service
could be the recommendation of dissimilar recommenders, the mean experience ends up
being lower than when computational trust is calculated from experiences.
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,
An example of the relationship between

)
and

for experience,

recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 55. In the
figure, the experimental results demonstrated that in most cases computational trust
calculated from experiences and recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) can
improve on the experimental results of computational trust calculated from either
experiences or recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) in the selection of static web
service. The only exception is when

. In this case, if the recommender

is an oscillating recommender, it could cause the trustor to try out web services with
negative usage experiences. As the recommendations provided by recommenders are
usually of the same sign as that of the recommended web service’s usage experience,
experience-based computational trust is improved upon due to the trustor seldom having
to invoke web service with negative usage experience. As for recommendation-based
computational trust, it is improved upon due to the mitigating effect of experience-based
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performance belief on recommendation-based performance belief that is dominated by
misleading recommendations.
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9.8 Conclusions and Discussions
The experiments have demonstrated the following:


Evidence source type and behavior plays a key role in computational trust
formation. With only access to experiences, the trustor has to depend on
exploration during web service selection. Too much exploration or too much
exploitation is both undesirable. The optimal amount of exploration and
exploitation is dependent on the available web services. With only access to
recommendations, the trustor’s performance in web service selection is dependent
on the composition of the recommenders. If most of the recommenders are similar
to the trustor, recommender exploration and exploitation is desirable. This is not
the case when most of the recommenders are dissimilar to the trustor. Although
experience and recommendation when used together in most cases can improve
web service selection. However, performing exploration based solely on
recommendations as in Section 9.7 may not be the best possible solution. Some
randomness may be needed to prevent the trustor from being misled by

132

recommendations and end up only exploiting a single web service. As evidence
plays an important role in computational trust formation, middleware support for
evidence gathering is provided in the computational trust architecture in the form
of the Evidence Gathering Service.


Effectiveness of different computational trust formation algorithms. The
experiments showed that weighted average is a relatively effective approach to
computational trust formation. Weighted average works well with web services
that are static, dynamic and fluctuating-dynamic. During evidence source trust
formation, weighted average is also an improvement over average. The only case
for which weighted average does not work well is with fluctuating web services.
Since fluctuating web services only fluctuate for a small amount of time, the best
strategy is to wait out the fluctuation as opposed to switching to a different web
service. There is a tradeoff between switching web services too early in cases of
fluctuation vs. switching web services too late in cases of dynamism. This is an
area that requires further investigation.
As for experience window, the experiments showed that it can improve
web service selection in cases of dynamic and fluctuating-dynamic web services.
However, experience window when applied to average also performs worse in all
the other cases. Therefore, experience window should not be used for short term
evidence filtering. Instead, experience window should be in long term filtering to
limit the amount of evidence to be considered during belief formation. Identifying
the appropriate window to use is an area that requires further investigation.

9.9 Summary
The experiments in this chapter are designed with two goals in mind. The first goal is to
evaluate the role that evidence source availability plays in computational trust formation.
The second goal is to investigate how different computational trust formation algorithms
performed. Both goals are examined through a series of experiments. The experiments
are conducted using an experimental testbed. Factors including web services, evidence
sources and web service selection strategies are varied during the experiments. The
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experimental results have demonstrated the importance of evidence source availability to
the quality of the formed computational trust. The results have also demonstrated that
weighted average is a relatively better algorithm than average and average with
experience window.
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Chapter 10

10 Scenarios
The focus of this chapter is to demonstrate the ability of the computational trust
architecture (SCOUT and Trust Calculator) to support computational trust formation in
different scenarios. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes a
movie scenario. The second section describes a web service scenario.

10.1 Movie Scenario
The first part of this section provides a general overview of the movie scenario. The
scenario’s implementation is described in the second part of this section.

10.1.1

Overview

In the movie scenario, the movie selector uses an application to view the available
movies and to rank the movies based on computational trust. Before ranking, the
application first needs to instantiate the Trust Calculator. The instantiated Trust
Calculator can be configured by calling the setApplicationFactors method (Section 6.3)
with the following input parameters:


application factors
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “MovieSelection”

The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational
trust for movie selection. Although “DecisionType” is a decision factor, it is passed to the
Trust Calculator as an application factor. This is due to the fact that “DecisionType” does
not change across decisions. There is no point in passing “DecisionType” for every
computational trust formation. To calculate computational trust in a movie, the
application calls the calculateTrust method (Section 6.3) of the Trust Calculator. An
example invocation could have the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “Zombieland”
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o type = “Movie/Horror”


decision factors = null

The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke the TcPlanner.
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 35 of Section 8.2.1 to select the
TcPlan needed for computational trust calculation. The TcPlanner retrieves the
TcTemplate named “MovieSelection” in Figure 27 of Section 6.2. The TcPlanner then
parameterizes the TcTemplate with the parameters in the mappings. The resulting TcPlan
is shown in Figure 25 of Section 6.2. The tree constructed from the TcPlan is graphically
represented in Figure 26 of Section 6.2. Computational trust is calculated as the weighted
average of cognitive trust and emotional trust. Cognitive trust is calculated based on the
selector’s quality belief. The formed TcPlan is returned to the Trust Calculator.
After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the
TcPlan. The selector’s quality belief in a movie can be obtained by calling the
getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “Zombieland”
o type = “Movie/Horror”



aggregate belief
o type = “Quality”



hints = null

The BF-Policy responsible for calculating quality belief in a movie is shown in Figure 56.
In the figure, the Belief Engine identified as “SCOUT-Reputation” is selected to perform
belief calculation (line 5). “SCOUT-Reputation” implements the belief formation
algorithm described in Section 7.1.3. The configuration of the Belief Engine (lines 6-8) is
mapped to the algorithm as follows:


FeedbackThreshold →
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ReputationCountWeight →



ReputationThreshold →

The configuration values are determined by the movie selector during BF-Policy creation.
All SCOUT policies need to be created before computational trust calculation. The last
step in the BF-Policy is to invoke the Belief Engine to perform belief calculation.
1 when
2
trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" )
3
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Quality" )
4 then
5
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Reputation");
6
beliefEngine.set("FeedbackThreshold", 10);
7
beliefEngine.set("ReputationCountWeight", 0.3);
8
beliefEngine.set("ReputationThreshold", 2);
9
10
belief = new Belief(aggBelief.getType());
11
beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief);
12 end

Figure 56: BF-Policy (Movie)
The Belief Engine calculates the selector’s quality belief in a movie based on the
reputations stored in the Evidence Repository. To maximize belief reliability, if the
number of reputations available is less than the “ReputationThreshold” in Figure 56, the
Belief Engine invokes the gatherEvidence method of EGS with the following input
parameters to gather more reputation values:


trustee
o id = “Zombieland”
o type = “Movie/Horror”



belief
o type = “Quality”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Reputation”
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The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of quality reputations of a movie is shown in
Figure 57. In the figure, the “BroadcastStrategy” is invoked. This means that all Evidence
Gatherers that can gather movie’s quality reputations are invoked to perform reputation
gathering. The gathered reputations are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence
Handlers. The mapped reputations are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in
belief calculation.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

when
trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" )
belief: Belief( type == "Quality" )
hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Reputation" )
then
strategy = new BroadcastStrategy();
strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint.getValue());
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
end

Figure 57: EG-Policy (Movie)
The calculated quality belief is returned to the Trust Calculator. The TcEngine
then maps the quality belief to the selector’s cognitive trust in the movie. Emotional trust
is obtained by calling the getEmotionalTrust method of ETS with the following
parameter:


trustee
o id = “Zombieland”
o type = “Movie/Horror”

The ET-Policies responsible for emotional trust of movies are shown in Figure 23 of
Section 5.4. After emotional trust is obtained, it is returned to the Trust Calculator. The
TcEngine then calculates computational trust by applying weighted average to the
calculated cognitive trust and emotional trust. The last step is for the calculated
computational trust to be returned to the application to be used in movie ranking. The
computational trust formation process is graphically illustrated in Figure 58. The highest
ranked movie (i.e., most trusted movie) is then selected by the movie selector.
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Figure 58: Computational Trust Formation (Movie)

10.1.2

Implementation

The movie ranking application was developed using the Java programming language.
Reputations needed for quality belief calculation are obtained from Rotten Tomatoes and
IMDb. For simplicity sake, the reputations are looked up and stored in a database. The
reputations are stored in the same format as the original website. When EGS needs to
perform reputation gathering, it accesses the database to obtain a movie’s reputation. An
Evidence Gatherer and Handler pair has been implemented for accessing the reputations
calculated by Rotten Tomatoes. A different Evidence Gatherer and Handler pair is used
to access the reputations calculated by IMDb.

10.2 Web Service Scenario
The first part of this section provides a general overview of the web service scenario. The
scenario’s implementation is described in the second part of this section.

10.2.1

Overview

The web service scenario described in this subsection is a more complex version of the
scenario described in Section 1.3.2. The scenario consists of three decisions: web service
selection, negotiation and management. Each decision along how its associated
computational trust is calculated is introduced in the rest of this subsection.

139

10.2.1.1 Web Service Selection
A web service discovery, selection and negotiation web service (DSN) has been
implemented. An application could invoke the findWebService method of DSN to obtain
a web service. The method has as input three parameters: web service type, web service
classifications and web service importance. An example invocation could have the
following input parameters:


web service type = “Type1”



web service classifications = [“Consumer”, “Enterprise”]



web service importance = “Low”

Basically, the invocation would cause DSN to find a web service of “Type1”. The web
service could be a consumer level web service or an enterprise level web service. The
invocation is of low importance to the trustor. The importance level is used to determine
computational trust formation.
After web service discovery based on web service type and web service
classifications, the next step for DSN is to calculate computational trust for each of the
discovered web services. After the instantiation of the Trust Calculator, it is configured
by calling the setApplicationFactors method with the following input parameters:


application factors
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “WebServiceSelection”

The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational
trust for web service selection. To calculate computational trust in a web service, the
DSN calls the calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator. An example invocation
could have the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”
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decision factors
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

Information about the trustee is obtained during web service discovery. As for decision
factors, the decision’s importance is obtained from web service importance supplied to
the findWebService method. The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke
the TcPlanner.
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 59 to select the TcPlan needed
for computational trust calculation. In the figure, there are two possible TcPlans. There is
a TcPlan for “Importance” is “Low” and another for “Importance” is “High”. In the case
of low importance (lines 3-12), the TcPlan “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” is returned to the
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance (lines 13-22), the TcPlan “WSSelectionTrust-High” is returned to the Trust Calculator.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <mappings>
3
<mapping>
4
<factors>
5
<factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceSelection</factor>
6
<factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor>
7
<factor name="Importance">Low</factor>
8
</factors>
9
<tcplan>
10
<name>WS-SelectionTrust-Low</name>
11
</tcplan>
12
</mapping>
13
<mapping>
14
<factors>
15
<factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceSelection</factor>
16
<factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor>
17
<factor name="Importance">High</factor>
18
</factors>
19
<tcplan>
20
<name> WS-SelectionTrust-High</name>
21
</tcplan>
22
</mapping>
23
…
24 </mappings>

Figure 59: Factors-TcPlan Mappings (Web Service Selection)
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The “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” TcPlan is shown in Figure 60. In the figure,
computational trust is based solely on the calculated cognitive trust. Since emotional trust
is not considered, the calculated computational trust can be viewed as “rational”. As both
cognitive trust and computational trust have the same values, the TcPlan can be
simplified by returning the calculated cognitive trust to DSN (lines 39-47).
In the figure, cognitive trust calculation is the responsibility of the
“cognitiveTrust” node (line 35). Cognitive trust is calculated from the aggregate belief
value of “aggregateBelief”. The “aggregateBelief” node (lines 30-34) has a “cause”
parameter (aBelief > 0 && reliability > 0.5) that when evaluated to true based on the
aggregate belief value of its left child (i.e., “competenceBelief”) would return the
aggregate belief value of its right child (“avgAggregateBelief”). Otherwise, it would
return

and

(i.e., disbelief). This aggregate belief value

would be mapped by the “cognitiveTrust” node to

(i.e., distrust). The

“avgAggregateBelief” node (lines 24-29) calculates aggregate belief by averaging the
calculated accessibility belief and competence belief. Competence, accessibility and
performance beliefs are all obtained from SCOUT (lines 4-7, 8-15, 16-23). All three
nodes have a parameter “importance” that is set to “Low” (lines 6, 14, 22) since the
TcPlan is selected when a decision is of low importance. Accessibility belief and
performance belief are also calculated based on experience and reputation (lines 10-13,
18-21). The parameters “importance” and “evidenceType” are hints to the
getAggregateBelief method of BFS since any non-“aggregateBelief” parameter of
“AggregateBeliefQuery” is treated as hints. The tree constructed from this TcPlan is
graphically represented in Figure 61. As for “WS-SelectionTrust-High”, its difference
from “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” is that its “importance” parameter is set to “High”. Also,
recommendations are used in accessibility belief and performance belief calculation.
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <tcplan>
3
<nodeDefinition>
4
<node id="competenceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
5
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Competence</parameter>
6
<parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter>
7
</node>
8
<node id="accessibilityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
9
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Accessibility</parameter>
10
<parameters name="evidenceType" type="string">
11
<parameter>Experience</parameter>
12
<parameter>Reputation</parameter>
13
</parameters>
14
<parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter>
15
</node>
16
<node id="performanceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
17
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Performance</parameter>
18
<parameters name="evidenceType" type="string">
19
<parameter>Experience</parameter>
20
<parameter>Reputation</parameter>
21
</parameters>
22
<parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter>
23
</node>
24
<node id="avgAggregateBelief" class="AggregateBeliefWeightedAvg">
25
<parameters name="weights" type="double">
26
<parameter>0.5</parameter>
27
<parameter>0.5</parameter>
28
</parameters>
29
</node>
30
<node id="aggregateBelief" class="CausalAggregateBelief">
31
<parameter name="cause" type="string">
32
aBelief > 0 && reliability > 0.5
33
</parameter>
34
</node>
35
<node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/>
36
</nodeDefinition>
37
<trustCalculation>
38
<tree>
39
<cognitiveTrust>
40
<aggregateBelief>
41
<competenceBelief/>
42
<avgAggregateBelief>
43
<accessibilityBelief/>
44
<performanceBelief/>
45
</avgAggregateBelief>
46
</aggregateBelief>
47
</cognitiveTrust>
48
</tree>
49
</trustCalculation>
50 </tcplan>

Figure 60: TcPlan (Web Service Selection)
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Figure 61: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service Selection)
After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the
TcPlan. The consumer’s competence belief in a web service is obtained by calling the
getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



aggregate belief
o type = “Competence”



hints
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

The BF-Policy responsible for calculating competence belief in a web service is shown in
Figure 62. In the figure, importance is not considered in belief calculation. The aggregate
belief competence is calculated from qualification belief. Qualification belief is
calculated from qualification signals (implemented as certificates). The Belief Engine
identified as “SCOUT-Signal” is selected for belief calculation (line 5). “SCOUT-Signal”
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implements the belief formation algorithm described in Section 7.1.4. The configuration
of the Belief Engine (lines 6-7) is mapped to the algorithm as follows:


SignalCountWeight →



SignalThreshold →

The last step in the BF-Policy is to invoke the Belief Engine to perform belief calculation.
1 when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Competence" )
4
then
5
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Signal");
6
beliefEngine.set("SignalCountWeight", 0);
7
beliefEngine.set("SignalThreshold", 1);
8
9
beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Qualification"));
10 end

Figure 62: BF-Policy (Competence Belief)
To maximize belief reliability, if the number of signals available in the Evidence
Repository is less than the “SignalThreshold” in Figure 62 (i.e., if there are no signals),
the Belief Engine invokes the gatherEvidence method of EGS with the following input
parameters to gather more signals:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



belief
o type = “Qualification”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Signal”

The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of qualification signals of a web service is
shown in

Figure 63.

In the figure, the

Evidence Gatherer

identified as
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“QualificationGatherer” is invoked to perform qualification signals gathering (lines 6-7).
The gathered signals are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence Handler. The
mapped signals are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in belief calculation.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Qualification" )
Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Signal" )
then
gatherer = Registry.lookup("QualificationGatherer");
gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief);
end

Figure 63: EG-Policy (Qualification Belief)
Accessibility belief is obtained by calling the getAggregateBelief method of BFS
with the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



aggregate belief
o type = “Accessibility”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience, Reputation”
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

The BF-Policies needed for belief calculation are shown in Figure 64. In the figure, there
is a BF-Policy for low importance (lines 1-36) and a BF-Policy for high importance (lines
38-45). In the case of low importance, the aggregate belief accessibility is calculated as
the weighted average of the availability beliefs. Since the “EvidenceType” hint is set to
“Experience” and “Reputation”, “SCOUT-Experience” (lines 11-17) and “SCOUTReputation” (lines 27-33) are configured and invoked to calculate availability belief
based on experience and reputation. “SCOUT-Experience”, “SCOUT-Recommendation”
and “SCOUT-Reputation” implements the belief formation algorithm described in
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Section 7.1.1, Section 7.1.2 and Section 7.1.3. The availability beliefs are all assigned
different weights (lines 16, 24, 32). The calculated accessibility belief is returned to the
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance, the belief calculation is similar to that of
low importance. The difference is that the Belief Engines are configured differently. For
example, “RecommendationThreshold” (line 21) is set to 3 for low importance but it is
set to 6 for high importance. This is so that for high importance, more recommendations
are taken into account during availability belief formation.
In the case of experience, the gatherEvidence method of EGS is always invoked
to gather all of the consumer’s latest experiences. The input parameters are as follows:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



belief
o type = “Availability”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience”

The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of availability experiences of a web service
is shown in Figure 65 (lines 1-9). In the figure, the experiences are gathered using the
broadcast strategy. The gathered experiences are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the
Evidence Handler. The mapped experiences are stored in the Evidence Repository to be
used in belief calculation.
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16
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18
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Accessibility" )
hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" )
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" )
then
belief = new Belief("Availability");
evidenceTypes = hint.getValue();
aggBeliefCalculator = new WeightedAvg();
if (evidenceTypes.contains("Experience")) {
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Experience");
beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30);
…
expBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief);
aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.5, expBelief);
}
if (evidenceTypes.contains("Recommendation")) {
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Recommendation");
beliefEngine.set("RecommendationThreshold", 3);
…
recBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief);
aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.3, recBelief);
}
if (evidenceTypes.contains("Reputation")) {
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Reputation");
beliefEngine.set("FeedbackThreshold", 10);
…
repBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief);
aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.2, repBelief);
}
aggBeliefCalculator.calculateAggBelief();
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Accessibility" )
hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" )
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" )
then
…
end

Figure 64: BF-Policies (Accessibility Belief)
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when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Availability" )
hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" )
then
strategy = new BroadcastStrategy();
strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint.getValue());
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Availability" )
hint1: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" )
hint2: Hint( name == "NumOfEvidence" )
then
strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy();
strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint1.getValue());
strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", hint2.getValue());
strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0);
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
belief: Belief( type == "Availability" )
hint1: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Reputation" )
hint2: Hint( name == "NumOfEvidence" )
then
strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy();
strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint1.getValue());
strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", hint2.getValue());
strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0);
strategy.execute(trustee, belief);
end

Figure 65: EG-Policies (Availability Belief)
In the case of recommendation, the gatherEvidence method of EGS is invoked if
the number of recommendations available in the Evidence Repository is less than the
“RecommendationThreshold” in Figure 64. This is to maximize belief reliability. The
input parameters to the gatherEvidence method are as follows:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”
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belief
o type = “Availability”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Recommendation”
o name = “NumOfEvidence”, value = “3”

The hint “NumOfEvidence” is used to inform EGS of the number of recommendations to
be

gathered.

The

EG-Policy

responsible

for

the

gathering

of

availability

recommendations of a web service is shown in Figure 65 (lines 11-23). In the figure, the
recommendations are gathered using the evidence source trust strategy. The gathered
recommendations are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence Handler. The
mapped recommendations are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in belief
calculation. In the case of reputation, it is gathered using the same approach as that for
recommendation. Its EG-Policy is shown in Figure 65 (lines 25-37).
The evidence gathering and belief formation of performance belief uses the same
approach as that for accessibility belief. Basically, aggregate belief performance is
calculated as the weighted average of timeliness beliefs. The calculated performance
belief is returned to the Trust Calculator. After TcPlan execution, the calculated
computational trust is returned to DSN. The computational trust formation process is
graphically illustrated in Figure 66.

Figure 66: Computational Trust Formation (Web Service Selection)
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For each discovered web service, the utility to be gained from invoking the web
service is calculated as follows:
(

In equation (18),

(18)

)

is the utility that the web service consumer would

gain if the web service meets the consumer’s expectations. A consumer based its
expectation on the web service’s classification. For example, a consumer may have
higher expectation for an enterprise level web service than a consumer level web service.
The different expectations result in different utility gained from web service invocation.
If the consumer’s computational trust in web service

is calculated to be -1, then zero

utility would be gained from invoking the web service. If the computational trust is
calculated as 0, then the web service is expected to meet the consumer’s expectations.
Higher computational trust should lead to higher utility. After utility is calculated, the
next step is filter the candidate web services based on utility. This is by selecting all the
web services with

where

is a threshold

determined by the web service consumer.

10.2.1.2 Web Service Negotiation
After DSN has performed utility-based web service selection, the next step is for the
negotiation of contracts with the remaining web services. To determine the terms of
negotiation, computational trust needs to be calculated. The Trust Calculator is
reconfigured by calling the setApplicationFactors method with the following input
parameters:


application factors
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “WebServiceNegotiation”

The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational
trust for web service negotiation. To calculate computational trust in a web service, the
calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator is invoked with the following parameters:
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trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



decision factors
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke the TcPlanner.
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 67 to select the TcPlan needed
for computational trust calculation. Figure 59 and Figure 67 together forms the factorsTcPlan mappings for DSN. In the figure, there are two possible TcPlans. There is a
TcPlan for “Importance” is “Low” and another for “Importance” is “High”. In the case of
low importance (lines 3-12), the TcPlan “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” is returned to the
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance (lines 13-22), the TcPlan “WSNegotiationTrust-High” is returned to the Trust Calculator.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <mappings>
3
…
4
<mapping>
5
<factors>
6
<factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceNegotiation</factor>
7
<factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor>
8
<factor name="Importance">Low</factor>
9
</factors>
10
<tcplan><name>WS-NegotiationTrust-Low</name></tcplan>
11
</mapping>
12
<mapping>
13
<factors>
14
<factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceNegotiation</factor>
15
<factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor>
16
<factor name="Importance">High</factor>
17
</factors>
18
<tcplan><name> WS-NegotiationTrust-High</name></tcplan>
19
</mapping>
20 </mappings>

Figure 67: Factors-TcPlan Mappings (Web Service Negotiation)
The “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” TcPlan is shown in Figure 68. In the figure,
computational trust is based solely on the calculated cognitive trust. Cognitive trust is
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calculated from the web service consumer’s dependability belief. Dependability belief is
calculated from experience and reputation. The tree constructed from this TcPlan is
graphically represented in Figure 69. Unlike web service selection, weighted average is
applied to aggregate beliefs (line 25) at the Trust Calculator as oppose to at the BFS. This
is just to illustrate a different way that aggregate belief can be calculated. The approach in
this section allows the application to determine the weight on experience-based aggregate
belief and reputation-based aggregate belief. In web service selection, the determination
is left up to the web service consumer. Both approaches are equally viable and are
supported by the computational trust architecture. As for “WS-NegotiationTrust-High”,
its difference from “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” is that its “importance” parameter is set
to “High”. Also, recommendations are used in dependability belief calculation.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <tcplan>
3
<nodeDefinition>
4
<node id="expBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
5
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Dependability</parameter>
6
<parameter name="evidenceType" type="string">Experience</parameter>
7
<parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter>
8
</node>
9
<node id="repBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery">
10
<parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Dependability</parameter>
11
<parameter name="evidenceType" type="string">Reputation</parameter>
12
<parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter>
13
</node>
14
<node id="dependabilityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefWeightedAvg">
15
<parameters name="weights" type="double">
16
<parameter>0.7</parameter>
17
<parameter>0.3</parameter>
18
</parameters>
19
</node>
20
<node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/>
21
</nodeDefinition>
22
<trustCalculation>
23
<tree>
24
<cognitiveTrust>
25
<dependabilityBelief><expBelief/><repBelief/></dependabilityBelief>
26
</cognitiveTrust>
27
</tree>
28
</trustCalculation>
29 </tcplan>

Figure 68: TcPlan (Web Service Negotiation)
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Figure 69: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service Negotiation)
After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the
TcPlan. The web service consumer’s dependability belief in a web service based on
experience is obtained by calling the getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the
following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



aggregate belief
o type = “Dependability”



hints
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience”
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

The BF-Polices responsible for calculating dependability beliefs in a web service are
shown in Figure 70. There needs to be BF-Policies for belief formation based on
experience (lines 1-20), recommendation (lines 22-38) and reputation (not shown due to
space limitation). For each evidence type, there is a BF-Policy for low importance (lines
1-11, 22-29) and a BF-Policy for high importance (lines 13-20, 31-38). The aggregate
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belief dependability is calculated from compliance belief. The formation of compliance
belief from experience, recommendation and reputation is based on the Belief Engines
“SCOUT-Experience”,

“SCOUT-Recommendation”

and

“SCOUT-Reputation”.

Basically, the belief formation is similar to the case with web service selection except
with different evidence.
1 when
2
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
3
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" )
4
Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" )
5
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" )
6
then
7
beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Experience");
8
beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30);
9
…
10
beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Compliance"));
11 end
12
13 when
14
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
15
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" )
16
Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" )
17
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" )
18 then
19
…
20 end
21
22 when
23
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
24
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" )
25
Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" )
26
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" )
27 then
28
…
29 end
30
31 when
32
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
33
aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" )
34
Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" )
35
Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" )
36 then
37
…
38 end
39
40 …

Figure 70: BF-Policies (Dependability Belief)
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As for evidence gathering, the approach taken is similar to that of web service
selection. The deployed EG-Policies are similar to those listed in Figure 65 except for the
different evidence that is being gathered.
By obtaining experience-based dependability belief and reputation-based
dependability belief from SCOUT, computational trust can now be calculated. After
TcPlan execution, the calculated computational trust is returned to DSN. The
computational trust formation process is graphically illustrated in Figure 71.
Computational trust could help determine the penalties to be demanded for contract
violation. Basically, the lower the calculated computational trust, the higher should be the
penalties as the web service is believed to be undependability. The actual steps for
contract negotiation are outside the scope of this thesis. Of all the web services where
contract negotiation ends up being successful, DSN would select the web service with the
highest utility to be returned to the application.

Figure 71: Computational Trust Formation (Web Service Negotiation)

10.2.1.3 Web Service Management
A web service management web service (WSM) has been implemented. An application
could invoke the startManagement method of WSM to manage a web service. The
method has as input two parameters: web service and web service importance. An
example invocation could have the following input parameters:


web service
o id = “www.webservice.com”
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o type = “WebService/Type1”


web service importance = “Low”

Information about the web service is obtained from DSN. The return value of
startManagement is a unique identifier: managementId. The managementId identifier is
used in the endManagement method to end an existing web service management.
Upon invocation of startManagement, WSM would instantiate a management
agent (mAgent) to manage the provided web service. The management policies to be
deployed into the mAgent can be selected by taking computational trust into account. For
example, computational trust can be calculated using the TcPlan of Figure 68. For web
services with low computational trust, management policies can be used to keep the web
service consumer inform of changes to the provided QoS. These management policies are
not needed in cases when the web service is computationally trusted.
Computational trust can also be used within a management policy. An example is
shown in Figure 72. In the figure, whenever there is an SLA violation, computational
trust would be calculated (lines 1-6). An email is sent if computational trust has fallen
below zero (lines 8-12). Upon invocation of the endManagement method, the WSM
would look up the corresponding mAgent, stop its execution and destroy the mAgent.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

when
Violation( )
then
trust = trustCalculator.calculateTrust(trustee);
insert(new Trust(trustee, trust));
end
when
trust: Trust( value < 0 )
then
email("chyew@csd.uwo.ca", "Computational Trust < 0");
end

Figure 72: Web Service Management Policies
With the end of web service invocation, the last step is for the application to
request feedbacks from the web service consumer with regards to the invoked web
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service. The application would request feedbacks concerning a web service’s
competence, accessibility, performance and dependability. A consumer could choose to
provide feedback to only some of the aggregate beliefs. The obtained feedbacks are
mapped to the interval of [-1, 1]. Next, the provideFeedback method of BFS is invoked.
An example invocation could have the following input parameters:


trustee
o id = “www.webservice.com”
o type = “WebService/Type1”



aggregate belief feedbacks
o type = “Accessibility”, timestamp = “2010-10-06 15:10:00”, feedback = 0
o type = “Performance”, timestamp = “2010-10-06 15:10:00”, feedback = 0



hints
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low”

The AF-Policies responsible for mapping aggregate belief feedbacks to belief feedbacks
are shown in Figure 73. In the figure, importance is not considered since the aggregate
belief to belief mappings are the same irrespective of importance. In the case of feedback
to aggregate belief performance, this would trigger the policy at lines 21-29. The
feedback to performance belief is mapped to feedback to timeliness belief (lines 25-27)
with timeliness belief being assigned the timestamp and feedback of performance belief.
After mapping, the provideFeedback method of EGS is invoked (line 28) with the
timeliness belief feedback.
The EA-Policy responsible for evidence source assessment is shown in Figure 74.
In the figure, the Evidence Source Assessor identified as “SCOUT-Assessor” is selected
to calculate evidence source trust (line 5). “SCOUT-Assessor” implements the evidence
source assessment algorithm described in Section 7.2. It is responsible for all the belief
feedbacks to web service of type one and for all the gathered evidence types. The
assessor is configured (lines 6-7) and finally invoked (line 8) to calculate evidence source
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trust in recommenders, reputation systems and signal providers. The same approach is
also taken for feedback to aggregate belief accessibility.
1
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7
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14
15
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17
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34
35
36
37
38
39

when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Competence" )
then
feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Qualification",
aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),
aggFeedback.getFeedback());
EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Accessibility" )
then
feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Availability",
aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),
aggFeedback.getFeedback());
EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Performance" )
then
feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Timeliness",
aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),
aggFeedback.getFeedback());
EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]);
end
when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Dependability" )
then
feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Compliance",
aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),
aggFeedback.getFeedback());
EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]);
end

Figure 73: AF-Policies (Web Service)
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when
trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" )
feedback: BeliefFeedback( )
then
assessor = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Assessor");
assessor.set("EvidenceWindow", 60);
…
assessor.assessEvidenceource(trustee, feedback);
end

Figure 74: EA-Policy (Web Service)

10.2.2

Implementation

A graphical illustration of DSN is shown in Figure 75. In the figure, DSN consists of
three different types of plug-ins. The WS-Discoverer plug-in is responsible for web
service discovery. An example of which can be used for discovering the web services
stored in a WSO2 Governance Registry [138]. A WS-Selector plug-in is responsible for
web service selection. An example plug-in could implement the algorithm described in
Section 10.2.1.1. A WS-Negotiator plug-in is responsible for web service negotiation. A
stub plug-in is currently used as a substitute for web service negotiation. The plug-ins are
all registered with a registry. The DSN Manager uses the registry to discover the
available plug-ins. It employs policies to coordinate the invocation of different plug-ins.
The policies are deployed to the Drools rule engine [37] within the DSN Manager.
A graphical illustration of WSM is shown in Figure 76. In the figure, the WSM
Manager is responsible for the selection of management policies. It is also responsible for
the instantiation and destruction of mAgents. Each mAgent has its own Drools rule
engine to process management policies. A mAgent may interact with the Monitoring
Service to setup the monitoring of a web service. The Monitoring Service is implemented
as a stub that provides events that trigger the management policies.
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Figure 75: Web Service Discovery, Selection and Negotiation Web Service

Figure 76: Web Service Management Web Service

10.3 Summary
Two scenarios are presented in this chapter. The scenarios are used to demonstrate how
computational trust can be calculated with the support of the computational trust
architecture. The first scenario is a movie selection scenario where computational trust is
calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust. The second scenario is a web service
scenario where computational trust is calculated from cognitive trust. The calculated
computational trust is used in web service selection, negotiation and management.

161

Chapter 11

11 Evaluation
The focus of this chapter is on evaluating the design of the computational trust
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section covers the
evaluation of SCOUT. The second section covers the evaluation of the Trust Calculator.

11.1 Evaluation of SCOUT
SCOUT is evaluated from three different perspectives. The first perspective examines
SCOUT through its evolution. The second perspective examines how SCOUT supports
the computational trust properties. The last perspective examines how SCOUT addresses
the challenges to computational trust.

11.1.1

Evolution

The design of SCOUT has gone through numerous revisions. Initially, SCOUT consisted
of numerous Trust Manager plug-ins. Each Trust Manager is responsible for its own
evidence gathering and trust calculation. For example, there is a Trust Manager for
calculating trust based on experiences and a Trust Manager for calculating trust based on
recommendations. As trust is subjective, each trustor is responsible for deploying its own
Trust Managers. The weakness of this design is that evidence gathering and trust
calculation are tightly coupled. As a result, a new Trust Manager has to be created for
each evidence discovery and gathering protocol and trust formation algorithm
combination. The design does not encourage code reuse. Moreover, it also introduces
numerous challenges to SCOUT’s maintenance.
To address the coupling weakness, SCOUT was redesigned with Evidence
Gatherers responsible for evidence gathering and Trust Managers responsible for trust
calculation. With this more modular design, evidence gathering and trust formation are
now able to evolve independently of each other though a weakness still remains in that
there is no research that backs up the trust calculation. As a result, the cognitive trust
view from social psychology has been adopted. In cognitive trust formation, cognitive
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trust is calculated from beliefs and beliefs calculated from evidence. SCOUT in turn was
redesigned to be responsible for belief calculation and evidence gathering. As for
cognitive trust calculation, it is the responsibility of the applications. Basically, SCOUT
is a web service that provides beliefs to the applications.
A weakness of encapsulating both evidence gathering and belief calculation in a
web service is that evidence gathering is not accessible to the applications. Some
applications may already support cognitive trust calculation and could leverage SCOUT
for more evidence. To address this weakness, the SCOUT service was redesigned into
two services: the Evidence Gathering Service (EGS) and Belief Formation Service (BFS).
Later, the Emotional Trust Service (ETS) is added to SCOUT to account for trust
calculation that is not evidence-based. This three service design is the design discussed in
Chapter 4 and graphically illustrated in Figure 10 of Section 0.
As for the adaptation of the SCOUT services to changing computational trust
formation needs, initially the different factors (Section 4.1.6) were implemented as input
parameters that can be configured by the trustor. A weakness of this approach is that
there are many factors. Moreover, different trustors may have different views on when
adaptation is needed along with how adaptation should proceed. The result is a system
that is complex and challenging to configure. With the adoption of policies however, the
entire process can be simplified. All the factors that SCOUT may be interested in are
passed in as hints. The hints are then used in policies for web service adaptation.
Basically, the trustor could start out with simple policies. If the policies are not adequate,
more advanced policies could be created. Adding, updating and removing policies as the
need arises allows for adaptation without having to sacrifice ease of use.

11.1.2

Computational Trust Properties

SCOUT is designed with the computational trust properties listed in Section 1.2.3 in
mind. SCOUT supports computational trust that is quantifiable, comparable, subjective,
multidimensional and dynamic. As for computational trust being reflexive, nonsymmetrical and non-transitive, these are properties that SCOUT supports through the
plug-ins. Example algorithms that have these properties are discussed in Chapter 7.

163

11.1.3

Computational Trust Challenges

The challenges to computational trust are discussed in Section 1.4. The role that SCOUT
plays in addressing these challenges is as follows:


Lack of standards for discovering and accessing evidence. To address this
challenge, EGS has adopted a plug-in approach to evidence gathering. This allows
EGS to be extended with new evidence discovery and gathering protocols. As
EGS is a middleware service, any changes to evidence gathering (e.g. changes to
EG-Policies or Evidence Gatherers) is transparent to the trustor’s applications and
BFS. Basically, developers no longer have to support a variety of evidence
discovery and gathering protocols. This also cuts down on the amount of code
duplication due to the implementation of the same protocols.



Lack of standards for representing evidence. To address this challenge, EGS has
adopted a plug-in approach to handle the variety of evidence representations. This
allows EGS to be extended to support new evidence representations. The different
evidence representations are all mapped to a standard representation. With only a
single

evidence

representation,

this

simplifies

evidence

interpretation.

Applications and BFS no longer have to account for the different evidence
representations. This also cuts down on the amount of code duplication.


Evidence Filtering. To address this challenge, EGS has adopted the trust-based
approach to evidence filtering. The Evidence Source Assessors are implemented
as plug-ins. This allows EGS to be extended to support new evidence source
assessment algorithms. By moving evidence filtering from the application end to
the middleware end, this allows evidence filtering to be conducted transparently
during evidence gathering.



Computational Trust is subjective and multidimensional. To address this
challenge,

the

SCOUT

services

need

to

support

subjectivity

and

multidimensionality. Subjectivity is supported through the deployed policies: EGPolicies, BF-Policies and ET-Policies. The policies allow the trustor to
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subjectively influence evidence gathering, belief formation and emotional trust
formation. Multidimensionality is supported through policies and aggregate
beliefs. Cognitive trust can be calculated from different combinations of
aggregate beliefs. The formation of aggregate beliefs could be influenced by the
deployed policies.

11.2 Evaluation of Trust Calculator
The Trust Calculator is evaluated from three different perspectives. The first perspective
examines the Trust Calculator through its evolution. The second perspective examines
how the Trust Calculator supports the computational trust properties. The last perspective
examines how the Trust Calculator addresses the challenges to computational trust.

11.2.1

Evolution

The Trust Calculator was originally a component of SCOUT. It was responsible for
aggregating the trusts calculated by the different Trust Managers to form trust in the
trustee. As there are many different ways for trust to be calculated, it is the responsibility
of the application to describe its trust calculation needs to the Trust Calculator. The
description is expressed as a Trust Coordination Plan. An example plan is shown in
Figure 77. In the figure, the Trust Calculator first loads and names all of the components
needed

for

trust

calculation

(lines

1-5).

For

example,

the

class

“ExperienceManagerProxy” is loaded and given the name “ExpManager”. Next, the
Experience Manager is invoked to calculate trust based on compliance experiences (line
7). The Recommendation Manager is then invoked to calculate trust based on compliance
recommendations (line 8). The calculated trusts are then aggregated using the weighted
average function (line 10). The last step in the Trust Coordination Plan is for the
calculated trust to be returned to the requesting application (line 11).
There are a number of weaknesses to the SCOUT based Trust Calculator. These
weaknesses have been addressed in the Trust Calculator introduced in Chapter 6. For
example, the language for describing trust calculation has been simplified. Instead of a
language that uses dollar sign ($) to denote variables, an at sign (@) to denote
information that needs to be filled in and square brackets ([ ]) for list creation, trust
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calculation is structured as a tree that is described in XML. This in turn simplifies the
specification of computational trust formation. Moreover, instead of calculating trust
from other calculated trusts in an ad hoc manner, computational trust formation has a
solid socio-psychological underpinning and is based on cognitive trust and emotional
trust. The final major change is the move of the Trust Calculator from middleware end to
the application end. This is to capture the fact that although the applications share the
same emotional trust and beliefs in a trustee, computational trust formation is still
adaptable to each application’s decision making needs.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

load {
ExpManager: "ExperienceManagerProxy";
RecManager: "RecommendationManagerProxy";
Math: "AggregationAlgorithms";
}
{
$expTrust = ExpManager.calculateTrust("@Provider", "Compliance");
$recTrust = RecManager.calculateTrust(“@Provider”, "Compliance");
$trust = Math.weightedAvg([$expTrust, $recTrust]);
return $trust;
}

Figure 77: Trust Coordination Plan

11.2.2

Computational Trust Properties

The Trust Calculator is designed with the computational trust properties listed in Section
1.2.3 in mind. The Trust Calculator supports computational trust that is quantifiable,
comparable, subjective, multidimensional and dynamic. As for computational trust being
reflexive, non-symmetrical and non-transitive, these are properties that are supported
through the computational trust formation algorithms (i.e., nodes).

11.2.3

Computational Trust Challenges

The Trust Calculator addresses the challenge of computational trust being subjective and
multidimensional. The Trust Calculator supports TcTemplates that allows subjective
information concerning computational trust formation to be filled in by the trustor. As for
multidimensionality, this is supported through the Trust Calculation Planner that maps
the different factors that influence computational trust formation to TcPlans.
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11.3 Summary
The computational trust architecture proposed in Chapter 4 is evaluated in this chapter.
The evaluation is conducted from three different perspectives. The first perspective
focuses on the evolution of the proposed architecture. The second perspective examines
the architecture in terms of its support of the computational trust properties. The final
perspective addresses how the proposed architecture meets the computational trust
challenges.
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Chapter 12

12 Conclusions and Future Directions
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the contributions of the
thesis are summarized. In the second section, the focus is on possible future directions
that the computational trust research could take.

12.1 Conclusions
Trust has been shown to play an important role in everyday decision making. In [84],
Marsh showed that trust can also be applied to decision making in computing. In this
thesis, a trust model known as computational trust is introduced. The model is based on
the work of Lewis and Weigert [75]. The computational trust model calls for the
formation of computational trust from cognitive trust and emotional trust. Cognitive trust
is formed from the trustor’s beliefs in a trustee. Belief can be calculated based on the
available evidence. This thesis has identified eight different types of aggregate beliefs
and four different types of evidence. As for emotional trust, it is based on recognition of
the trustee.
The implementation of the computational trust model can be challenging. Four
different challenges have been identified. The challenges are the lack of standards for
discovering and accessing evidence, the lack of standards for representing evidence,
evidence filtering and computational trust being subjective and multidimensional. To
address these challenges, a computational trust architecture is proposed. The architecture
consists of a SCOUT middleware, Evidence Repository and Trust Calculators. The
SCOUT middleware can be thought of as the personification of the trustor. It provides
information about the trustor that is shared by all of the trustor’s applications. As for the
Evidence Repository, it is a storage for all of the available evidence concerning the
trustees. The Trust Calculator is associated with an application. It is responsible for the
formation computational trust that meets the decision making needs of the application.
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SCOUT consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief
Formation Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for
evidence gathering. The gathered evidence are normalized before being stored in the
Evidence Repository. The evidence stored in the repository are accessible to all of the
trustor’s applications. EGS also calculates evidence source trust for evidence filtering. By
taking into account the trustor’s feedbacks, EGS could learn to avoid evidence from
untrusted or distrusted evidence sources. As for BFS, it is responsible for belief
formation. The evidence needed for belief formation can be retrieved from the Evidence
Repository. If there are not enough evidence, BFS could contact EGS for evidence
gathering. As for ETS, it is responsible for emotional trust formation. Emotional trust is
determined by the trustee’s position in a hierarchy.
A Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust formation. The
aggregate beliefs and emotional trusts needed for computational trust formation can be
obtained from the SCOUT middleware. A TcPlan can be created to describe the
formation of computational trust. A TcPlan is written in XML. It is structured as a tree
with tree nodes representing operations on aggregate beliefs and trusts. The TcPlanner of
the Trust Calculator is responsible for mapping the factors that could influence
computational trust formation to a TcPlan. If the TcPlan has information missing, it is
known as a TcTemplate. The TcTemplate needs to be parameterized before being used in
computational trust formation. The TcEngine of the Trust Calculator is responsible for
the instantiation and execution of the selected TcPlan. The calculated computational trust
is then returned to the application.
The proposed computational trust architecture has been implemented. Algorithms
have also been developed for belief formation and evidence source assessment.
Experiments have also been conducted to demonstrate the importance of evidence source
availability and how different algorithms impact the performance of computational trust.
The computational trust architecture has been evaluated. Finally, a movie scenario and a
web service scenario are presented. The scenarios are used to demonstrate how the
computational trust architecture can support computational trust formation. In conclusion,
this thesis has introduced a middleware approach to computational trust formation. The
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approach should help address the challenges of implementing a computational trust
model.

12.2 Future Work
There are a number of areas in the proposed architecture that can be improved with more
work. The areas include:


Evidence filtering. There are many different ways to perform evidence filtering.
The computational trust architecture currently only supports the formation of
evidence source trust from feedbacks. Other evidence filtering approaches may
include the use of recommendations, reputations and signals to calculate evidence
source trust. Works such as [125] and [141] layer multiple evidence filtering
approaches together to perform evidence filtering. These alternative approaches
should be supported in the computational trust architecture.



Privacy. As pointed out in Section 2.3, privacy should be taken into account
during evidence gathering and distribution. How a trustor’s privacy concerns
should be expressed and integrated into SCOUT is an area open to future work.



SCOUT policies. A policy-based approach has been adopted to deal with
computational trust being subjective and multidimensional. One weakness of the
policy-based approach is that the specification of policies could still be too
challenging for a trustor. A possible solution is to have default policies for
different trustee types. For example, there would be default policies for movies
and different types of web services. These policies can be downloaded and
deployed to satisfy common decision making needs. Tools could also be made
available to help in the editing of SCOUT policies. This is an area that requires
more investigation and may involve other research areas such as human-computer
interaction.



Multidimensionality of trust. Trust in one dimension can influence trust in a
different dimension. For example, cognitive or emotional trust in a movie could
be influenced by cognitive or emotional trust in the movie’s director and actors.
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The relationship between dimensions is currently not explicitly represented in the
proposed architecture. Whether support is needed for representing the
relationships is an area that requires further exploration.


Emotional trust. Currently, emotional trust policies are created by the trustor.
More investigations should be conducted on whether it is possible to automate
some of the emotional trust assignments. This could involve access to the trustor’s
social graph or the adoption of research in areas such as context-awareness and
emotional recognition.



Conceptual model. In Lewis and Weigert’s conceptual model, cognitive,
emotional and behavior trust all influence each other. The influences have been
simplified in the computational trust architecture. It would be interesting to
investigate whether some of the simplifications can be removed to create a more
realistic computational trust model.



TcPlan. A GUI editor could be created to simplify TcPlan creation. Instead of
passing XML to the TcEngine for parsing, future work could include TcPlan
compilation to ensure faster computational trust calculation.



Middleware management. The trustor is currently tasked with the management of
the middleware (e.g. configuration the middleware or deploying policies to the
middleware). The development of an agent that stands as a representative of the
trustor in middleware management is an area that requires further investigation.



Experiments. More experiments should be conducted to better understand
computational trust formation. Specifically, the assumptions made in Chapter 9
should be removed to create more realistic experiments. Metrics such as
computational cost and storage cost of the proposed algorithms should also be
measured. The societal benefit of using computational trust is another metric
worth exploring. Finally, experts in other disciplines such as psychologists and
sociologists may need to be consulted to determine the best way to validate
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emotional trust, to capture a trustor’s subjective views and to compare
computational trust with the human notion of trust.


Evaluation. To gain more insight into decision making based on computational
trust, the computational trust architecture could be evaluated using more
scenarios. Example scenarios may include access control and crowdsourcing.
Applicability to more scenarios could help demonstrate the genericity of the
proposed architecture.



Integration. For computational trust to be widely used, it should be integrated into
the trustor’s everyday workflow. More research needs to be done to examine how
the proposed architecture can be integrated into either a business or consumer
oriented workflow.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Syntax of SCOUT Policies
The syntax for SCOUT policies is shown in Table 23. Everything in bold is a language
keyword. Everything in bold-italic is automatically inserted by the architecture.
Everything in italics can be set by the policy author. Square brackets ([ ]) are used to
indicate optional elements while braces ({ }) are used to indicate zero or more elements.
As an example, consider EG-Policy, the computational trust architecture
automatically inserted the package and import statements to ensure that the policies are
placed in the right package and that basic classes are available to the policy author.
Although neglected in the discussion in the thesis, each policy should be assigned a
policy name. Optionally, a priority could be assigned to a policy. The default salience is
set to zero if no priority is assigned. The conditional part (i.e., when part) of EG-Policy
must consist of at least Trustee and Belief. Hint however is optional. It is possible for
there to be one or more Hint. Finally, RHS consists of actions to be taken if a policy is
triggered. Any legal Java statement is acceptable though in some cases libraries may need
to be imported. The same interpretation also applies to EA-Policy, BF-Policy, AF-Policy
and ET-Policy.
Table 23: Syntax of SCOUT Policies
SCOUT Policies

Syntax

Evidence Gathering Policy
(EG-Policy)

package ca.uwo.evidence.egPolicies
import ca.uwo.evidence.*
policy policyName
[ salience priority ]
when
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression )
belief-ref: Belief( expression )
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) }
then
RHS
end
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Evidence Source Assessment Policy
(EA-Policy)

package ca.uwo.evidence.eaPolicies
import ca.uwo.evidence.*

Belief Formation Policy
(BF-Policy)

policy policyName
[ salience priority ]
when
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression )
feedback-ref: BeliefFeedback(expression )
then
RHS
end
package ca.uwo.belief.bfPolicies
import ca.uwo.belief.*
policy policyName
[ salience priority ]
when
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression )
aggBelief-ref: AggregateBelief( expression )
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) }
then
RHS
end

Aggregate Belief Feedback Policy
(AF-Policy)

package ca.uwo.belief.afPolicies
import ca.uwo.belief.*

Emotional Trust Policy
(ET-Policy)

policy policyName
[ salience priority ]
when
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression )
aggFeedback-ref: AggregateBeliefFeedback( expression )
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) }
then
RHS
end
package ca.uwo.trust.etPolicies
import ca.uwo.trust.*
policy policyName
[ salience priority ]
when
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression )
then
RHS
end
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Appendix B: Syntax of Subscription Filters
There are two types of filters that can be installed in the Subscription Manager: aggregate
belief filter and emotional trust filter. An aggregate belief filter can be used to filter the
aggregate belief calculated by Belief Formation Service. The syntax for specifying an
aggregate belief filter is shown in Figure 78. When evaluated, an aggregate belief filter
should return a Boolean value of “True” or “False”. If “True”, the calculated aggregate
belief is returned to the subscriber. Otherwise, the calculated aggregate belief is filtered
out. In terms of functions, any function in Java that does not require “import” can be used
in an aggregate belief filter. The same also applies to emotional trust filter. Its syntax is
shown in Figure 79.
1
2
3
4
5

filter:
condition (("&&" | "||") condition)*
condition: expression | expression operator expression
expression: function(expression) | "aggBelief.belief" | "aggBelief.reliability" |
"lastAggBelief.belief" | "lastAggBelief.reliability" | integer | double | boolean
operator: ">" | ">=" | "<" | "<=" | "==" | "!="

Figure 78: Syntax of Aggregate Belief Filter
1
2
3
4
5

filter:
condition (("&&" | "||") condition)*
condition: expression | expression operator expression
expression: function(expression) | "emoTrust" | "lastEmoTrust" | integer | double |
boolean
operator: ">" | ">=" | "<" | "<=" | "==" | "!="

Figure 79: Syntax of Emotional Trust Filter
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